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Introduction 
As of 2016, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) 
counted about 65.6 million individuals globally who had been forcibly 
displaced.1 Refugees and asylum-seekers accounted for 25.3 million of 
this total.2 Syria continues to be the major source of both refugees and 
asylum-seekers worldwide.3 While Turkey, Pakistan, and other devel-
oping nations hosted the largest numbers of refugees,4 Germany was the 
 
1. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 
2016, 5 (June 19, 2017), http://www.unhcr.org/5943e8a34.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/84N7-MRY7]. 
2. Id. at 13, 39. While refugees are those accorded protections under the 
international definition of refugee discussed below, asylum seekers are 
“people who are seeking international protection but whose refugee status is 
yet to be determined.” Id. at 39. The largest contingent of forcibly displaced 
persons consists of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Id. at 35 (estimating 
that there were 40.3 million IDPs globally at the end of 2016, including 5.5 
million new IDPs). Colombia, Syria, and Iraq accommodated the highest 
number of IDPs, totaling about 17.3 million. Id. at 36. 
3. Id. at 16, 42. 
4. Id. at 14. Notably, Lebanon and Jordan were the countries with the highest 
refugee-inhabitant ratio in 2016. Id. at 20 (noting that there were “169 
refugees for every 1,000 Lebanese” at that time). In the same year, South 
Sudan was the country with the highest number of refugees per one million 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 3·2018 
Testing Religion 
977 
largest recipient of new asylum applications in 2015 and 2016, followed 
by the U.S.5 
Just over fifty years ago, on January 31, 1967, an important inter-
national document was signed that was meant to address the number 
of international refugees—the Protocol to the 1951 Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees.6 While the U.S. did not ratify the Conven-
tion,7 it acceded to the Protocol in 1968.8 Over a decade later, Congress 
passed the Refugee Act of 1980 as an amendment to the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (“INA”) of 1952. 9  This amendment not only 
 
U.S. dollars Gross Domestic Product. Id. at 21 (noting that the refugee 
burden “was greatest among the world’s poorest countries”). 
5. Id. at 39–40. 
6. For the 1951 document, see Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) 
[hereinafter Convention]. For the 1967 document, see Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force 
Oct. 4, 1967) [hereinafter Protocol]. On earlier twentieth-century attempts 
to deal with refugees on an international level, see Claudena M. Skran, 
Historical Development of International Refugee Law, in The 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 1967 
Protocol: A Commentary 3 (Andreas Zimmermann ed., 2011) 
[hereinafter The 1951 Convention]. For a brief overview of the roots of 
asylum law in early modern authors on international law, see Terje Einarsen, 
Drafting History of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, in The 1951 
Convention, supra, at 37, 41–42 (discussing, among others, the approaches 
of Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, and Christian Wolff). Hannah Arendt 
placed the fruitless attempts to deal with the issue of statelessness and 
minorities in Europe after World War I in context of the contemporaneous 
demise of the nation state and the concurrent rise of totalitarianism. 
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 269–90 (new ed. 
1966). 
7. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, United Nations 
Treaty Collection ch. V.2, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/ 
MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20V/V-2.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CFD-
FVEU] (last visited Mar. 4, 2018). One explanation that the U.S. Department 
of State gave as to why the U.S. did not sign the Convention it helped to 
negotiate was that “all migrants to the United States already received the 
benefits sought by the convention.” Shirley V. Scott, International 
Law, US Power 175 (2012). 
8. Protocol, supra note 6; see Multilateral Treaties in Respect of 
Which the Secretary-General Performs Depositary Functions: 
List of Signatures, Ratifications, Accessions, etc. as at 31 
December 1968, at 96, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.D/2, U.N. Sales No. 
E.96.V.5 (1969). 
9. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 
Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2012)); 
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2012)). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 3·2018 
Testing Religion 
978 
adopted a definition of refugee “virtually identical” to the one set forth 
in the Convention and slightly modified by the Protocol,10 but also 
made this definition the foundation of current U.S. asylum law.11 
Former West Germany ratified the Convention in 195312 and joined 
the Protocol in 1969.13 Former East Germany acceded to both the Con-
vention and the Protocol in 1990.14 Following the formation of the EU, 
Germany’s refugee policy became subordinate to EU directives that are 
based on the international definition of a refugee.15 Accordingly, current 
 
10. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 437 (1987). 
11. Refugee Act of 1980 § 208 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) 
(2012)). The relevant definitional section is id. § 201(a) (codified as amended 
at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012)). 
12. Gesetz betreffend das Abkommen vom 28. Juli 1951 über die Rechtsstellung 
der Flüchtlinge [Law on the Convention of July 28, 1951 on the Legal Status 
of Refugees], Sept. 1, 1953, BGBl II at 559. 
13. Bekanntmachung über das Inkrafttreten des Protokolls über die 
Rechtsstellung der Flüchtlinge [Notice of Entry into Force of the Protocol 
on the Legal Status of Refugees], Apr. 14, 1970, BGBl II at 194. 
14. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: 
Status as at 31 December 1990, at 211 n.2, 227 n.4, U.N. Doc. 
ST/LEG/SER.E/9, U.N. Sales No. E.91.V.8 (1991). 
15. By one of its constitutional treaties, the EU is charged with framing “a 
common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control” for the 
EU member states. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 
67(2), 2016 O.J. (C 202) 1, 73. The EU is committed to formulating this 
policy according to the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol. Id. art. 78(1). 
Two EU documents in particular are pertinent: The first is the Qualification 
Directive 2011/95 adopted in December 2011. 2011 O.J. (L 337) 9 (EU) 
[hereinafter 2011 Qualification Directive]. This regulation recast the earlier 
directive 2004/83, 2004 O.J. (L 304) 12 (EC). 2011 Qualification Directive, 
at 9. The second is the Asylum Procedures Directive 2013/32 that was 
adopted in June 2013 to prescribe further details about the EU-wide 
procedures for granting and withdrawing the two types of international 
protection recognized by the EU. 2013 O.J. (L 180) 60 (EU) [hereinafter 
2013 Procedures Directive]. This regulation recasts the earlier directive 
2005/85, 2005 O.J. (L 326) 13 (EC). 2013 Procedures Directive, at 60. See 
also Kay Hailbronner, Asyl- und Ausländerrecht 13–14 (4th ed. 
2017) (discussing the interaction between EU and German asylum law); 
Andreas Heusch et al., Das neue Asylrecht 3–5 (2016) (outlining the 
impact of EU law on current German asylum legislation). For a more 
detailed discussion of EU asylum law, see Anja Klug, Regional 
Developments: Europe, in The 1951 Convention, supra note 6, at 117, 
127–37. For a critique of EU asylum law, see James C. Hathaway, E.U. 
Accountability to International Law: The Case of Asylum, 33 Mich. J. Int’l 
L. 1 (2011). 
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German law makes this definition the cornerstone of its approach to 
refugee claims.16 
The U.S. asylum system and the German refugee system are too 
vast to compare in their totality within the space available in this Note. 
Therefore, this Note will focus on basic elements of establishing an 
asylum or refugee claim that are derived from the shared international 
definition of refugee. To provide concrete examples of how these ele-
ments are interpreted and applied in practice, this Note will consider 
the fate of Iranians seeking religious asylum in the U.S. and Germany, 
especially those who became refugees by conversion to Christianity after 
leaving their home country.17 
While Iran is not at the epicenter of the current refugee crisis, it is 
a country that has come to occupy a place in U.S. foreign policy that 
is quite different from the place it occupies in German foreign policy. 
Additionally, over the years, Iran has provided a steady stream of appli-
cants who seek religious asylum both in the U.S. and Germany. Finally, 
while religious asylum claims have generated relatively little litigation 
in the U.S., 18  they have recently generated renewed attention in 
Germany due to an unprecedented wave of conversions by Muslims to 
Christianity in the wake of the Syrian refugee crisis.19 
Taking all of these factors together, Iranian applicants for religious 
asylum seem particularly well-suited to shed light on a fundamental 
problem in asylum and refugee law, namely, how a disparate evaluation 
of the situation in the country of origin and a different transposition of 
the international definition of a refugee into national law impacts indi-
vidual asylum or refugee claims. 
 
16. See Asylgesetz [AsylG] [Asylum Act], Sep. 2, 2008, BGBl I at 1798, as 
amended by Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie 2011/95/EU [Act 
Transposing Directive 2011/95/EU], Aug. 23, 2013, BGBl I at 3474, § 3(1), 
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/asylvfg_1992/BJNR111260992.html 
[https://perma.cc/A4SP-P4XY]. 
17. These refugees are known in international law as refugees sur place. U.N. 
High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and 
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶¶ 94–96, U.N. Doc. 
HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV. 3 (Dec. 2011) (noting that refugees sur place are 
created when circumstances in the applicants’ home country change or when 
the applicants themselves change by taking on a characteristic—e.g., a 
political opinion or a religion—that qualifies them as refugees). 
18. Michael J. Churgin, Is Religion Different? Is There a Thumb on the Scale 
in Refugee Convention Appellate Court Adjudication in the United States? 
Some Preliminary Thoughts, 51 Tex. Int’l L.J. 213, 219 (2016) (noting 
that asylum claims based on political opinion and membership in a particular 
social group were more heavily litigated in the U.S. than religious asylum 
claims). 
19. See infra Section II.A. 
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While it is desirable to have a universal definition of refugee corre-
spond to a common interpretation20 and a common application of that 
definition to avoid disparities in treatment of similarly situated appli-
cants,21 this Note will show that using a common international defini-
tion of refugee, without more, has not resulted in similarly situated ap-
plicants being treated similarly by the countries where they happen to 
seek refuge from persecution. 
Absent an authoritative international court of refugee and asylum 
law—or an international refugee agency with the authority to assign 
refugee quotas to sovereign nations22—longstanding national precedent 
both procedural and substantive in nature within which the inter-
national definition is interpreted and applied appears to be an insur-
mountable hurdle on the path toward similarly treating the similarly 
situated.23 Moreover, the case of asylum seekers from Iran appears to 
show that differences in political and diplomatic relations with the ap-
plicants’ country of origin have a bearing on how those claims are adju-
dicated based on disparate assessments of the situation in Iran.  
These differences do not mean that U.S. and German high courts 
cannot, or should not, benefit from each other’s jurisprudence on asy-
lum matters in the interest of an operationalization of international 
refugee law that treats similarly situated applicants similarly.24 In fact, 
 
20. See Jane McAdam, Interpretation of the 1951 Convention, in The 1951 
Convention, supra note 6, at 75 (discussing the meaning of the 1951 
Convention in light of the interpretative principles set forth in the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). 
21. James C. Hathaway & Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee 
Status 3–4 (2d ed. 2014). 
22. Christopher Heath Wellman, Freedom of Association and the Right to 
Exclude, in Debating the Ethics of Immigration: Is There a Right 
to Exclude? 127 (Christopher Heath Wellman & Phillip Cole eds., 2011). 
23. See Curtis A. Bradley, International Law in the U.S. Legal 
System 66–70 (2d ed. 2015) (noting that while U.S. courts interpreting 
international treaties under U.S. law do look to how other contracting parties 
construe those treaties, they give significant deference to how the Executive 
Branch, in conjunction with the Senate, interpret those treaties under the 
so-called Biden condition). 
24. See, e.g., Stephen G. Breyer, The Court and the World: American 
Law and the New Global Realities 243–46 (2015) (finding that 
concerns about a loss of U.S. sovereignty that he perceives to be at the heart 
of resistance to judicial cross-referencing of foreign decisions are not based 
on the actual practice of U.S. courts). For two writers engaging the Associate 
Justice’s book, see Curtis A. Bradley, The Supreme Court as a Filter 
Between International Law and American Constitutionalism, 104 Cal. L. 
Rev. 1567 (2016), and Jenny S. Martinez, Who’s Afraid of International and 
Foreign Law?, 104 Cal. L. Rev. 1579 (2016). Martinez, while echoing some 
of Breyer’s concerns when she deplored a trend toward judicial 
isolationism—even hostility toward non-U.S. law—in the U.S., pointed to a 
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given the absence of effective global institutions able to protect the 
rights of refugees, national law plays a critically important role in af-
fording refuge to those who have lost the protection of their home 
countries.25 This importance of the nation state—and of organizations 
that have reached a level of political integration on par with the 
European Union—makes the task of international learning indis-
pensable in order to achieve a more similar treatment of similarly 
situated people who do not have the luxury of international forum 
shopping. 
As a contribution towards this goal, this Note will proceed in four 
steps. Part I will discuss the legal framework for reviewing refugee 
claims based on religious persecution. It will do so by comparing and 
contrasting the U.N. position on refugee law, U.S. asylum law, and 
German refugee law as they pertain to those experiencing religious per-
secution. Part II will briefly highlight the different relations between 
the U.S. and Iran and Germany and Iran and then investigate by way 
of example the legal situation of one potential group of asylum seekers 
in their country of origin—Christians in Iran. Part III—after discussing 
the respective general frameworks for judicial review of administrative 
asylum or refugee decisions—will review a number of U.S. and German 
court decisions reviewing administrative decisions of claims of religious 
persecution brought by Iranians. The Conclusion will highlight areas of 
 
dissenting opinion by the late Justice Antonin Scalia that seems pertinent to 
this Note. Id. at 1584 n.37 (citing Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 
658 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). There, Scalia stated that “[w]hen we 
interpret a treaty, we accord the judgments of our sister signatories 
‘considerable weight.’” Husain, 540 U.S. at 658 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985)). This approach based 
on treaty interpretation is fleshed out in Fatma E. Marouf, The Role of 
Foreign Authorities in U.S. Asylum Adjudication, 45 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & 
Pol. 391 (2013). Justice Ginsburg once described the challenge and promise 
of international judicial learning like this: “No doubt, we should approach 
foreign legal materials with sensitivity to our differences and imperfect 
understanding of the social, historical, political, and institutional background 
from which foreign opinions emerge. But awareness of our limitations should 
not dissuade us from learning what we can from the experience and wisdom 
foreign sources may convey.” Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Foreword to the Third 
Edition of Donald P. Kommers & Russell A. Miller, The 
Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, at xi, xii (3d ed. 2012). 
25. For Hannah Arendt—based on her own experience of statelessness as a 
German-born Jew between 1937 and 1950—the plight of European refugees 
during the years following World War I underscored the impracticable 
nature of “inherent human rights” which presumably included the right to 
be granted asylum. As a more pragmatic alternative, she—drawing on 
Edmund Burke’s preference of the “rights of an Englishman” over the 
“abstraction” of “human rights” he saw play out in the French Revolution—
argued for the realization of equal rights for all by means of political 
organization. Arendt, supra note 6, at 280, 299–302. 
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agreement and disagreement between U.S. and German law and provide 
suggestions for a more just system of asylum and refugee adjudication 
based on the current interaction between national and international 
law. 
I. The Legal Framework for Adjudicating Claims of 
Religious Persecution 
Before analyzing how religiously motivated applicants from Iran 
fare under U.S. asylum law and German refugee law, this part seeks to 
describe important elements of the legal framework under which appli-
cants’ claims are adjudicated. Since pertinent law in both the U.S. and 
Germany goes back to the international definition of refugee, this de-
scription will include the UNHCR’s understanding of this international 
definition. While the UNHCR’s interpretation of the 1951 Convention’s 
definition of refugee is not binding, it still provides an international 
point of reference for the national utilization of this definition. 
A. Some Context for the Framework 
The international definition of refugee set forth in the 1951 Conven-
tion did not originate in some legal or historical vacuum. It is firmly 
rooted in the attempts to use international declarations and agreements 
to deal with the consequences of World War II. In view of the Con-
vention, important components of those attempts were the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) and the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). 
1. Freedom of Religion and Asylum in the 1948 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
In December 1948, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the 
UDHR.26 The UDHR was meant to be a response to the severe human 
rights violations committed in the course of World War II.27 The U.N. 
Commission on Human Rights—established in 1946 and first chaired 
by Eleanor Roosevelt—was charged with drafting not just a non-
binding declaration, but an instrument that would allow the U.N. to 
intervene in a timely manner to prevent human rights violations like 
 
26. G.A. Res. 217 (III), A Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 
1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
27. Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 
Origins, Drafting, and Intent 1–3 (1999) (noting that the experiences 
of World War II were first expressed in the various references to human 
rights in the U.N. Charter of 1946, which then became the springboard for 
further activities resulting in the adoption of the UDHR in 1948). 
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those witnessed just years earlier.28 But in the changed circumstances 
of the Cold War, the Commission first drafted no more than the 1948 
Declaration.29 It would take almost two decades of further discussions 
until the originally intended International Bill of Human Rights was 
completed, when two binding international human rights covenants 
were opened for signature in 1966—the ICCPR and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”).30 
The following UDHR and ICCPR provisions are especially relevant 
for the topic of this Note: The UDHR declared that “[a]ll human beings 
are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”31 Therefore, “[e]veryone 
is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, reli-
gion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status.”32 
Furthermore, the UDHR declared that “[e]veryone has the right to 
seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.”33 This 
article failed to declare a universal right to be granted asylum because 
the past experiences of the chiefly Jewish refugees from Nazi Ger-
many—often stuck in deadly limbo because no state was required or 
willing to grant them asylum 34 —were eclipsed by the 500,000 
 
28. Id. at 14. 
29. Id. at 18 (noting that at one point, only the Soviet Union opposed drafting 
a binding human rights document). 
30. Id. at 19–20 (noting that this delay gave the UDHR an independent moral 
stature that resulted in the “phenomenal” growth of binding international 
human rights instruments). 
31. UDHR, supra note 26, art. 1. Morsink called this statement “a trumpet call 
of victory after battle,” noting that these “deep truths [were] rediscovered in 
the midst of the Holocaust.” Morsink, supra note 27, at 38. 
32. UDHR, supra note 26, art. 2. Morsink noted that “[m]ore than any other 
voting bloc the Communists pushed from the very start for the inclusion of 
clear antidiscrimination language in [article 2 of the UDHR].” Morsink, 
supra note 27, at 93. 
33. UDHR, supra note 26, art. 14(1). The language adopted replaced the 
stronger language proposed earlier that would have declared an individual 
right to asylum. Morsink, supra note 27, at 76–79; see also Einarsen, supra 
note 6, at 47 (arguing that, while this provision “does not contain a guarantee 
of formalized asylum or permanent residence in the receiving State,” it would 
be contrary to the “object and purpose” of this article “if a State actively 
denies a refugee protection from persecution”). 
34. Illustrative of the plight of Jewish refugees at the time are the events 
surrounding the S.S. St. Louis in 1939: Having left Germany in May of that 
year with about 1,000 Jews bound for Cuba, the ship had to return to Europe 
when neither Cuba nor the U.S. was willing or obligated to grant refuge to 
these passengers in the months before World War II, handing Hitler a 
propagandistic victory and resulting in about a quarter of the Jews aboard 
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Palestinian refugees that were created by the 1948 Israeli-Arab War 
while the article was being discussed.35 
Finally, the UDHR expressed “the right to freedom of thought, con-
science and religion” in a way that was progressive for its time:36 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or 
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and 
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, 
practice, worship and observance.37 
The inclusion of the right to change one’s religion resulted in objec-
tions from Muslim countries and prompted Saudi Arabia to be one of 
the eight nations that abstained when the UDHR was brought to a vote 
at the U.N. General Assembly in 1948.38 
The ICCPR,39 as a binding realization of some of the lofty declara-
tions of the UDHR, does not contain the right to seek, enjoy, or be 
 
the ship being killed in the Holocaust—because the U.S. quotas for German-
Austrian immigrants for 1939 had already been filled. Churgin, supra note 
18, at 214; Voyage of the St. Louis, U.S. Holocaust Mem’l Museum, 
https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005267 [https:// 
perma.cc/BL9X-X2JX] (last visited Mar. 13, 2017). Producing masses of 
poor, burdensome Jewish refugees was part of Nazi Germany’s “factual 
propaganda” aimed at spreading antisemitism everywhere. Arendt, supra 
note 6, at 269. 
35. Morsink, supra note 27, at 75–79. Based on the Jewish experience under 
German rule, Joseph Carens posited as criterion for all laws and regulations 
dealing with refugees today whether they would allow or mandate providing 
refuge to the Jews persecuted by the Germans. Joseph H. Carens, The 
Ethics of Immigration 194 (2013). He went on to argue that democratic 
states have a duty to admit refugees. Id. at 195–97. 
36. Morsink, supra note 27, at 259–261 (noting that the UDHR was progressive 
for its day in that it placed majority and minority religions on equal footing 
by making the freedom individual in nature and in that it included the 
freedom to have no religion). 
37. UDHR, supra note 26, art. 18. 
38. Morsink, supra note 27, at 261–62. Morsink also noted that the Greek 
delegate, like his Muslim counterparts, expressed misgivings about 
“proselytism” directed at the religious majority, while the delegate from the 
Philippines stated that, if proselytism was done within the limits of public 
order, “the free exchange of religious ideas was one of the healthiest signs of 
freedom and democracy.” Id. at 262. 
39. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. Both 
East and West Germany ratified the ICCPR in 1973 with reservations; Iran 
ratified the ICCPR in 1975 without reservations. Id. at 172, 293–96. The 
U.S. ratified the ICCPR in 1992 with reservations. Multilateral 
Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General: Status as at 31 
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granted asylum. But, incorporating the broad antidiscrimination lan-
guage from article 2 of the UDHR,40 the ICCPR makes granting the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion binding on the 
states that ratified the document.41 The ICCPR, after quoting article 
18 of the UDHR with slight modifications,42 adds that “[n]o one shall 
be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to 
adopt a religion or belief of his choice.”43 The ICCPR furthermore pro-
vides that a person’s “[f]reedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs” 
may be abridged only by law where necessary “to protect public safety, 
order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of oth-
ers.”44 Finally, the ICCPR safeguards the rights of parents to raise their 
children according to their own beliefs and moral convictions.45 
2. History Meets National Law: Some Recent Developments in the U.S. 
and Germany 
In the years following the ratification of the 1951 Convention and 
its 1967 Protocol and their initial incorporation into national law, both 
the U.S. and Germany have faced a number of refugee crises that have 
left their imprint on these countries’ political debates and laws.46 The 
most recent formative event for both U.S. and German law is the Syrian 
refugee crisis that contributed significantly to the currently high level 
of global refugees, as noted at the beginning of this Note. 
a. Recent Developments in the U.S. 
Responding to international pressure in late 2015, the U.S. raised 
the number of Syrian refugees it would accept in the 2016 Fiscal Year—
 
December 1992, at 124, 132, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/11, U.N. Sales No. 
E.93.V.11 (1993). 
40. ICCPR, supra note 39, art. 2(1). 
41. Id. art. 18. 
42. Compare id. art. 18(1) with UDHR, supra note 26, art. 18. 
43. ICCPR, supra note 39, art. 18(2). 
44. Id. art. 18(3); see UDHR, supra note 26, art. 29(2). 
45. ICCPR, supra note 39, art. 18(4); see UDHR, supra note 26, art. 26(3) 
(guaranteeing to parents “a prior right to choose the kind of education that 
shall be given to their children”). 
46. See Deborah E. Anker, Law of Asylum in the United States § 1:3 
(2016) (outlining the basic legislative and administrative developments after 
the adoption of the Refugee Act of 1980 in the U.S.); Richard D. Steel, 
Steel on Immigration Law §§ 1:1–1:3 (2016) (outlining the main 
elements of U.S. immigration law before and after 1952); see also Andreas 
Dietz, Ausländer- und Asylrecht 25–27 (2016) (chronicling the main 
waves of immigration to, and emigration from, Germany through the 
centuries and the legal responses to those waves). 
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after intensely scrutinizing them under the U.S. Refugee Assistance 
Program (USRAP)47—to 10,000.48 In the wake of the November 2015 
terrorist attack in Paris—where two of the nine perpetrators affiliated 
with the Islamic State (“IS”) had entered Europe possibly posing as 
refugees from Syria who were only minimally scrutinized when entering 
the EU via Greece49—this decision caused a passionate back-and-forth 
during the 2016 presidential campaign amongst the Republican candi-
dates vying for their party’s nomination to run for the presidency.50 
Some Republican candidates demanded that preference be given to 
Christian refugees from the countries affected by the IS campaigns,51 
 
47. The USRAP was also created by the Refugee Act of 1980 that established a 
basic quota of 50,000 refugees per year. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
212, § 207, 94 Stat. 102, 103–05 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1157 
(2012)). The relevant definitional section is § 201(a), 94 Stat. at 102–03 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2012) (deviating from 
the international definition of refugee by requiring that the USRAP refugee 
be “within the country of such person’s nationality”)). See also The United 
States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP): Consultation & Worldwide 
Processing Priorities, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. (May 5, 2016), 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/refugees/united-
states-refugee-admissions-program-usrap-consultation-worldwide-processing-
priorities [https://perma.cc/L82K-G8LQ]. While those eligible under the 
USRAP must also qualify as refugees, they are typically referred by the 
UNHCR and are subject to intense scrutiny before leaving their country of 
nationality. Steel, supra note 46, § 8:4; Refugee Processing and Security 
Screening, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. (Dec. 3, 2015), 
https://www.uscis.gov/refugeescreening [https://perma.cc/GEV4-D3X8]. 
By contrast, asylum seekers under the INA must have made it to the U.S. 8 
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2012). 
48. Haeyoun Park & Rudy Omri, U.S. Reaches Goal of Admitting 10,000 Syrian 
Refugees: Here’s Where They Went, N.Y. Times (Aug. 31, 2016), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/08/30/us/syrian-refugees-in-the-united-
states.html [https://perma.cc/VS74-YWLC]. 
49. Paris Attacks: Who Were the Attackers?, BBC News (Apr. 27, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34832512 [https://perma.cc/M2UJ-
WEM4]. 
50. David Nakamura, An Angry Obama Upbraids Critics Who Want to Block 
Refugees from Syria, Wash. Post (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/politics/an-angry-obama-upbraids-critics-who-want-to-
block-refugees-from-syria/2015/11/18/c2375082-8db9-11e5-acff-673ae92ddd 
2b_story.html [https://perma.cc/DUP4-TDE6]. 
51. Julian Hattem, Obama: “Shameful” to Propose “Religious Test” for 
Refugees, Hill (Nov. 16, 2015), http://thehill.com/policy/national-
security/260260-obama-hits-bush-refugee-plan-as-not-american [https:// 
perma.cc/LQE9-MZ76]. 
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although—in that majority Muslim region—the bulk of those affected 
by IS violence and persecution were Muslims.52 
In January 2017, President Trump closed the U.S. borders to citi-
zens of seven majority Muslim countries—including Iraq and Iran—for 
90 days; suspended the USRAP for 120 days; mandated, after resump-
tion of the USRAP, the prioritization of religious-based refugee claims 
made by applicants who belong to religious minorities in their country 
of nationality; and barred Syrian nationals—regardless of their reli-
gion53—from entering the U.S. indefinitely by issuing an Executive 
Order.54 The implementation of these provisions was enjoined by a na-
tionwide Temporary Restraining Order issued by the U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Washington.55 The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declined to stay the district court’s 
order.56 
The President then revoked the previous Executive Order and re-
placed it with a new Executive Order in March 2017, closing U.S. bor-
ders to citizens of six majority Muslim countries—including Syria and 
 
52. Abigail Hauslohner & Karen DeYoung, Draft Executive Order Would Begin 
‘Extreme Vetting’ of Immigrants and Visitors to the U.S., Wash. Post (Jan. 
25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/draft-
executive-order-would-begin-extreme-vetting-of-immigrants-and-visitors-to-
the-us/2017/01/25/17a27424-e328-11e6-a547-5fb9411d332c_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/GL87-2MJ7]. 
53. President Trump nonetheless cited what he perceived as unfair treatment of 
Syrian Christians persecuted by the IS under the previous administration’s 
refugee policy as one of the reasons behind the envisioned preferential 
treatment for members of religious minorities. David Brody, Brody File 
Exclusive: President Trump Says Persecuted Christians Will Be Given 
Priority as Refugees, Brody File (Jan. 27, 2017), http://www1.cbn.com/ 
thebrodyfile/archive/2017/01/27/brody-file-exclusive-president-trump-says-
persecuted-christians-will-be-given-priority-as-refugees [https://perma.cc/ 
YFC9-CZ63]. 99% of the more than 12,000 Syrian refugees resettled in the 
U.S. in 2016 were Muslims—the Syrian population is 93% Muslim—while 
the overall balance of the USRAP for that year was almost equal between 
Muslims and Christians. Phillip Connor, U.S. Admits Record Number of 
Muslim Refugees in 2016, Pew Res. Ctr. (Oct. 5, 2016), http:// 
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/05/u-s-admits-record-number-of-
muslim-refugees-in-2016/ [https://perma.cc/V6C6-7SBB]. 
54. Exec. Order 13,769, §§ 3(c); 5(a)–(c), 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977, 8,978–79 (Jan. 27, 
2017). Interestingly, the President signed this Order, not at the White House 
or the Department of Homeland Security, but at the Pentagon. Michael D. 
Shear & Helene Cooper, Trump Bars Refugees and Citizens of 7 Muslim 
Countries, N.Y. Times (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/ 
27/us/politics/trump-syrian-refugees.html [https://perma.cc/W8GE-76B4]. 
55. Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *2 (W.D. 
Wash. Feb. 3, 2017). 
56. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). 
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Iran—for at least 90 days, unless they already possessed permission to 
enter and live in the U.S., and suspending the USRAP for 120 days.57 
These substantive provisions were enjoined by a Temporary Restraining 
Order issued by the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii.58 The 
U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland enjoined the first sub-
stantive provision, the “travel ban,” on the same day.59 
In May and June 2017, respectively, the government lost its appeals 
of the Maryland and Hawaii orders.60 In June 2017, the Supreme Court 
issued a partial stay for both the Hawaii and Maryland injunctions.61 
In October 2017, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, thereby vacat-
ing the judgments below.62 
Meanwhile, on September 24, 2017, the President issued a procla-
mation that imposed various levels of limitations on the entry of nation-
als from seven countries—Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, 
Venezuela, and Yemen—after a review conducted by various executive 
departments pursuant to Executive Order No. 13,780 had identified 
these countries to be inadequate in their “identity-management and 
 
57. Exec. Order No. 13,780, §§ 1(b)(i), 2(c), 3(a), (b), 6(a), 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209, 
13,212–15 (Mar. 6, 2017). 
58. Hawai’i v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1123 (D. Haw. 2017). The plaintiffs 
briefed two statutory claims—that the Executive Order violated the INA’s 
non-discrimination clause, 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) (2012), and that it 
disregarded the Congressional scheme set up to determine terrorism-related 
inadmissibility, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (2012), by overextending the 
Presidential authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (granting the President 
discretionary power to suspend entry “of any aliens or of any class of aliens” 
in the national interest)—and three constitutional issues, i.e., violations of 
the Due Process, Establishment, and Equal Protection clauses. 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining 
Order at 24–45, Hawai’i v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (D. Haw. 2017) 
(No. 1:17-cv-50 DKW–KSC), 2017 WL 6547034. The court assessed the 
likely success on the merits—the first prong of the standard temporary 
restraining order analysis—purely on grounds of an Establishment Clause 
violation. Hawai’i, 241 F. Supp. 3d at 1134–39. It did so although it 
acknowledged that, unlike its predecessor, Exec. Order 13,780 did not 
“contain any term or phrase that can be reasonably characterized as having 
a religious origin or connotation.” Id. at 1134–35. 
59. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 565–66 (D. 
Md. 2017) (enjoining Exec. Order 13,780, § 2(c)). 
60. Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 756 (9th Cir. 2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance 
Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 572 (4th Cir. 2017). 
61. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2083 (2017) (per 
curiam). 
62. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017) (mem.) (vacating and remanding 
with instructions to dismiss the challenge because Executive Order 13,780 
expired on September 24, 2017); Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance, 138 S. 
Ct. 353 (2017) (mem.) (same). 
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information-sharing . . . protocols.”63 For instance, the proclamation 
suspended the entry of Iranian nationals into the U.S. “as immigrants 
and as nonimmigrants,” but granted an exception from this suspension 
to holders of valid student and exchange-visitor visas.64 
The Proclamation was blocked by a temporary restraining order 
issued by the U.S. District Court of Hawaii on October 17, 2017.65 In 
December 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed this decision, but limited the scope of the block to “those with 
a credible bona fide relationship with the United States.”66 
 
63. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,163–64, § 1(f)–(h) (Sept. 24, 
2017) (discussing Exec. Order No. 13,780, supra note 57, § 2(d)–(e)). These 
suspensions are subject to a semi-annual review process by various executive 
departments. Id. at 45,169–70, § 4. 
64. Id. at 45,165, § 2(b)(ii). 
65. Hawaii v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1145 (D. Haw. 2017) (granting 
motion for a temporary restraining order because Proclamation 9645 “suffers 
from precisely the same maladies as [Exec. Order No. 13,780]: it lacks 
sufficient findings that the entry of more than 150 million 
nationals . . . would be ‘detrimental to the interests of the United 
States,’ . . . [a]nd [the Proclamation] plainly discriminates based on 
nationality” (citing Trump, 859 F.3d at 774, 776–79)). 
66. Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 702 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Int’l Refugee 
Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. at 2088), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018). 
The lower court had changed its original temporary restraining order into a 
preliminary injunction to make it appealable. Id. at 675. 
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b. Recent Developments in Germany 
In 2015, Germany opened its borders67 to an unprecedented influx 
of migrants from Syria and other countries, including Iran.68 This move, 
first greatly admired and welcomed,69 now continues to fuel controversy 
within Germany and Europe.70 These discussions—involving calls for a 
centralization of the federal structure of Germany’s security agen-
cies71—were further intensified by a December 2016 terror attack in 
 
67. While there are no longer any internal borders in the EU, EU member 
states—under current EU law meant to prevent forum shopping across the 
EU—must refuse asylum-seekers that enter their territory from safe third 
countries. Heusch et al., supra note 15, at 113–15 (discussing the basic 
ideas behind the so-called Dublin Rules governing the mutual responsibilities 
of EU member states regarding refugees). Since Germany is surrounded by 
such countries—i.e., other EU member states—it was not permitted to 
process any asylum applications generated by the current migration from 
Syria and Northern Africa. For a few months during the summer and fall of 
2015, Germany suspended the application of those rules to support EU 
border nations such as Greece. Dietz, supra note 46, at 172 (arguing that 
Germany’s refusal to abide by the Dublin Rules and turn migrants away 
from its borders was a trigger of the migrant crisis during the second half of 
2015); see also Matthew Holehouse et al., Germany Drops EU Rules to Allow 
in Syrian Refugees, Telegraph (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.telegraph. 
co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/11821822/Germany-drops-EU-rules-
to-allow-in-Syrian-refugees.html [https://perma.cc/6TKS-SV3P]; Germany 
Reinstates Dublin Rules for Syrian Refugees, DW (Nov. 10, 2016), 
http://www.dw.com/en/germany-reinstates-dublin-rules-for-syrian-refugees/ 
a-18842101 [https://perma.cc/T3FX-4ZQX]. 
68. Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe Explained in Seven Charts, BBC News 
(Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911 [https:// 
perma.cc/4EW5-MVJY]. Ironically, during World War II, tens of thousands 
of individuals from the Balkans and Greece evaded the advancing German 
armies by fleeing to camps in the Near East, including Syria. Evan Taparata 
& Kuang Keng Kuek Ser, During WWII, European Refugees Fled to Syria, 
PRI (Apr. 26, 2016), http://www.pri.org/stories/2016-04-26/what-it-s-inside-
refugee-camp-europeans-who-fled-syria-egypt-and-palestine-during [https:// 
perma.cc/A582-Y3EF]. 
69. The welcome was extended in part because of the German refugee experience 
in the wake of World War II and at the end of communist East Germany in 
1989. Justin Huggler, Germans Have Been Refugees Before—They See 
Themselves in These Syrians, Telegraph (Sept. 4, 2015), http:// 
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/11842533/German
s-have-been-refugees-before-they-see-themselves-in-these-Syrians.html [https: 
//perma.cc/G4CS-PSER]. 
70. Kathleen Schuster, How the World Sees Germany a Year into the Refugee 
Crisis, DW (Aug. 23, 2016), http://www.dw.com/en/how-the-world-sees-
germany-a-year-into-the-refugee-crisis/a-19486079 [https://perma.cc/9JPT-
ZC4A]. 
71. Ruth Bender, German Interior Minister Calls for Security Overhaul After 
Berlin Christmas Market Attack, Wall St. J. (Jan. 3, 2017), http:// 
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Berlin that was perpetrated by a man whose asylum application had 
been denied, but who had not been deported due to questions over his 
actual citizenship.72 In the September 2017 federal elections, the gov-
erning coalition was dealt heavy losses especially in Germany’s East, 
while an anti-immigrant party saw a sizeable number of its delegates 
enter the German parliament for the first time due to voters’ lingering 
dissatisfaction with the 2015 decision to open Germany’s borders.73 
The controversy surrounding religious asylum claims by aliens who 
convert from Islam to Christianity in Germany was reignited when an 
Afghan killed a five-year old boy and injured the boy’s mother in June 
2017. The perpetrator had converted to Christianity while imprisoned 
for arson in 2012. An administrative court had blocked his deportation 
to Afghanistan because it found credible his claim that he would face 
persecution in his home country. Both victims were refugees as well.74 
Moreover, in April 2017, German authorities arrested two suspects—
one German translator and one Iranian who worked for the German 
embassy in Iran—who were accused of helping Iranian asylum-seekers 
by providing forged documents and coaching them by telling them to 
convert to Christianity to improve the likelihood of successful 
applications.75 
 
www.wsj.com/articles/german-interior-minister-calls-for-security-overhaul-
after-berlin-christmas-market-attack-1483462292 [https://perma.cc/86WC-
N5U4]. 
72. Alistair Walsh, Berlin Terrorist Anis Amri Was a Known Drug Dealer, DW 
(May 17, 2017), http://www.dw.com/en/berlin-terrorist-anis-amri-was-a-
known-drug-dealer/a-38878974 [https://perma.cc/Z573-GUJA]; Bill Chappell, 
What We Know About Anis Amri, Suspect in Berlin Market Attack, NPR 
(Dec. 22, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/12/22/5065 
87263/what-we-know-about-anis-amri-suspect-in-berlin-market-attack [https: 
//perma.cc/5326-RGA2]. 
73. German Election: Merkel Vows to Win Back Right-Wing Voters, BBC 
(Sept. 25, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41384550 [https: 
//perma.cc/GE55-TNQF]; Noah Barkin, Incensed over Refugees, East 
Germans Punish Easterner Merkel, Reuters (Sept. 24, 2017), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-election-merkel-east/incensed-
over-refugees-east-germans-punish-easterner-merkel-idUSKCN1BZ120 [https: 
//perma.cc/S5HX-46LH]. 
74. Peter Wenig, Glaube oder Trick? Wenn Flüchtlinge Christen werden, 
Berliner Morgenpost (Aug. 27, 2017), https://www.morgenpost.de/ 
politik/article211724473/Glaube-oder-Trick-Wenn-Fluechtlinge-Christen-
werden.html [https://perma.cc/5JG2-LUMS]; Andreas Glas & Lisa Schnell, 
Arnschwang: Konnten die Behörden wissen, wie gefährlich der Täter war?, 
Süddeutsche Zeitung (June 6, 2017), http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ 
bayern/oberpfalz-arnschwang-konnten-die-behoerden-wissen-wie-gefaehrlich-
der-taeter-war-1.3535315 [https://perma.cc/T42Q-NT7E]. 
75. German Police Arrest Two for Alleged Human Smuggling, Reuters (Apr. 
25, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-migrants/german-
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B. The Basic Definition and Benefits of Refugees in International and 
National Law 
After outlining the current legal and historical backdrop and con-
text in which asylum and refugee claims are now being adjudicated, it 
is time to turn to the laws under which these claims must be made. 
This section will highlight the international definition of a refugee and 
where the definition is tied into the national bodies of law in the U.S. 
and Germany. 
International law defines a refugee as anyone who, “owing to well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”76 
The 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol require the contracting 
states to grant certain basic rights to individuals recognized as refu-
gees.77 While these documents do not require the contracting states to 
grant refugees asylum or any right of permanent residence, they forbid 
these states to expel those recognized as refugees “save on grounds of 
national security or public order”78 and prohibit them from removing 
(refouler) refugees “in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of ter-
ritories where [their] life or freedom would be threatened” on account 
of the five protected characteristics set forth in the definition of 
refugee.79 
 
police-arrest-two-for-alleged-human-smuggling-idUSKBN17R2CI [https:// 
perma.cc/7MC4-XM9W]. 
76. Convention, supra note 6, art. 1(A)(2). Einarsen deemed this definition to 
be “the single most important provision of the 1951 Convention and a key 
to the scope of all its rights and obligations.” Einarsen, supra note 6, at 49–
50. Einarsen also discussed the drafting history of this definition. Id. at 53–
68. For a discussion of the various international refugee definitions prior to 
1951, see Andreas Zimmermann & Claudia Mahler, Article 1 A, para. 2 
(Definition of the Term ‘Refugee’/Définition du Terme ‘Réfugié’), in The 
1951 Convention, supra note 6, at 217, 299–311. The 1951 definition 
contained the cut-off date of January 1, 1951, which “has lost all of its 
relevance” for the parties to the 1967 Protocol. Id. at 322. 
77. For example, non-discrimination, freedom of religion, free access to the 
courts, access to gainful employment, access to housing and public education, 
access to administrative assistance, and freedom of movement. Convention, 
supra note 6, arts. 3–4, 16–17, 21–22, 25–26. 
78. Id. art. 32. 
79. Id. art. 33(1). Article 33 excepts those who reasonably pose a danger to the 
host country or have been convicted of a “particularly serious crime.” Id. 
art. 33(2). 
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The U.S. incorporated this definition into federal law80 and makes 
those who meet it eligible to be granted asylum on a discretionary ba-
sis.81 Reportedly, “discretionary denials of asylum are ‘unusual’ and ‘ex-
ceedingly rare.’”82 Transposing the Convention’s prohibition of refouler, 
U.S. law prohibits expelling aliens to countries where their life or 
freedom would be threatened on the basis of any of the five protected 
characteristics.83 
Germany incorporated this definition into its national law as well,84 
and generally awards refugee status to all those who meet it.85 While 
this lack of discretion is an important difference from U.S. law, German 
law transposes the Convention’s prohibition of refouler in a way similar 
to U.S. law.86 
C. Elements of the Refugee Definition in Detail 
Narrowing the focus further, after describing where the inter-
national definition of refugee is tied into U.S. and German law, this 
Note now delves into investigating how the international definition is 
operationalized in U.S. asylum law and German refugee law. The U.S. 
Customs & Immigration Services (“USCIS”)—the federal agency within 
 
80. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012). 
81. Id. § 1158(b)(1)(A). See generally Kate Aschenbrenner, Discretionary 
(In)Justice: The Exercise of Discretion in Claims for Asylum, 45 U. Mich. 
J. L. Reform 595 (2012) (discussing the discretionary nature of granting 
asylum in the U.S. and arguing that it should be a mandatory form of relief 
because discretionary relief is an unnecessary additional layer of screening, 
offers insufficient protection to refugees, and rests on an inherently vague 
basis). During the drafting discussion leading to the 1948 UDHR, the U.S. 
chair of the U.N. Human Rights Committee, Eleanor Roosevelt, already 
asserted that even formulating a non-binding declaration of an individual 
right to be granted asylum would “raise false hopes” and exceed the U.N.’s 
powers vis-à-vis sovereign states. Morsink, supra note 27, at 76. 
82. Marouf v. Lynch, 811 F.3d 174, 180 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Huang v. INS, 
436 F.3d 89, 90, 92 (2d Cir. 2006)). But see Aschenbrenner, supra note 81, 
at 598–99 (arguing that “it is highly likely” that these appellate opinions 
overstate “the rarity of discretionary denials” because there is no statistical 
data available to verify the courts’ claims independently). 
83. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2012). 
84. Compare Asylgesetz [AsylG] [Asylum Act], Sep. 2, 2008, BGBl I at 1798, 
as amended, § 3(1), https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/asylvfg_1992/BJNR 
111260992.html [https://perma.cc/A4SP-P4XY], with 2011 Qualification 
Directive, supra note 15, art. 2(d). 
85. Compare AsylG § 3(4) with 2011 Qualification Directive, supra note 15, art. 
13 (“shall grant refugee status”). 
86. Aufenthaltsgesetz [AufenthG] [Residency Act], Feb. 25, 2008, BGBl I at 162, 
as amended, § 60, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/aufenthg_2004/ 
BJNR195010004.html [https://perma.cc/H7D7-HXHP]. 
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the Department of Homeland Security charged with adjudicating af-
firmative asylum claims87—distinguishes between establishing that the 
applicant was or will be persecuted and establishing that the reason for 
the persecution involved one of the five protected characteristics, such 
as religion.88 Using this distinction as a structural clue, this Note will 
focus on the first part of the definition of refugee by analyzing, first, 
what is meant by persecution; second, the requirements for establishing 
past persecution and a “well-founded fear of future persecution;” and 
third, the requirements for proving the causal nexus between past or 
future persecution and one of the five protected characteristics requires. 
In keeping with the comparative nature of this Note, three positions 
will be described and compared: that of the U.N., the U.S., and 
Germany. While the last two positions will be set forth based on their 
respective national laws and regulations, the position of the U.N. is 
outlined based on documents published by the UNHCR. While these 
documents—unlike the 1951 Convention, the 1967 Protocol, or the 1966 
ICCPR—do not represent binding international agreements that must 
inform national legislation and adjudication, their considered position 
still provides an important international point of reference because the 
Convention itself requires the parties to cooperate with the UNHCR.89 
1. Persecution 
a. The UNHCR 
No universal definition of “persecution” exists.90 But within the 
Convention itself, Article 33 provides some hints as to what is meant 
by the term. Article 33 prohibits the expulsion of refugees to countries 
where their “life or freedom would be threatened on account of [their] 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
 
87. Anker, supra note 46, §§ A1:2, A2:1. Defensive asylum applications—filed, 
e.g., in order to prevent removal from the U.S.—are adjudicated by 
immigration judges under the Department of Justice’s Executive Office of 
Immigration Review (“EOIR”). Id. §§ A1:2, A3:1. The EOIR also oversees 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), the appellate body reviewing 
determinations by immigration judges. Steel, supra note 46, § 2:5. 
88. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Asylum Eligibility Part I: 
Definition of Refugee; Definition of Persecution; Eligibility 
Based on Past Persecution 15–16 (2009) [hereinafter Eligibility I], 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/Refugees%
20%26%20Asylum/Asylum/AOBTC%20Lesson%20Plans/Definition-Refugee 
-Persecution-Eligibiity-31aug10.pdf [https://perma.cc/4S77-NR9P]. 
89. Hathaway & Foster, supra note 21, at 10 (citing Convention, supra note 
6, art. 35(1) (requiring state parties to cooperate with the UNHCR to 
“facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of this 
Convention”)). 
90. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 17, ¶ 51, at 13. 
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political opinion.”91 Since the same protected characteristics are listed 
here as in the refugee definition quoted above, the UNHCR regards 
threats to the applicants’ “life or freedom” because of any one of the 
protected characteristics—along with similarly severe violations of hu-
man rights—as “persecution” within the meaning of the Convention.92 
While threats to a person’s life and freedom and “other serious vio-
lations of human rights”—either by state or non-state actors93—inher-
ently possess an objective severity that qualifies them as “persecution,” 
other “prejudicial actions or threats” may be severe enough to generate 
a subjective fear of persecution in an individual applicant.94 Moreover, 
it is also possible to establish persecution cumulatively, that is, based 
on “various measures not in themselves amounting to perse-
cution . . . .”95 
Accordingly, while disparate treatment is not in itself persecution, 
it amounts to persecution if it either is inherently severe enough—e.g., 
by imposing “serious restrictions” on a person’s right to practice his or 
her religion—or has a persecutory effect, either cumulatively or sub-
jectively, for a particular applicant.96 Similarly, prosecution is not in 
itself persecution, unless it is based either on laws that violate “accepted 
human rights standards” or on generally applicable laws that are ap-
 
91. Convention, supra note 6, art. 33(1). 
92. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 17, ¶ 51, at 13 (noting that “it 
may be inferred that a threat to life or freedom on account of [one of the 
protected characteristics] is always persecution” and that “[o]ther serious 
violations of human rights” would be as well (emphasis added)). This 
definitional nexus is even clearer in Article 31 of the Convention. 
Convention, supra note 6, art. 31(1) (discussing “refugees . . . coming 
directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the 
sense of article 1” (emphasis added)). 
93. State actors are mainly in view as agents of persecution, but non-state actors 
qualify as well, “if they are knowingly tolerated by the authorities, or if the 
authorities refuse, or prove unable, to offer effective protection.” U.N. High 
Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 17, ¶ 65, at 15 (providing the example of 
a sizeable faction of the population that is religiously intolerant). 
94. Id. ¶ 52, at 13; see Zimmermann & Mahler, supra note 76, at 353–54 (“The 
object and purpose of the term ‘persecution’ as the linchpin of the refugee 
definition lies in the protection of the human dignity of an 
individual . . . . Since . . . any human rights violation might . . . lead 
to refugee status, it is the severity of the human rights violation that is of 
crucial importance.”). Moreover, they suggest that “violations of some rights 
might more easily substantiate a refugee claim than others.” Id. at 354. 
95. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 17, ¶ 53, at 13. 
96. Id. ¶¶ 54–55, at 14. 
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plied in a discriminatory manner, such as by meting out excessive 
punishment to persons having one of the five protected characteristics.97 
In keeping with the UDHR and the ICCPR, persecution on religious 
grounds may specifically involve the prohibition of belonging to a cer-
tain religious community, worshiping in public, or receiving religious 
instruction.98 It may also involve serious discrimination because of en-
gaging—or not engaging—in certain religious practices. 99  As stated 
earlier, the severity of the sanctions—either individually or cumu-
latively—is what qualifies them as persecution.100 Moreover, it is vital 
to consider the importance of the practice threatened by persecutory 
conduct for the individual practitioner to establish whether the threat-
ened conduct rises to the level of persecution.101 
Persecution may be carried out by both state and non-state ac-
tors.102 Given that governments are presumed to be the guardians of 
the basic human rights of all the people living within their territory,103 
 
97. Id. ¶¶ 56–59, at 14. 
98. Id. ¶ 72, at 16. See supra notes 33–45 and accompanying text (discussing 
the pertinent provisions of the UDHR and the ICCPR). 
99. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 17, ¶ 72, at 16. 
100. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: 
Religion-Based Claims under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 
the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. 
HCR/GIP/04/06 (Apr. 28, 2004); see Zimmermann & Mahler, supra note 
76, at 386 (noting that international law—e.g., the ICCPR, as discussed 
supra note 44—permits restrictions of the exercise of the right of religious 
freedom under generally applicable laws); see also Christian Walter, Article 
4 (Religion/Religion), in The 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol, supra note 6, at 657, 667 
(noting that the impact of the 1951 Convention’s own protection of refugees’ 
religious freedom is “rather limited” because the document merely 
established the “national treatment standard” which, in repressive states, 
“will not suffice for adequate protection”). 
101. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 100, ¶ 16. 
102. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 17, ¶ 65, at 15. Four different 
scenarios are possible: The state conducts persecution; the state condones 
persecution; the state tolerates persecution; the state refuses, or is unable, to 
offer meaningful protection. Zimmermann & Mahler, supra note 76, at 358. 
103. Anker, supra note 46, § 4:8. Early twentieth-century international refugee 
definitions, while dealing with the issue on a country-by-country basis as 
new refugee crises materialized, commonly featured a reference to the 
absence of government protection. See Skran, supra note 6, at 9, 11, 27, 30. 
Similarly, Christopher Wellman has proposed a modified version of the 
traditional concept of state sovereignty dating back to the 1648 Peace of 
Westphalia where a state “is legitimate only if it adequately protects the 
human rights of its constituents and respects the rights of all others,” Nazi 
Germany being an obvious example of an illegitimate regime. Wellman, 
supra note 22, at 16. 
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a key determination in this context is whether the government in the 
applicants’ country of origin is either unwilling or unable “to offer effec-
tive protection” from persecutory conduct by non-state actors.104 
b. U.S. Law 
Neither the INA nor the applicable agency regulations define perse-
cution.105 This uncertainty or “flexibility” created by the statutory and 
regulatory void is filled by administrative and judicial case law that, in 
general terms, calls for findings of an absence of state protection and 
“severe harm.”106 Accordingly, applicants must show more than that 
the harm experienced or feared “is sufficiently serious to amount to 
persecution.”107 They must also demonstrate that the persecutor was ei-
ther a state actor or a non-state actor the government in their country 
of origin is “unable or unwilling to control.”108 
The U.S. has adopted an objective definition of harm,109 which 
means that applicants need not prove that the persecutor acted with a 
 
104. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 17, ¶ 65, at 15. This is also why 
the international refugee definition requires would-be refugees to establish 
that they are “unable or . . . unwilling to avail [themselves] of the 
protection of [their] country [of origin].” Convention, supra note 6, art. 
1(A)(2); see U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 17, ¶¶ 97–101, at 
20 (discussing the meaning of the terms “unable” and “unwilling” in 
reference to protection available or denied in the applicants’ countries of 
nationality or, in the case of stateless refugees, to their countries of habitual 
residence). 
105. Anker, supra note 46, § 4:4. 
106. Id. (noting that while persecution is a “flexible concept,” it requires “findings 
of failure of state protection and severe harm” (citing Vasili v. Holder, 732 
F.3d 83, 90 (1st Cir. 2013))). 
107. Eligibility I, supra note 88, at 15. 
108. Id. at 16, 43–47 (citing Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (BIA 1996)). On 
the increasing relevance of non-state agents of persecution since the 1951 
Convention’s drafting and the lagging legal response of Western countries, 
see Andrew I. Schoenholtz, The New Refugees and the Old Treaty: 
Persecutors and Persecuted in the Twenty-First Century, 16 Chi. J. Int’l 
L. 81, 92–107 (2015). According to a recent statutory definition, a non-state 
actor is “a nonsovereign entity that (A) exercises significant political and 
territorial control; (B) is outside the control of a sovereign government; and 
(C) often employs violence in pursuit of its objectives.” Frank R. Wolf 
International Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 114-281, § 3(3), 130 Stat 
1426, 1428 (2016) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6402(11)). 
109. See Zimmermann & Mahler, supra note 76, at 373–74 (noting that the 1951 
Convention focuses on “an objective assessment of the underlying reasons 
for persecution, rather than . . . on the subjective motivation of the 
respective persecutor”). 
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“punitive” or “malignant” intent to harm them.110 Thus, it is not deter-
minative whether the persecutor intended the applicants to experience 
certain conduct as harm, but whether a reasonable person would con-
sider such conduct as serious harm.111 This harm can take a variety of 
forms, from torture to severe economic disadvantage.112 The seriousness 
of the harm may be established by showing cumulative instances of in-
herently lesser harms.113 
The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (“IRFA”)114 de-
fines both “particularly severe violations of religious freedom” and “vio-
 
110. Eligibility I, supra note 88, at 16 (citing Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 365; 
Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 646 (9th Cir. 1997)). This is analogous to 
the single-intent approach to battery that does not require an intent to harm 
the victim, only an intent to touch that is objectively offensive or harmful 
to the victim. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Intentional Torts to 
Persons §§ 102–03 (Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015) (“The 
actor need not intend to cause harm or offense to the other.”); Kenneth W. 
Simons, A Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts?, 48 Ariz. L. Rev. 
1061, 1066–70 (2006) (contrasting single-intent and dual-intent approaches 
to battery); accord Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 647; see also Fisher v. I.N.S., 
79 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that the BIA typically defines the 
“extreme concept” of persecution as “the infliction of suffering or harm upon 
those who differ (in race, religion or political opinion) in a way regarded as 
offensive”). This meaning goes back to the dictionary definition of the term. 
Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969). 
111. Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 647. At the same time, USCIS deems it important 
to consider the “unique circumstances of the individual.” Eligibility I, 
supra note 88, at 21 (noting that treatment that may easily be bearable by 
a healthy individual may prove deadly to an elderly or sickly person). 
112. Eligibility I, supra note 88, at 22–43 (discussing human rights violations, 
discrimination, arrests and detentions, economic harm, psychological harm, 
sexual harm, coercive population control, and harm to third parties). 
113. Id. at 20–21 (noting that while a single act may constitute persecution, 
several less severe acts taken together may rise to the required severity as 
well). 
114. Pub. L. No. 105-292, 112 Stat. 2787 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 22 U.S.C. (2012)). 
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lations of religious freedom.”115 Asylum officers should consider these 
definitions when adjudicating claims of religious persecution.116 
The “particularly severe violations of religious freedom” listed in 
the IRFA correspond to the severe human rights violations already dis-
cussed and are incorporated into USCIS’s adjudication practice accord-
ingly.117 General “violations of religious freedom” under the IRFA also 
include lesser acts such as arbitrary prohibitions, arbitrary registration 
requirements, and other restrictions imposed on religious practices.118 
Such lesser acts “may constitute persecution, depending on the circum-
stances.”119 
When reviewing claims of religiously motivated persecution, it may 
be necessary to assess the “importance or centrality of the [sanctioned] 
practice in the religion or to the individual applicant,”120 unless the ap-
 
115. 22 U.S.C. § 6402(11), (13) (2012). In the December 2016 amendment to the 
IRFA, paragraph (11) was redesignated as paragraph (13) and paragraph 
(13) was redesignated as paragraph (16); paragraph (13) was amended to 
include persecution involving atheists. Frank R. Wolf International Religious 
Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 114-281, §§ 3(1), (5), 130 Stat 1426, 1427–28 
(2016) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6402). The pertinent lesson in the 
USCIS Asylum Officer Basic Training Course Participant Workbook already 
incorporates “an individual’s failure or refusal to observe a religion” as 
protected under “religion.” U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., The 
International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) and Religious 
Persecution Claims 12 (2009) [hereinafter Religious Persecution 
Claims], https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/ 
Refugees%20%26%20Asylum/Asylum/AOBTC%20Lesson%20Plans/Intl
-Religious-Freedom-Act-31aug10.pdf [https://perma.cc/CKA3-MSGC]. 
116. See Religious Persecution Claims, supra note 115, at 21 (noting that 
the “range of violations listed in IRFA is instructive for determining 
persecution under the INA”). 
117. Compare 22 U.S.C. § 6402(11) (2012), with Eligibility I, supra note 88, 
at 22, and Religious Persecution Claims, supra note 115, at 24 (noting 
that “[i]n most instances, the serious forms of mistreatment categorized in 
IRFA . . . will constitute persecution”). 
118. See 22 U.S.C. § 6402(13)(A) (2012) (listing “arbitrary prohibitions on, 
restrictions of, or punishment for” certain religious conduct such as 
“assembling for peaceful religious activities,” “speaking freely about one’s 
religious beliefs;” “changing one’s religious beliefs;” and “raising one’s 
children in the religious teachings and practices of one’s choice”); cf. id. 
§ 6402(13)(B) (listing a number of examples of more severe sanctions 
imposed “on account of an individual’s religious belief or practice,” ranging 
from detention to rape and execution). 
119. Religious Persecution Claims, supra note 115, at 24. 
120. Compare id. at 25 (noting that “forced compliance with laws that 
fundamentally are abhorrent to a person’s deeply held religious convictions 
may constitute persecution” (citing Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1242 (3d Cir. 
1993) (“An example of such conduct might be requiring a person to renounce 
his or her religious beliefs or to desecrate an object of religious 
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plicants can show that conversion to a different religion is subject to 
severe penalties.121 But U.S. authorities may not require applicants to 
forego practicing their beliefs in public to avoid religious persecution, 
since being forced to practice one’s beliefs underground is itself a form 
of persecution that “is contrary to our basic principles of religious freed-
om and the protection of religious refugees.”122 
c. German Law 
The Asylum Act defines acts of persecution both as to their severity 
and their specific form. The severity of these acts must be such that 
they “constitute a severe violation of basic human rights,” especially 
the right to life; the prohibition of torture, slavery, and forced labor; 
and the common legal principle of nulla poena sine lege.123 
The critical level of severity can be reached either by the specific 
nature or repetition of those acts or by an accumulation of various 
measures.124 Specific examples of persecutory conduct—perpetrated ei-
 
importance . . . only if directed against a person who actually possessed the 
religious beliefs or attached religious importance to the object in 
question.”))), with Eligibility I, supra note 88, at 21 (highlighting the 
general importance of considering “the feelings [and] opinions . . . of the 
applicant”). 
121. Religious Persecution Claims, supra note 115, at 28 (citing Bastanipour 
v. INS, 980 F.2d 1129, 1132–33 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
122. Id. at 26 (quoting Zhang v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 713, 719 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
123. Compare Asylgesetz [AsylG] [Asylum Act], Sep. 2, 2008, BGBl I at 1798, 
as amended, § 3(1)(a)–(b), https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/asylvfg_ 
1992/BJNR111260992.html [https://perma.cc/A4SP-P4XY], with 2011 
Qualification Directive, supra note 15, art. 9(1)(a)–(b), and Council of 
Europe, 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 15(2), www.echr.coe.int/ 
Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/CWS4-5RSW]. See 
Heusch et al., supra note 15, at 21–22 (distinguishing between the 
“emergency-resistant” human rights set forth in the Asylum Act based on 
the European Convention and those human rights that may be limited by 
law in times of public emergency threatening the existence of a state without 
automatically constituting persecution). Religion, while recognized as 
protected, “central,” and “foundational,” is not one of those “emergency-
resistant” human rights. See, e.g., BVerwG, Mar. 5, 2009, 10 C 51.07, ¶ 13, 
http://www.bverwg.de/entscheidungen/pdf/050309U10C51.07.0.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/SUX5-6P9X]. Otherwise permissible limitations of human 
rights—including religious liberty—may constitute persecution, for example, 
if they are applied disproportionately or discriminatorily. Hailbronner, 
supra note 15, at 413. 
124. Compare AsylG § 3a(1)(a)–(b) with 2011 Qualification Directive, supra note 
15, art. 9(1)(a)–(b). See also Heusch et al., supra note 15, at 22–23 (noting 
that the cumulative principle is an innovation in German refugee 
jurisprudence derived from EU law). 
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ther by state or non-state actors operating within the boundaries of the 
applicant’s country of origin125—include acts of physical or mental vio-
lence; legal or administrative measures that either are facially discrimin-
atory or are applied in a discriminatory fashion; or prosecution or pun-
ishment that is disproportionate or discriminatory.126 The subjective 
motivation of the persecutor is irrelevant.127 
d. Summary 
The definition of persecution embraced by the UNHCR, the U.S., 
and Germany—despite the absence of a binding international defini-
tion—is very similar. It requires severe mistreatment, but allows 
asylum-seekers to show that their treatment reaches this level cumu-
latively. Common to all three regimes is the fact that both state and 
non-state actors qualify as potential agents of persecution. At least for 
the U.S. and Germany, it is irrelevant whether the persecutor meant to 
harm the applicants. 
Subjective considerations on the part of the applicants—such as 
how important a proscribed religious practice is to the individual seek-
ing asylum—are also discussed in German law. German law, however, 
is centered on the complex notion of “religious identity” when establish-
ing well-founded fear, the topic of the following section. 
2. Well-founded Fear 
a. The UNHCR 
The UNHCR defines “well-founded fear”128 as having a subjective 
component, “fear,” and an objective component, “well-founded,” and 
holds that the inquiry into a refugee’s claim of persecution should focus 
on the applicants’ statements, not on the situation in their country of 
origin.129 
 
125. Compare AsylG § 3c with 2011 Qualification Directive, supra note 15, art. 
6. 
126. Compare AsylG § 3a(2) with 2011 Qualification Directive, supra note 15, 
art. 9(2). These acts have in common that they are deliberate and targeted 
conduct; they are not simply incidental to war and natural disasters. Dietz, 
supra note 46, at 137; Hailbronner, supra note 15, at 417. 
127. BVerfG, 2 BvR 153/96, ¶ 23, Aug. 5, 1998, https://www.bundesver 
fassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/1998/08/rk19980805_
2bvr015396.html [https://perma.cc/27YK-2XUT]. 
128. This expression was added to the 1951 Convention “to express that a person 
has either been actually a victim of persecution or can show good reason why 
he fears persecution.” Zimmermann & Mahler, supra note 76, at 337 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). 
129. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 17, ¶¶ 37–38, at 11. But see 
James C. Hathaway & William S. Hicks, Is There a Subjective Element in 
the Refugee Convention’s Requirement of “Well-Founded Fear”?, 26 Mich. 
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Investigating the subjective element requires assessing the appli-
cants’ personality and, at times, their credibility, to establish whether 
“the predominant motive for [their] application is fear.”130 Investigating 
the objective element requires assessing statements made by the ap-
plicants in view of “the relevant background situation,” including the 
conditions in their country of origin.131 The objective element is satisfied 
if the applicants can reasonably show that the situation in their country 
of origin was or would be “intolerable” for them because of the reasons 
stated in the definition of refugee.132 Determinations of a future threat 
may require applicants to demonstrate that people like them have been 
persecuted, how the laws of their country of origin are applied, or that 
they are prominent or outspoken members of the community that may 
more likely become victims of persecution than obscure, quiet members 
of that same community.133 
Importantly, while internal relocation as an alternative to claiming 
refugee status abroad “is not explicitly referred to” in the 1951 inter-
national definition of a refugee, this question may “arise as part of the 
refugee status determination process.”134 A legitimate internal reloca-
 
J. Int’l. L. 505 (2005) (arguing that the review of refugee claims under the 
1951 Convention should abandon the traditional subjective-objective 
approach and be limited to objective factors, as required by the Convention 
itself); Zimmermann & Mahler, supra note 76, at 338 (noting that both 
“object and purpose of the 1951 Convention . . . support[] an interpretation 
of the notion of ‘well-founded fear’ as forward-looking expectation of risk 
based on objective reasons for such fear” (citing Hathaway & Hicks, supra, 
at 509)). This objective-only position was already advocated by Atle Grahl-
Madsen in 1966. 1 Atle Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in 
International Law 174 (1966) (“In fact, . . . the frame of mind of the 
individual hardly matters at all.”). 
130. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 17, ¶¶ 40–41, at 11–12. 
131. Id. ¶ 42, at 12. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. ¶ 43, at 12; see also Zimmermann & Mahler, supra note 76, at 341 
(noting that the “drafting history of the 1951 Convention does not provide 
any guidance” as to “what degree of risk is necessary in order to determine 
the existence of a well-founded fear of persecution”). 
134. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: 
“Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative” Within the Context of Article 
1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/03/04 (July 23, 2003); see also 
Zimmermann & Mahler, supra note 76, 445–49 (discussing the relatively 
recent, but now essential (in most jurisdictions) inquiry into whether 
applicants for refugee status had an internal-relocation alternative in light of 
the fact that “it is not self-evident” from the wording of the refugee definition 
that such an inquiry be conducted); Hathaway & Foster, supra note 21, 
at 332 (“[C]onsideration of internal protection aligns comfortably with the 
overarching object and purpose of the Refugee Convention, that being to 
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tion option should meet two basic criteria: First, the area in question 
must be one “where there is no risk of a well-founded fear of perse-
cution.”135 Second, those who experience persecution in one part of the 
country “could reasonably be expected to establish him/herself and live 
a normal life” in that area.136 Both criteria must be assessed “over 
time,” that is, not only at the time when the applicants fled their coun-
try of origin in the past, but also in a “forward-looking” manner to eval-
uate “whether the proposed area provides a meaningful alternative in 
the future.”137 
As observed at the beginning of this Note, a large number of people 
are currently classified as “internally displaced.”138 Although these indi-
viduals may enjoy some basic level of international assistance, their 
mere presence in a given country should not be construed to mean that 
 
provide surrogate international protection only where the national protection 
of one’s own country is not available.”). 
135. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 134, ¶ 6. Whether this criterion 
is met is established in a “relevance analysis.” Id. ¶¶ 7, 9–21. For a critique 
of this criterion based on where to locate the analysis of whether an internal 
relocation alternative exists within the language of the refugee definition, see 
Hathaway & Foster, supra note 21, at 333, 335–42 (arguing that the 
analysis should be based in the definition’s “state protection” language, not 
in its “well-founded fear” language). 
136. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 134, ¶ 6. Whether this criterion 
is met is established in the “reasonableness analysis.” Id. ¶¶ 7, 22–30; see 
also U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 17, ¶ 91, at 19 (noting that 
an internal-relocation alternative should not derail a refugee claim “if under 
all the circumstances it would not have been reasonable to expect [the 
applicant] to [take advantage of it]”). For a critique of the reasonableness 
criterion as providing too “fungible” a protection, see Hathaway & 
Foster, supra note 21, at 333 (basing this critique on the requirement of 
state protection within the applicants’ country of origin). 
137. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 134, ¶ 8. This paragraph 
addresses some of the concerns voiced by commentators on earlier 
formulations that remained ambivalent as to the point in time that would 
be determinative for establishing a reasonable, safe in-country alternative. 
See, e.g., Zimmermann & Mahler, supra note 76, at 449–50 (faulting the 
UNHCR Handbook for giving the impression that determinative for the 
inquiry into internal flight alternatives are the conditions existing when the 
applicants left their country of origin and arguing that establishing instead 
the time of assessment as the “decisive point in time in refugee status 
determination” is also supported by the nonrefoulement provision of the 1951 
Convention). The alternative to the UNHCR’s two-pronged approach 
formulated by Hathaway and Foster looks to the future when assessing 
whether a safe in-country alternative is actually available. Hathaway & 
Foster, supra note 21, at 361. 
138. See supra note 2. 
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there is a safe and reasonable internal-relocation alternative for would-
be refugees.139 
In the case of sur place claimants on religious grounds, the critical 
determination is whether the claimants’ actions—e.g., their conversion 
or apostasy—are likely to come to the attention of the local agents of 
persecution and how these actions will likely be viewed by such agents 
in their country of origin.140 If these agents will likely remain ignorant 
of the claimants’ activities or disregard them as opportunistic, a well-
founded fear cannot be established.141 
b. U.S. Law 
Applicants who can demonstrate by a preponderance of credible 
evidence142 that they were persecuted in the past create a rebuttable 
presumption of well-founded fear of future persecution.143 In the absence 
of past persecution, applicants also need to establish a well-founded fear 
of future persecution by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Excluded in principle from having such a well-founded fear are 
those applicants who could avoid persecution by relocating internally 
within their country of origin.144 But this requirement of internal relo-
cation applies only “if under all the circumstances it would be reason-
able to expect the applicant to do so.”145 This reasonableness require-
ment does not require the applicants to show that they would face 
persecution everywhere in their country of origin. Instead, the inquiry 
 
139. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 134, ¶¶ 31–32. 
140. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 100, ¶ 35; see also Hathaway 
& Foster, supra note 21, at 79–80 (noting that sur place applications should 
not be given a second-rate status but should simply be examined based on 
whether the claimants’ actions abroad could become known to potential 
persecutors in their country of origin and whether the risk created thereby 
“is both sufficiently serious . . . and based on an actual or imputed 
Convention ground”). 
141. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 100, ¶ 36. 
142. The burden-of-proof and credibility provisions in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) 
were added by the REAL ID Act of 2005, enacted as part of the Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, 
and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, tit. I, § 101(a)(3), 119 
Stat. 231, 303 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012)). 
143. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2016); see U.S. Citizenship & Immigration 
Servs., Asylum Eligibility Part II: Well-Founded Fear 26 (2009) 
[hereinafter Eligibility II], https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/ 
USCIS/Humanitarian/Refugees%20%26%20Asylum/Asylum/AOBTC%20
Lesson%20Plans/Well-Founded-Fear-31aug10.pdf [https://perma.cc/U66K-
QRM9]. 
144. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(ii). 
145. Id. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 3·2018 
Testing Religion 
1005 
focuses on factors such as “other serious harm,” “ongoing civil strife 
within the country,” a country’s infrastructure as well as “geographical 
limitations” and “social and cultural constraints.”146 Absent a reason-
able internal-relocation alternative, establishing “well-founded fear” 
requires applicants to prove the subjective element of fear of persecution 
in their country of origin due to one or more of the five protected char-
acteristics and the objective element of a “reasonable possibility of 
suffering such persecution” in their country of origin.147 
As for the subjective element mentioned in the previous para-
graph,148 the fear of persecution experienced by the applicant must be 
genuine.149 Moreover, while this fear does not have to be the applicant’s 
only motivation, it must be the “primary motivation for requesting 
refuge.”150 As for the objective element, the regulation’s “reasonable 
possibility” requirement is a standard of proof lower than the “more 
likely than not” standard required in other immigration proceedings.151 
To meet this standard, applicants must establish “facts that would lead 
a reasonable person in similar circumstances to fear persecution.”152 
 
146. Id. § 208.13(b)(3). 
147. Id. § 208.13(b)(2); see Eligibility II, supra note 143, at 4–5; U.S. 
Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Asylum Eligibility Part IV: 
Burden of Proof, Standards of Proof, and Evidence 11–12 (2006) 
[hereinafter Eligibility IV], https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/ 
USCIS/Humanitarian/Refugees%20%26%20Asylum/Asylum/AOBTC%20
Lesson%20Plans/Burden-of-Proof-Standards-Proof-Evidence-31aug01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/23JT-3GGX]. 
148. See also Anker, supra note 46, § 2:6 (discussing the pros and cons of even 
having a subjective element at this juncture). For a broader discussion, see 
generally Hathaway & Hicks, supra note 129 (arguing that the review of 
asylum claims should abandon the traditional bipartite approach and be 
limited instead to objective factors); see also Hathaway & Foster, supra 
note 21, at 92 (arguing that the bipartite approach is “neither 
desirable . . . nor defensible . . . .”). 
149. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 211 (BIA 1985) (defining fear as “a genuine 
apprehension or awareness of danger in another country”); see Eligibility 
II, supra note 143, at 4. 
150. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 211. 
151. Eligibility II, supra note 143, at 5 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 
U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (noting that a one-in-ten chance of persecution would 
lead to a “well-founded fear of being persecuted”)). The Supreme Court 
noted that the comparatively low standard of proof for “fear” for asylum 
purposes has to do with the discretionary nature of asylum and the 
mandatory nature of withholding and deferral of removal. Cardoza-Fonseca, 
480 U.S. at 443–44. 
152. Eligibility II, supra note 143, at 5 (citing, inter alia, Guevara Flores v. 
INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986); Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 
439, 448 (BIA 1987)). 
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The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 153 —in its 1987 
Mogharrabi opinion154—developed a four-pronged test to distinguish the 
statutorily required “well-founded fear” from mere “irrational 
apprehension.” 155  To prove that their fear of persecution is well-
founded, applicants must produce credible evidence that meets the 
following four criteria: (1) They must possess—or be believed to 
possess—one of the five protected characteristics, e.g., hold certain 
religious views or engage in certain religious practices. 156  (2) The 
“persecutor is aware or could become aware” that they possess—or are 
believed to possess—one of the five protected characteristics. 157 (3) 
“[T]he persecutor has the capability to persecute” them.158 (4) “[T]he 
persecutor has the inclination to persecute” them,159 demonstrated, e.g., 
by regularly enforcing persecutory laws that ban religious practices or 
conversions.160 
Appellate courts do not seem to have widely adopted Mogharrabi’s 
four criteria. Mogharrabi only intended these factors as “useful guide-
lines” to assist in the assessment as to whether the real standard em-
braced by that opinion was met, i.e., that “a reasonable person in [the 
applicant’s] circumstances would fear persecution.”161 After some criti-
 
153. See supra note 87. 
154. Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 446–47; see R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 942–
43 (BIA 2001) (referring to the four Mogharrabi criteria as exemplifying the 
BIA’s “longstanding analysis of the elements that must be present” to 
establish a fear of persecution). The Mogharrabi elements have been modified 
to adopt to early criticism of the test. The modification affects the first and 
third prongs, dropping Mogharrabi’s requirement that a persecutor seek to 
overcome the protected characteristics by means of punishment. Kasinga, 21 
I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (BIA 1996); see Eligibility II, supra note 143, at 6–
7 (citing Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 647–48 (9th Cir. 1997)); 
Eligibility I, supra note 88, at 16. USCIS also uses this test to evaluate 
claims made by sur place refugees. Eligibility II, supra note 143, at 20. 
155. See Blanco-Comarribas v. INS, 830 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1987). 
156. Eligibility II, supra note 143, at 6. 
157. Id. at 6–7. 
158. Id. at 7. 
159. Id. 
160. Hathaway & Foster, supra note 21, at 130 (cautioning that even a 
persecutory law that is not regularly enforced may still result in serious harm 
on account of a protected characteristic, for example, by exposing the person 
to blackmail and private law enforcement based on an at least perceived 
unwillingness of the government to protect the victim). 
161. Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 445–46 (BIA 1987) (quoting Guevara Flores 
v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986)). 
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cal reference to Mogharrabi’s four factors, mainly in the 1990s,162 courts 
typically demand that an applicant’s fear be “both subjectively genuine 
and objectively reasonable” to constitute “well-founded fear.”163 
Mogharrabi would not disagree with this two-pronged test. The 
structure of the Mogharrabi opinion shows that the BIA’s unified form-
ula, despite its echoes of the negligence standard in tort law—“a reason-
able person in the applicant’s circumstances”—does not exclude the 
consideration of the applicant’s subjective fear. This is because the 
opinion appreciatively discusses a number of appellate court opinions 
that espouse a variation of the subjective-objective formula. 164 
Eventually, Mogharrabi settled on the Fifth Circuit’s reasonable person 
formulation, which the Fifth Circuit meant to incorporate the 
subjective and objective prongs of the test.165 And while the four criteria 
themselves show no consideration for the applicant’s mental state, they 
are clearly not meant to represent the entire extent of the inquiry. But, 
as Mogharrabi maintains, any subjective considerations come into play 
after the objective basis of that fear has been established by “credible, 
direct, and specific evidence.”166 
 
162. See, e.g., Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 647–48 (9th Cir. 1997). For a 
more recent, and positive, reference to Mogharrabi, see Kyaw Zwar Tun v. 
INS, 445 F.3d 554, 565, 569–71 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting the four criteria and 
then employing the parts of the test particularly relevant to the specific facts 
of the case, which involved a Burmese national who became active in the 
Burmese pro-democracy movement while in the U.S.). 
163. See, e.g., Granados v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 578 F. App’x 866, 870–71 (11th 
Cir. 2014) (quoting Ruiz v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1257 (11th 
Cir. 2006) (per curiam)); see also Bathula v. Holder, 723 F.3d 889, 898 n.27 
(7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bolante v. Mukasey, 539 F.3d 790, 794 (7th Cir. 
2008)). According to the Seventh Circuit, the objective prong requires the 
applicants to “present specific, detailed facts showing a good reason” for their 
fear of persecution. Bolante, 539 F.3d at 794 (quoting Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 
348 F.3d 611, 618 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
164. Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 443–45 (discussing Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 
767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); Diaz-Escobar v. 
INS, 782 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1986); Yousif v. INS, 794 F.2d 236 (6th Cir. 
1986); Guevara Flores, 786 F.2d at 1242). 
165. Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. at 444–45 (quoting Guevara Flores, 786 F.2d at 
1249). 
166. Id. at 444 (quoting Cardoza-Fonseca, 767 F.2d at 1453; Diaz-Escobar, 782 
F.2d at 1492). Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012) (requiring that 
the applicant’s testimony in general “is credible, is persuasive, and refers to 
specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee” within 
the statutory definition), with Cardoza-Fonseca, 767 F.2d at 1453 (quoting 
Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
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The Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca167 makes 
evaluating the BIA’s Mogharrabi opinion—and balancing the subjective 
and objective elements of “well-founded fear”—difficult. The Court, on 
the one hand, requires the “subjective mental state of the alien” to be 
considered “to some extent.”168 On the other hand, it declares that there 
should be an “obvious focus on the individual’s subjective beliefs.”169 
Evidently, under this imprecise guidance, not every “two-pronged 
approach” accounting for the subjective and objective elements of “well-
founded fear” will look the same: For instance, one panel of the Ninth 
Circuit criticized Mogharrabi as unresponsive to the Supreme Court’s 
Cardoza-Fonseca opinion.170 While the panel claimed that the Supreme 
Court demanded the “primary focus” of the inquiry to be “on the sub-
jective state of mind of the petitioner,”171 the Supreme Court’s opinion 
lacks this clarity.172 Hence, another panel of the Ninth Circuit found 
Mogharrabi’s formulation of the reasonable person standard to be “not 
inconsistent” with the Supreme Court’s decision and a two-pronged 
approach.173 
While applicants must show that their subjective fear is genuine, 
they need not show that they would be persecuted individually to estab-
lish that their fear is well-founded. Instead, they must show, first, that 
there is a “pattern or practice” in their country of origin that subjects 
“a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant” to persecution 
for one or more of the five protected characteristics and, second, that 
the applicant is included in, or identified with, that group in a way that 
makes the applicant’s fear of future persecution reasonable.174 In other 
words, applicants must show that they share one or more of the five 
 
167. 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
168. Id. at 430–31. 
169. Id. at 431. 
170. Valle-Zometa v. INS, No. 88-7174, 1990 WL 208725, at *3 (9th Cir. Dec. 5, 
1990). 
171. Id. 
172. See Steel, supra note 46, § 8:8 (noting that Cardoza-Fonseca “did not 
determine with precision what would establish a well-founded fear”). 
173. Cuadras v. INS, 910 F.2d 567, 570 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Hathaway & 
Foster, supra note 21, at 93–95 (discussing a number of foreign jurisdictions 
that, applying the dual subjective-objective standard prevalent in the U.S., 
have turned establishing the subjective element into a “threshold question”). 
174. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(iii) (2016); see also Religious Persecution 
Claims, supra note 115, at 27–28 (noting that “mere membership in a 
religious community” will ordinarily not suffice to establish an applicant’s 
eligibility for religious asylum but also emphasizing that an individual need 
not prove individual persecution “if she shows that she is included in a group 
that suffers a pattern or practice of persecution”). 
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protected characteristics with those who are persecuted in a given 
country on account of those characteristics.175 
c. German Law 
Under German law, reviewing claims of a well-founded fear of future 
persecution on account of religion takes place in three basic steps:176 
First, a court must evaluate the objective—qualitative or quanti-
tative 177 —cumulative aspect of the severity of the threat to the 
applicant’s physical integrity, life, or physical liberty, e.g., by means of 
degrading treatment or punishment: How severe are the threats the 
applicants face? If the applicant claims to be exposed to criminal pros-
ecution for a proscribed religious practice, the court needs to review the 
actual practice of prosecution in the applicant’s country of origin for 
someone in the applicant’s position: A prohibition that is not 
apparently enforced provides no grounds for a significant risk of 
persecution.178 
Second, a court must evaluate the subjective aspect of the severity 
of the threatened infraction on the applicant’s religious liberty. Here, 
courts should review the special importance of the proscribed religious 
practice to the applicants’ “religious identity,” unless mere membership 
in a religious community already causes persecution.179 In other words, 
how important is the proscribed conduct to the applicants? While the 
practices of their religious community can provide circumstantial evi-
 
175. Eligibility II, supra note 143, at 9 (citing Meguenine v. INS, 139 F.3d 25, 
29 (1st Cir. 1998) (rejecting the claims of an apolitical health care worker 
from Algeria that healthcare workers face persecution, where the record 
showed that only healthcare workers who are opponents of Islamic 
fundamentalists faced persecution)). 
176. See BVerwG, Feb. 20, 2013, 10 C 23.12, http://www.bverwg. 
de/entscheidungen/pdf/200213U10C23.12.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6A2-
C5DQ]; Hailbronner, supra note 15, at 423–25; see also Uwe-Dietmar 
Berlit, Aktuelle Rechtsprechung zum Flüchtlingsrecht, Neue Zeitschrift 
für Verwaltungsrecht—Extra, Feb. 15, 2017, at 1, 15–16, 
http://rsw.beck.de/rsw/upload/NVwZ/NVwZ-Extra_2017_04.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/GH28-U2PC] (discussing current German refugee jurisprudence 
on religious converts). 
177. BVerwG, 10 C 23.12, ¶¶ 35–37; see also Asylgesetz [AsylG] [Asylum Act], 
Sep. 2, 2008, BGBl I at 1798, as amended, § 3a(1), https://www.gesetze-
im-internet.de/asylvfg_1992/BJNR111260992.html [https://perma.cc/A4S 
P-P4XY]. 
178. BVerwG, 10 C 23.12, ¶ 28. 
179. Id. ¶¶ 21, 33, 41 (distinguishing between persecution due to the applicant’s 
membership in a religious community and due to the applicant’s “deliberate 
conduct” (willensgesteuertes Verhalten)). But see infra note 223 (noting that 
the UNHCR distinguishes three elements of “religion” of which “identity” is 
only one that may or may not be present in a “sincerely” religious person). 
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dence here, the decisive inquiry aims at establishing how the individual 
applicants live their beliefs and whether the proscribed exercise of the 
applicants’ beliefs is indispensable for them personally according to 
their understanding of their beliefs.180 
“Religious identity” is an admittedly complex term.181 The current 
Presiding Justice of the refugee-and-asylum-law panel of the Federal 
Administrative Court locates the meaning of the term somewhere be-
tween a quasi-static, fateful-irreversible entity that is independent of 
one’s own experiences, actions, and decisions and some attitude that 
can be changed at will on short notice.182 
The term “religious identity”—employed to give meaning to 
“religion” in the context of the other protected characteristics under 
the Convention183—seems to be derived from German jurisprudence’s 
 
180. Id. ¶ 29. 
181. Uwe Berlit, Aktuelle Rechtsprechung des BVerwG zum Asyl- und 
Flüchtlingsrecht, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht—Extra, 
June 15, 2015, at 1, 2, http://rsw.beck.de/rsw/upload/NVwZ/NVwZ-
Extra_2015_12.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CTF-6T9J]. 
182. Id. Similarly, Reinhard Marx rejected the older, “static” understanding of 
“identity” in favor of a dynamic one that “aims at the public and the 
community and includes activities of the individual.” Reinhard Marx, Schutz 
der Religionsfreiheit im Flüchtlingrecht, in Grenzüberschreitendes 
Recht—Crossing Frontiers 217, 224 (Georg Jochum et al. eds., 2012). 
Concretely, Marx thought of “religious identity” as comprising “freedom of 
conscience,” including the freedom to act on one’s conscience, and “a 
tendency toward something that is pre-established, independent of the will,” 
such as religious traditions, rituals, and symbols that shape adherents of a 
particular religion and create in them a disposition to act in a certain, 
predictable way. Id. at 224–25 (citing Clifford Geertz, The 
Interpretation of Cultures 95 (1973)). Geertz’s model does not 
necessarily seem to capture the “essence” of religion, but rather seems to be 
based on Aristotle’s understanding of ethics where habitual virtues, created 
by constantly acting in virtuous ways, are dispositions to act virtuously 
under all circumstances; see also Richard Kraut, Aristotle’s Ethics, in The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2016), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/aristotle-ethics [https:// 
perma.cc/G6DV-CARY]. 
183. The common genus of the five protected characteristics was described by the 
Federal Administrative Court—based on the events during and after World 
War II that gave rise to the 1951 Convention—as “human characteristics 
and behaviors . . . that, according to historical experience, represented, and 
continue to represent, the most frequent and decisive points of contact and 
reference for the suppression and persecution of those who are different and 
think differently.” BVerwG, Mar. 15, 1988, 9 C 278.86, ¶ 16, https:// 
www.jurion.de/urteile/bverwg/1988-03-15/bverwg-9-c-27886/ [https:// 
perma.cc/2RE8-E9TH]. Against the historical backdrop, a certain 
understanding of the characteristics of nationality and race are given 
controlling weight for the interpretation of the other three characteristics. 
Id. ¶¶ 17–18 (construing homosexuality as a protected characteristic in 
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traditional distinction between an inner core area of religious liberty, 
that is essential for the religious identity of the individual and that may 
not be restricted without constituting persecution, and an external as-
pect of this freedom that may be restricted because it is not essential 
for one’s “religious identity.”184 The inner aspect of the freedom of reli-
gion includes the freedom to have or not to have a religious belief; the 
ability to change this belief; and the freedom to profess one’s religion 
individually and collectively within the confines of one’s own religious 
community. The external aspect includes the freedom to practice one’s 
beliefs publicly.185 
In 2012, this distinction was overturned by the EU’s Court of 
Justice. The court thereby expanded the area that may be essential for 
one’s “religious identity”—and, thus, relevant for refugee status deter-
minations—to include public manifestations of one’s religious beliefs, so 
long as they are “of particular importance to the person concerned in 
order to preserve his religious identity.”186 
As the above-cited Presiding Justice understands this EU decision, 
it highlights that, while “religious identity” is a subjective notion,187 it 
 
analogy to race and nationality as “fateful,” “inescapable,” “immutable,” not 
subject to the whims of the applicants as “mere inclination” (citing, among 
others, Grahl-Madsen, supra note 129, at 217 (grouping “race, nationality, 
membership in a social group, and—in certain respects—religion” together 
as reasons “beyond the control of the individual”))). But see Marx, supra 
note 182, at 221 (arguing that such a static understanding of the protected 
characteristics negates human autonomy in the interest of administrative 
efficiency). 
184. BVerwG, Dec. 9, 2010, 10 C 19.09, ¶ 20, http://www.bverwg.de/entsche 
idungen/pdf/091210B10C19.09.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VCL-PS9K]. 
185. Id. ¶ 27; see also Antje von Ungern-Sternberg, Religionsfreiheit in 
Europa 248–49 (2008) (discussing the background of this distinction 
between the applicants’ private religious sphere, the forum internum, and 
the public exercise of their religion in the forum externum based on cases). 
186. Joined Cases C-71 & 99/11, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. Y & Z, ¶¶ 62–
63, 70, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CEL 
EX:62011CJ0071&from=EN [https://perma.cc/5E22-JXY4]. 
187. See Ungern-Sternberg, supra note 185, at 233–34 (discussing the 
transition from an “objective,” or institutional, to a “subjective,” or 
individual, understanding of the constitutional provisions regarding the 
freedom of belief and the free exercise of religion set forth in Germany’s 
Constitution, the Basic Law); see Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], art. 
4(1)–(2), translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/ 
englisch_gg.pdf [https://perma.cc/NMW9-T5TA]; see also Donald P. 
Kommers & Russell A. Miller, The Constitutional Jurisprudence 
of the Federal Republic of Germany 538–66 (3d ed. 2012) (discussing 
key aspects of the constitutional status of religion and religious communities 
based on extensive quotations from seminal decisions by the Federal 
Constitutional Court). 
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is “more than intellectual arbitrariness in the deliberate selection of pro-
posals that endow life with transcendental meaning (transzendentale 
Sinnstiftungsangebote).”188 The very notion of “identity” implies “the 
binding character” that the sanctioned religious conduct at issue has 
for the applicant.189 While the demands on the importance of a given 
practice for one’s religious identity should not be overextended—e.g., 
by requiring applicants to prove that they would “suffer an internal 
breakdown or at least severe psychological damage” if forced to abstain 
from a particular religious practice—the practice must nonetheless be 
“indispensable” for the applicants.190 
Since “religious identity” is an internal reality, it can only be 
established based on the applicant’s statements and by drawing infer-
ences from external evidence.191 Courts, therefore, are required to en-
gage in quite extensive fact-finding to establish the religious self-
understanding of the applicant, both in the country of origin and in 
Germany, before a decision can be made.192 The standard of proof the 
applicant must meet here is what the court describes as “the complete 
conviction of the court.” 193 This is also called the “normal standard of 
 
188. Berlit, supra note 181, at 3. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. (paraphrasing BVerwG, Feb. 20, 2013, 10 C 23.12, ¶ 30, 
http://www.bverwg.de/entscheidungen/pdf/200213U10C23.12.0.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/A6A2-C5DQ] (noting that the religious practice at bar must be 
“a central element of [the applicants’] religious identity and, in this sense, 
indispensable [for them]”)). 
191. BVerwG, 10 C 23.12, ¶ 31. 
192. Id. In 2015, the Federal Administrative Court rejected the claim that, based 
on the peculiar way German law recognizes some religious communities, 
statements made by ministers of such communities as to the sincerity of an 
applicant’s religious beliefs should be dispositive. BVerwG, Aug. 25, 2015, 1 
B 40.15, http://www.bverwg.de/entscheidungen/pdf/250815B1B40.15.0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RD7X-DKJX]; see Kommers & Miller, supra note 187, 
at 538–39 (outlining the basic constitutional framework of the relationship 
between the state and the various religious communities in Germany). 
193. BVerwG, 10 C 23.12, ¶ 30. Berlit concedes that this high standard of proof 
creates “enormous problems of proof.” Berlit, supra note 181, at 3. See 
Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung [VwGO] [Code of Administrative 
Court Procedure], as amended, § 108(1), https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/bundesrecht/vwgo/gesamt.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GZW-YKET]; 
BVerwG, Dec. 9, 2010, 10 C 19.09, ¶ 43 http://www.bverwg.de/ 
entscheidungen/pdf/091210B10C19.09.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VCL-
PS9K]. The pertinent provision of the German Code of Civil Procedure and 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure are almost identically worded as their 
administrative counterpart. See Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [Code of 
Civil Procedure], as amended, § 286(1), https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/bundesrecht/zpo/gesamt.pdf [https://perma.cc/UK5V-CGV9]; 
Strafprozessordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure], as 
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proof” (Regelbeweismaß),194 which German courts describe as the level 
of proof that, after the judge’s free evaluation of the evidence presented, 
silences doubts in the judge’s mind without ruling them out com-
pletely.195 
If the applicants did not engage in the proscribed religious practice 
in their country of origin because of a well-founded fear of persecution, 
this is not evidence of the fact that the practice at issue is not of special 
importance to their religious identity, since they may have abstained 
from those practices because they feared persecution.196 But if the ap-
plicants, while living in Germany, do not engage in the religious 
practices proscribed in their country of origin, this is evidence that the 
proscribed practice is not really central to the applicant’s religious 
identity, unless the applicants produce convincing reasons for not en-
gaging in these practices in Germany.197 If the applicants do engage in 
such practices while living in Germany, the court must then review 
whether these practices are especially important for the applicant in 
order to preserve their religious identity or whether they engaged in 
these practices only to be recognized as a refugee.198 Evidently, this is a 
particularly relevant inquiry in the case of sur place refugees, for which 
German law provides expressly.199 
 
amended, § 261, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/stpo/ 
gesamt.pdf [https://perma.cc/63QA-XT6N]; see also Kevin M. Clermont, 
Standards of Proof Revisited, 33 Vt. L. Rev. 469, 471 (2009) (noting that 
civil-law countries “apply the same or a very similar standard in noncriminal 
cases as they do in criminal cases”). 
194. Holger Jäckel, Das Beweisrecht der ZPO 146 (2009) (discussing the 
meaning of this term of art). 
195. See, e.g., BVerwG, Feb. 8, 2011, 10 B 1.11, ¶ 8, http://www.bverwg. 
de/entscheidungen/pdf/080211B10B1.11.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/TLW6-
QT8F] (noting that under VwGO, § 108(1), “the court must not demand 
irrefutable certainty, but may be satisfied in truly doubtful cases with a 
degree of certainty sufficient for practical life that silences doubts even if 
they cannot be completely ruled out”); Heusch et al., supra note 15, at 
152–53. For a comparative-law perspective on the German view of standards 
of proof within the civil-law tradition, see Kevin M. Clermont & Emily 
Sherwin, A Comparative View of Standards of Proof, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 
243 (2002). 
196. BVerwG, 10 C 23.12, ¶ 31. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. Compare Asylgesetz [AsylG] [Asylum Act], Sep. 2, 2008, BGBl I at 1798, 
as amended, § 28(1a), https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/asylvfg_ 
1992/BJNR111260992.html [https://perma.cc/A4SP-P4XY], with 2011 
Qualification Directive, supra note 15, art. 5(1)–(2) (providing for sur place 
refugees that well-founded fear of persecution may be based on events 
occurring after the applicants left their country of origin, “especially also on 
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Third, German courts must evaluate the “real risk” of persecution. 
Since a refugee’s fear of persecution has to be “well founded,” the court 
needs to review whether the applicant faces a “real risk” (beachtliche 
Wahrscheinlichkeit) of being persecuted for the proscribed public reli-
gious practice.200 Courts here should not only engage in a quantifying 
process that considers the objective likelihood of persecution. 201 
Considering the totality of circumstances—including the severity of the 
feared sanction 202—courts should also take a qualitative view that 
weighs everything from the perspective of a reasonable person in the 
situation of the applicant: Given the evidence before the court, would 
a reasonable person fear persecution?203 The court must be fully con-
 
the alien’s conduct that is an expression and continuation of a conviction or 
orientation that already existed in the country of origin”), and Zimmermann 
& Mahler, supra note 76, 332 (noting that, under current EU law, 
“[c]ontinuity provides an indication as to the credibility of the applicant, but 
does not constitute a requirement for recognition as a refugee as such”). The 
applicable EU directive provides that the applicant’s individual assessment 
should also consider “whether the applicant’s activities since leaving the 
country of origin were engaged in for the sole or main purpose of creating 
the necessary conditions” for qualifying as a refugee. 2011 Qualification 
Directive, supra note 15, art. 4(3)(d). But, importantly, the goal of this 
inquiry is “to assess whether those activities would expose the applicant to 
persecution or serious harm if returned to [their] country [of origin].” Id. 
German law continues to make continuity a requirement for applications for 
political asylum. AsylG § 28(1); Hailbronner, supra note 15, at 420–21. 
200. BVerwG, 10 C 23.12, ¶ 32. 
201. Id. 
202. BVerwG, Nov. 5, 1991, 9 C 118.90, ¶ 18, https://www.jurion.de/ 
de/document/fullview/0:128292/ [https://perma.cc/W2NJ-QGH8] (noting 
that it makes a significant difference if the expected sanction is a month in 
prison or the death penalty). 
203. BVerwG, 10 C 23.12, ¶ 32. The court here referenced its own precedent, 
BVerwG, 9 C 118.90, ¶ 18 (citing approvingly the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Cardoza-Fonseca opinion and holding that a reasonable person, rejecting a 
mere theoretical possibility of persecution, may have a well-founded fear of 
persecution, even if the likelihood of persecution is less than 50 percent); see 
Hailbronner, supra note 15, at 416. For a German administrative court 
decision espousing the reasonable-person standard as early as 1959, see 
Zimmermann & Mahler, supra note 76, at 341 n.367. Unfortunately, this 
decision—VG Ansbach, Mar. 25, 1959, 3719 II/58—was destroyed at the 
end of the retention period. E-mail from Norbert Schneider, Head Registry 
Clerk, Administrative Court Ansbach, to author (Feb. 7, 2017, 07:38 EST) 
(on file with author). A translation of the opinion’s critical wording is found 
in Grahl-Madsen, supra note 129, at 174 ([W]ell-founded fear . . . exist[s] 
when a reasonable person would draw the conclusion from external facts that 
he would be subject to persecution in his home country.” (quotation marks 
omitted)). Grahl-Madsen provided three other examples from 1960s German 
courts referring to the reasonable person standard, but found those less 
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vinced that a reasonable person would.204 While evidence of past perse-
cution creates a rebuttable presumption that the applicants will also  
be subject to persecution in their country of origin in the future,205 the 
rebuttal will succeed if the likelihood of future persecution is less than 
a “real risk.”206 
Part of the totality of the circumstances to be assessed under 
German law to establish a “real risk” of persecution are two additional, 
related elements: First, the possibility of protection against persecution 
by non-state actors; second, the possibility of internal protection 
against persecution. First, just as German law recognizes non-state 
actors of persecution, it also recognizes non-state actors of protection 
who may obviate the need to seek refuge outside the applicants’ country 
of origin.207 To do so, these non-state actors of protection must provide 
 
helpful since they did not provide any external points of reference for the 
reasonableness of the fear. Id. at 174–75. 
204. BVerwG, Feb. 8, 2011, 10 B 1.11, ¶¶ 7–8, http://www.bverwg. 
de/entscheidungen/pdf/080211B10B1.11.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/TLW6-
QT8F] (citing Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung [VwGO] [Code of 
Administrative Court Procedure], as amended, § 108(1), https:// 
www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/vwgo/gesamt.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/6GZW-YKET]); see also Kathrin Groh, Zur Aufhebung von Asyl- und 
Flüchtlingsanerkennungen im Geflecht von völker- und europarechtlichen 
Verpflichtungen, 29 Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht und 
Ausländerpolitik 1, 5 (2009), http://www.zar.nomos.de/fileadmin/zar/ 
doc/Aufsatz_ZAR_09_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/R36S-3VKW] (“Agencies 
and courts need not be convinced that the applicant was actually afraid (sich 
tatsächlich gefürchtet hat), but must be convinced that he would have been 
justified in being afraid (sich fürchten durfte).”). 
205. BVerwG, 10 C 23.12, ¶¶ 17, 21; BVerwG, Apr. 27, 2010, 10 C 5.09, ¶¶ 19–
23, http://www.bverwg.de/entscheidungen/pdf/270410U10C5.09.0.pdf [htt 
ps://perma.cc/3EJD-7YVL] (discussing the—here unaltered—2004 
predecessor of the 2011 Qualification Directive, supra note 15, art. 4(4) 
(noting that past persecution or past threat of persecution directed at the 
applicants “is a serious indication of the applicant’s well-founded fear of 
persecution . . . unless there are good reasons to consider that such 
persecution . . . will not be repeated”)); BVerwG, June 1, 2011, 10 C 25.10, 
¶¶ 21–22, http://www.bverwg.de/entscheidungen/pdf/010611U10C25.10. 
0.pdf [https://perma.cc/GKQ2-UNF4]; see Dietz, supra note 46, at 138; 
Hailbronner, supra note 15, at 416–17. 
206. BVerwG, 10 C 5.09, ¶ 23 (noting that the lowered standard of probability 
German courts had used for applicants subject to past persecution was 
overruled by EU law in the refugee context). The lowered standard of 
probability is still in effect in domestic law governing applications for 
political asylum under GG, art. 16, which is not affected by EU law. Dietz, 
supra note 46, at 129; Heusch et al., supra note 15, at 11–12. 
207. Compare Asylgesetz [AsylG] [Asylum Act], Sep. 2, 2008, BGBl I at 1798, 
as amended, § 3d(1)–(2), https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/asylvfg_ 
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would-be refugees access to quasi-state protection, which means in a 
basic sense that the protection against persecution they offer cannot be 
ineffective or only temporary in nature.208 To meet this requirement, 
any actor of protection must take “suitable steps” to prevent persecu-
tion, for example, by means of effective legal regulations providing for 
the detection, prosecution, and punishment of persecutory conduct.209 
Second, applicants will not be recognized as refugees210 if they—at 
the time their applications are adjudicated211—have a safe and reason-
able option of protection against persecution within their country of 
 
1992/BJNR111260992.html [https://perma.cc/A4SP-P4XY], with 2011 
Qualification Directive, supra note 15, art. 7(1)(b). 
208. Compare AsylG § 3d(2) with 2011 Qualification Directive, supra note 15, 
art. 7(2). See also 2011 Qualification Directive, supra note 15, art. 4(3)(c) 
(listing some relevant “personal circumstances of the applicant,” including 
“background, gender and age”). 
209. 2011 Qualification Directive, supra note 15, art. 7(2). While this functional 
approach to protection mirrors nicely the persecution side of the equation 
and has been invoked in court, questions remain as to its practicability and 
its fidelity to the international definition of a refugee. Hathaway & 
Foster, supra note 21, at 289–92. Questions about this approach’s fidelity 
to the definition of a refugee are underscored by the fact that German and 
EU law directly refer to this definition. Compare AsylG § 3(1)(2)(a) with 
2011 Qualification Directive, supra note 15, art. 2(d). While the international 
definition of a refugee is broad enough to accommodate state and non-state 
persecutors because it is indeterminate at this point—it merely speaks of 
“being persecuted”—it is determinate as to the actors of protection by 
speaking expressly, and exclusively, of “the protection of that country,” not 
merely of protection in that country. This is in keeping with the definition’s 
precedent. See supra note 103. 
 Hailbronner argues that allowing for non-state actors that meet relatively 
demanding standards to qualify as actors of protection—for example, 
international organizations controlling at least a substantial portion of the 
applicants’ country of origin—is in keeping with the principle of surrogacy 
that forms the basis of the international refugee law. Hailbronner, supra 
note 15, at 428. But he does not address the international definition of a 
refugee itself, which assumes the surrogacy of states in the protection of 
refugees, not that of states and non-state actors such as tribes. 
210. See Dietz, supra note 46, 140 (noting that the existence of an internal 
alternative to seeking refuge abroad does not deny the fact of persecution 
elsewhere in the country, but simply negates the recognition as refugee 
abroad based on the principle of surrogacy in refugee protection (citing 
BVerwG, Jan. 19, 2009, 10 C 52.07, ¶ 29, https://www.jurion.de/ 
urteile/bverwg/2009-01-19/bverwg-10-c-5207/ [https://perma.cc/LP4Z-
FXY6])). 
211. Compare AsylG § 3e(2) (“Bei der Prüfung der Frage . . . .”) with 2011 
Qualification Directive, supra note 15, art. 8(2) (“In examining 
whether . . . .”). See Hailbronner, supra note 15, at 429; Heusch et al., 
supra note 15, at 34. 
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origin.212 In general, decision-makers are required to consider both the 
general conditions in a safe part of the country and the personal circum-
stances of the applicants.213 When evaluating the possibility of internal 
protection, it would be unreasonable to expect applicants to move to a 
safe part of their country of origin where they would not be able to 
meet a minimum level of subsistence (Existenzminimum).214 This low 
level of subsistence may be met by earning a living, even in the informal 
economy and below the applicants’ qualifications—though not in crimi-
nal ventures or under conditions of general illegality—or by receiving 
humanitarian aid.215 
d. Summary 
The UNHCR, the U.S., and Germany evaluate whether an appli-
cant has a well-founded fear of persecution by considering subjective 
and objective factors. The UNHCR emphasizes the subjective factor by 
looking for a genuine fear of persecution. U.S. law, due to ambivalent 
Supreme Court precedent, is somewhat unclear as to how to balance 
subjective and objective factors, but generally follows the UNHCR in 
requiring the subjective factor to be met by a showing of the applicants’ 
genuine fear, while the objective factor covers such things as the 
potential persecutors’ knowledge of the applicants’ protected charac-
teristic and their ability and willingness to engage in persecutory 
conduct. 
German law alters the subjective prong from an inquiry into the 
genuineness of the applicants’ fear into an inquiry into the centrality of 
the proscribed practices for the applicants’ “religious identity,” where 
this identity is of a semi-static nature and, thus, not totally at the whim 
of the applicants. As noted earlier,216 UNHCR and USCIS also prescribe 
an inquiry into the importance of a particular religious belief or practice 
for the applicants when assessing whether a certain conduct qualifies as 
 
212. Compare AsylG § 3e(1) with 2011 Qualification Directive, supra note 15, 
art. 8(1). See also Heusch et al., supra note 15, at 33 (noting that, within 
the European context, the concept of internal protection was first developed 
by German courts and later adopted in EU directives and national 
legislation). 
213. Compare AsylG § 3e(2) with 2011 Qualification Directive, supra note 15, 
art. 8(2). 
214. BVerwG, May 29, 2008, 10 C 11.07, ¶¶ 31–32, http://www.bverwg. 
de/entscheidungen/pdf/290508U10C11.07.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/D4V9-
CVLW]; see Hailbronner, supra note 15, at 432. 
215. BVerwG, Feb. 1, 2007, 1 C 24.06, ¶¶ 11–12, http://www.bverwg. 
de/entscheidungen/pdf/010207U1C24.06.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6JU-
CQNS]; see Hailbronner, supra note 15, at 430; Heusch et al., supra 
note 15, at 34. 
216. See supra notes 101, 120 and accompanying text. 
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persecution, but at least USCIS does not do so within a broader inquiry 
into the applicants’ “religious identity.” 
Unlike U.S. asylum law, German law requires all three elements—
the objective, the subjective, and the qualitative element—to be estab-
lished to the complete conviction of the court, the normal standard of 
proof for all German trials. But as in U.S. asylum law, the individual 
probability of persecution grounding the qualitative assessment of a 
well-founded fear may be established based on the reasonable person 
standard and may be present even if persecution would be less likely to 
occur than not. This is somewhat surprising since the U.S. Supreme 
Court justified this lower standard of probability not only based on dif-
ferences in the statutory text but also by observing that, under U.S. 
law, asylum is a discretionary grant, while withholding of removal—
requiring the higher standard of a preponderance of evidence—is not. 
Under German law, as seen above, refugee protection is generally a 
right for all who meet the statutory refugee definition. 
Finally, while the UNHCR, U.S. law, and German law provide for 
internal protection in the applicants’ country of origin as a hurdle on 
the path to recognition as refugee, only German law allows for non-
state actors to qualify as protectors against persecution. 
3. Establishing a Causal Nexus Between (the Fear of) Persecution and 
Religion 
The nexus requirement—expressed by the “for reasons of” language 
found in the international refugee definition217—links the applicants’ 
claimed persecution to one of the five protected characteristics under 
the 1951 Convention. Applicants qualify as refugees only if they can 
establish the existence of this nexus. This means that after establishing 
that they will endure persecution or have endured persecution and that 
they have a well-founded fear of such persecution, applicants need to 
show two additional things: First, they share one of the five protected 
characteristics.218 And second, they will be persecuted because of that 
characteristic. 
 
217. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
218. These five characteristics, according to Hathaway & Foster, “embody 
multiple manifestations of a single idea: fundamental socio-political 
disenfranchisement defined by reference to core norms of non-discrimination 
law.” Hathaway & Foster, supra note 21, at 390–91; see also id. at 427 
(offering an alternative to the identity-based definition of the genus common 
to the five characteristics by defining them as evolving “grounds on which a 
person may be discriminated against by society” (citing the joined decision 
Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t Immigration Appeal Tribunal & 
R v. Ex Parte Shah, [1999] UKHL 20, [1999] 2 AC 629, at 656 (Lord Hope 
of Craighead) (appeal taken from Eng.), http://www.bailii.org/uk/ 
cases/UKHL/1999/20.html [https://perma.cc/T7F3-ZH8T])). 
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a. The UNHCR 
 
i. Establishing Religion 
 
In the case of religiously motivated refugee claims, the UNHCR 
recognizes “[c]redibility [as] a central issue.”219 This is especially true in 
case of sur place refugees, that is, in the case of those who become 
refugees while being outside of their country of origin, for example, 
because of actions taken by those seeking recognition as refugees, such 
as converting to a religion that is persecuted in their country of origin.220 
In the case of the latter, “a rigorous and in depth examination of the 
circumstances and genuineness of the conversion will be necessary,”221 
unless it can be established that a religious belief or practice will be 
imputed to the claimant by agents of persecution.222 
This examination, however, should not be carried out by adminis-
tering a test on the religious knowledge of the claimants: There are dif-
ferent forms of religion requiring more or less detailed knowledge to be 
formative for one’s understanding of religion.223 Knowledge varies wide-
ly based on the gender or level of education of the claimants.224 There 
is no necessary correlation between a person’s detailed knowledge and 
 
219. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 100, ¶ 28. 
220. Id. ¶ 34; see also U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 17, ¶¶ 94–
96, at 19 (defining refugees sur place). 
221. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 100, ¶ 34. 
222. Id. ¶ 9; see also Hathaway & Foster, supra note 21, at 88–89 (discussing 
how to address the risk that a claimant may seek to manipulate the system 
by “self-serving actions” and arguing that such claims “should be assessed 
on the basis of the usual criteria” because, while the mental state of the 
claimants is not decisive, “the reaction of the home country . . . is 
critical”); Zimmermann & Mahler, supra note 76, at 333–34 (noting that, 
while some have rejected sur place claims made in bad faith, others, including 
the UNHCR, have focused on what would happen to the fraudulent 
applicants, fraudulent or not, in their country of origin). 
223. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 100, ¶¶ 5–8, 29. The document 
expressly distinguishes three elements of “religion” that may be present 
individually or in some combination, i.e., “a) religion as belief (including non-
belief); b) religion as identity; c) religion as a way of life.” Id. ¶ 5. “Identity” 
here is understood “less as a matter of theological beliefs than membership 
of a community that observes . . . common beliefs, rituals, traditions, 
ethnicity, nationality, or ancestry” and may go with “a sense of belonging” 
to that “particular group or community.” Id. ¶ 7. But see supra notes 179–
195 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of “religious identity” 
for adjudicating all refugee claims based on religious persecution in 
Germany). 
224. Id. ¶¶ 30–31. 
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the sincerity of that person’s belief or conversion.225 There is also the 
possibility that claimants may be “coached” on religious knowledge 
prior to the examination.226 The better alternative, in the case of sur 
place applicants, is to ask open-ended questions that allow applicants 
to set forth their motivations for converting and the effect conversion 
had on their lives.227 
 
ii. Establishing Nexus 
 
Refugees are those who have a well-founded fear that they will be 
persecuted because of one or more of the five protected characteristics, 
i.e., race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, 
or political opinion.228 This means that the protected characteristic 
“must be a relevant contributing factor, though it need not be shown 
to be the sole, or dominant, cause.”229 Accordingly, persons fleeing civil 
war in their countries of origin “are not normally considered refugees,” 
but civil war may result in persecution within the definition of the 1951 
Convention.230 
 
225. Id. ¶ 29. 
226. Id. ¶ 35. 
227. Id. 
228. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 17, ¶ 66, at 15–16. 
229. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: 
Gender-Related Persecution under the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 
Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
¶ 20, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/16 (May 7, 2002). 
230. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 17, ¶ 164–65, at 33 (noting that 
whether claimants are effectively protected against persecution within their 
countries of origin is an important consideration when evaluating refugee 
claims by those fleeing civil war). Persecution may be established, for 
example, if one party’s way of waging war includes systematically killing, or 
threatening with death, persons having protected characteristics. Eric Fripp, 
Inclusion of Refugees from Armed Conflict: Combatants and Ex-combatants, 
in Refuge from Inhumanity? War Refugees and International 
Humanitarian Law 128, 139 (David James Cantor & Jean-François 
Durieux eds., 2014). Fripp also notes that armed conflict poses the risk of 
being both over-inclusive and under-inclusive in how the Convention’s 
refugee definition is applied. Id. at 132–33; see also Vanessa Holzer, 
Persecution and the Nexus to a Refugee Convention Ground in Non-
International Armed Conflict: Insights from Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, in Refuge from Inhumanity? War Refugees and 
International Humanitarian Law, supra, at 101, 110 (noting that “the 
material scope of persecution is not narrower in armed conflict than in times 
of peace”). 
 The exclusion of those fleeing war or famine from the international refugee 
definition is open to moral challenge. For example Joseph Carens has argued 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 3·2018 
Testing Religion 
1021 
As far as religion is concerned, refugees are those who fear that they 
will be persecuted because they exercise—or are believed to exercise231—
their freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, as this freedom is de-
fined in article 18 of the ICCPR.232 Given the broad definition of this 
freedom that, as seen above, includes atheism, religion is not a one-
dimensional matter, but may include the aspects of belief (convictions 
and values), identity (belonging to a like-minded community), and 
practice (way of life, interaction with world and, religious observ-
ances).233 Accordingly, exercising this particular freedom may take a 
variety of forms. And it does not matter whether claimants belong to 
the religious minority or majority in their country of origin.234 
b. U.S. Law 
Once applicants have established that they were persecuted, or fear 
that they will be persecuted, they must show that they possess at least 
one protected characteristic and that they were, or will be, persecuted 
because of that protected characteristic. This means, for example, that 
facing the hardships and dangers that are incidental to civil war is, by 
itself, not a sufficient reason to qualify as a refugee under current U.S. 
asylum law.235 
 
i. Establishing Religion 
 
The congressional findings prefacing the International Religious 
Freedom Act (IRFA) of 1998 invoke the definition of religious freedom 
 
that “what is most important is the severity of the threat to basic human 
rights and the degree of risk rather than the source or character of the 
threat.” Carens, supra note 35, at 201. Consequently, he believes that “the 
Convention embodies a misplaced set of priorities.” Id. For a rejoinder, see 
Wellman, supra note 22, at 123, who acknowledges a nation’s duty to help 
refugees, but posits that this duty can be fulfilled either by opening one’s 
door to refugees or by assisting refugees in their country of origin. 
231. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 100, ¶¶ 9, 31. 
232. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 17, ¶¶ 71–72, at 16; see supra 
Section I.A.1 (discussing the relevant portions of the ICCPR). 
233. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 100, ¶¶ 5–8. 
234. Id. ¶ 12. 
235. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Asylum Eligibility Part III: 
Nexus and the Five Protected Characteristics 74–76 (2009), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/Refugees%
20%26%20Asylum/Asylum/AOBTC%20Lesson%20Plans/Nexus-the-Five-
Protected-Characteristics-31aug10.pdf [https://perma.cc/34A4-UKCZ] 
[hereinafter Eligibility III] (noting that applicants must invariably 
establish that they were targeted by violence—which may well be related to 
civil war—because of at least one of the protected characteristics). 
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found in the UDHR and the ICCPR without initially defining religion.236 
The 2016 amendment to the IRFA defined the freedom protected by 
these international documents broadly, so as to cover “theistic and non-
theistic beliefs and the right not to profess or practice any religion.”237 
In keeping with the invoked international documents, this protected 
freedom covers certain practices, such as worship, speaking freely about 
one’s religious beliefs, changing one’s beliefs, possessing religious litera-
ture, and raising one’s children in the belief of one’s choice.238 The 2016 
Amendment to the IRFA adds to the list of protected practices “not 
professing a particular religion, or any religion.”239 
Due to, or despite, the broad scope of the definition of religious 
belief under U.S. law, “[c]redibility determinations, which are always 
difficult, can be particularly complex in religious persecution cases.”240 
To determine whether an applicant “adopted a belief system solely for 
the purposes of trying to obtain asylum,” “[a]djudicators may need to 
judge the sincerity of the applicant’s claimed religious beliefs,” but not 
“the validity of the belief system itself.”241 
Accordingly, the “legitimacy of religion” is not scrutinized as closely 
as, for example, the related protected characteristic of “membership in 
a social group,” since only the latter requires a showing of “a charac-
teristic that it is either immutable or is so fundamental to individual 
 
236. 22 U.S.C. § 6401(a)(2)–(3) (2012). The international documents referenced 
here have been discussed above. See supra notes 26–45 and accompanying 
text. 
237. Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 114-281, 
§ 2(a)(1), 130 Stat 1426, 1427 (2016) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. 
§ 6401(a)(3)). Section 2(a)(3) specifically adds “the specific targeting of non-
theists, humanists, and atheists because of their beliefs” as an equivalent to 
“religious persecution.” Id. (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6401(a)(6)). 
Section 3(5)(B)(i) adds “conscience [and] non-theistic views” as equivalent 
to “religious belief or practice.” Id. at 1428 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. 
§ 6402(16)(B)). 
238. 22 U.S.C. § 6402(13)(A) (2012). 
239. Section 3(5)(A)(ii), 130 Stat. at 1428 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. 
§ 6402(16)(A)(iv)). 
240. Religious Persecution Claims, supra note 115, at 13; see also 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (listing congressionally-suggested factors to be 
considered when assessing applicants’ credibility “[c]onsidering the totality 
of the circumstances[] and all relevant factors,” if their testimony needs 
corroboration). 
241. Religious Persecution Claims, supra note 115, at 13–14; see also Anker, 
supra note 46, § 2:7 (noting that sur place refugees were formerly met with 
greater scrutiny as “bootstrap refugees” if they had created the risk of future 
persecution by their own activities). 
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identity or conscience that a person ought not be required to change.”242 
Moreover, the investigation of an applicant’s sincerity of belief should 
not unduly rely on quizzes of religious knowledge.243 Additionally, vari-
ances from an adjudicator’s preconceived notions of the way a given 
religious belief should be practiced should not, without more, lead to 
adverse sincerity determinations.244 Finally, even if the conversion was 
found to be insincere, it may still cause the applicant to be persecuted 
 
242. Lozano-Zuniga v. Lynch, 832 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Cece v. 
Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 669 (7th Cir. 2013)). The Seventh Circuit’s distinction 
in the Lozano–Zuniga opinion is somewhat surprising since the BIA’s Acosta 
ruling—cited by the Circuit three years prior in Cece—was about 
establishing the meaning of the somewhat vague term “membership in a 
social group” by applying the interpretive principle of ejusdem generis after 
describing the genus common to the first four characteristics as follows: 
“Each of these grounds describes persecution aimed at an immutable 
characteristic: a characteristic that either is beyond the power of an 
individual to change or is so fundamental to individual identity or conscience 
that it ought not be required to be changed.” Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 
233 (BIA 1985). 
 The fact that the Seventh Circuit declined to follow the BIA’s Acosta opinion 
in holding religion to the same stringent identity-based standard as 
membership in a social group reflects what appears to be a consensus of 
appellate courts to cite Acosta for what it says on social groups, not for what 
it says about the other four characteristics, since Acosta was about group 
membership, not, for example, religion. In addition to Cece, see, for example, 
Rodas-Orellana v. Holder, 780 F.3d 982, 990–91 (10th Cir. 2015) (discussing 
the evolution of the Acosta standard since 1985). It also reflects the Seventh 
Circuit’s long-standing tradition of overturning the BIA for adjudicating 
religious asylum claims based on what Churgin called the “Mindszenty 
model”—named after Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty, the Catholic Primate of 
Hungary who publicly opposed the Communist takeover of Hungary after 
World War II and was convicted in a show trial in 1949—that involved a 
highly visible Christian identity and a conscious, unwavering public 
commitment to it. Churgin, supra note 18, at 218–21 (discussing Bastanipour 
v. INS, 980 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
243. See, e.g., Rizal v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 2006) (rejecting 
“expressly . . . the rationale that a certain level of doctrinal knowledge is 
necessary in order to be eligible for asylum on grounds of religious 
persecution,” while not discounting the need for testing such knowledge 
where it would tend to prove or disprove specific factual claims made by the 
applicant); see also Religious Persecution Claims, supra note 115, at 14 
(citing Cosa, 543 F.3d at 1070; Iao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 
2005)). 
244. Huang v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 945, 949 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that the lower 
court’s decision was “not [made on] a proper basis for an adverse credibility 
finding” in a case about a Chinese applicant’s claims that a portion of the 
record was “based entirely on either the [immigration] judge’s personal beliefs 
or some perceived common knowledge about the [applicant’s Catholic] 
religion”). 
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in his country of origin if sent back there, depending on what conduct 
potential persecutors deem worthy of persecution.245 
Thus, analyzing religious sincerity in the asylum context is recog-
nized as a peculiar endeavor. While U.S. courts engage in assessing the 
sincerity of religious belief in a variety of other legal contexts,246 the 
situation of religious asylum seekers is not entirely identical to 
determinations for the purposes of domestic law, where belief is linked 
to recognizing, not a potential for persecution, but legal privilege and 
accommodation under the First Amendment in an orderly manner and 
in a limited number of situations.247 An agent of persecution in another 
 
245. See, e.g., Bastanipour, 980 F.2d at 1133 (remanding the case of an Iranian 
convert to Christianity by urging adjudicators to be concerned more about 
what would happen to the applicant before a religious court in Iran than 
about whether his purported conversion was sincere); Najafi v. INS, 104 F.3d 
943, 948 (7th Cir. 1997) (summarizing the circuit’s Bastanipour ruling as 
“shift[ing] the focus of the immigration judge from Indianapolis to Iran”); 
Kyaw Zwar Tun v. INS, 445 F.3d 554, 570–71 (2d Cir. 2006) (remanding 
the case of a Burmese pro-democracy activist by noting that the statutory 
protection against persecution is not limited to persecution due to actual 
political beliefs, since even political beliefs adopted self-servingly to gain 
asylum can still lead to real persecution). 
246. The Supreme Court has addressed the issue in a variety of circumstances. 
See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) (noting that, in 
the context of conscientious objection based on religious belief, the truth of 
the underlying belief cannot be questioned, only “whether it is ‘truly held’”). 
Sincerity of belief has been described as “the most difficult of all forms of 
credibility for a trial court to determine.” 2 Michael B. Mushlin, Rights 
of Prisoners § 7:15 (4th ed. 2009) (citing Reed v. Faulkner, 653 F. Supp. 
965, 971 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (arguing that determining the sincerity of a 
religious belief is more demanding than establishing the credibility of a trial 
witness and requires investigating whether there is some—though not 
perfect—congruence between the professed beliefs and the conduct and 
statements of the plaintiff)). Mushlin provides a number of mostly negative 
factors to help establish the sincerity of a prisoner’s claim of religion. Id. 
Others have suggested a relatively simple two-factor test: Is there a material 
incentive to claim religious belief? Is there congruence between claimed 
beliefs and behavior? Ben Adams & Cynthia Barmore, Recent Development, 
Questioning Sincerity: The Role of the Courts After Hobby Lobby, 67 Stan. 
L. Rev. Online 59, 62–63 (2014); see also Michael Kagan, Refugee 
Credibility Assessment and the “Religious Imposter” Problem: A Case Study 
of Eritrean Pentecostal Claims in Egypt, 43 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1179, 
1206–21 (2010) (discussing the origins of the “sincerity” test, its application 
in religion-based refugee claims, and its weaknesses). 
247. In the domestic context, testing a claimant’s sincerity serves—in a limited 
number of situations—as an accepted limitation on accessing such privilege. 
Without such limitation, a political community governed by laws may well 
be impossible. See, e.g., 2 Mushlin, supra note 246, § 7:15 (“Without a 
requirement of a showing of sincerity, the First Amendment would 
become . . . ‘a limitless excuse for avoiding all unwanted legal 
obligations.’”). While being recognized as a refugee is also the first step 
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part of the world may not care about the sincerity of someone’s beliefs 
or practices, but may simply impute these beliefs or practices with or 
without objective justification, which would render the applicants’ reli-
gious knowledge or sincerity practically irrelevant.248 
 
ii. Establishing Religion as “One Central Reason” of Persecution 
 
Since the REAL ID Act of 2005, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 requires applicants 
to show that they are refugees in the statutory sense.249 They must show 
that one of the five protected characteristics of a refugee “was or will 
be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.” 250 
Compared to a 2004 bill containing narrower language,251 the statute 
allows for mixed-motive applications and turns the attention away from 
trying to establish the exact motivation of the persecutor.252 It also 
provides a more demanding standard in comparison to case law prior 
to 2005 that required the applicant only to show that the persecution 
 
toward a domestic legal privilege—i.e., asylum or withholding of removal—
it is also a protective measure benefiting those who, without such protection, 
may well suffer an unacceptable deprivation of basic human rights, including 
the rights to life and freedom, at the hands of actors concerned about 
enforcing outward conformity, not scrutinizing inner motives. 
248. Religious Persecution Claims, supra note 115, at 17 (quoting 
Bastanipour v. INS, 980 F.2d 1129, 1132 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that the 
critical question in the case of an Iranian convert to Christianity was not 
whether the claimant “believes the tenets of Christianity in his heart of 
hearts or . . . is acting opportunistically,” but what would “matter to an 
Iranian religious judge”)). Kagan, drawing on Bastanipour to fashion his 
“eyes of the persecutor test” to replace the sincerity test, argued that, “[s]ince 
the persecutor . . . cannot know an asylum seeker’s genuine beliefs, 
inquiring about the applicant’s genuine beliefs accomplishes nothing” and 
that “the adjudicator should [instead] focus on observable factors that trigger 
persecution . . . .” Kagan, supra note 246, at 1222, 1224. But Bastanipour 
does not say the applicant’s inner motivation never matters to a persecutor, 
but simply directs adjudicators to establish what matters to potential 
persecutors and to evaluate an applicant’s claim accordingly. For example, 
apostasy is not a strict-liability offense in Iran. See infra Part II. 
249. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing amendments to this 
section by the REAL ID Act). 
250. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012). 
251. The 2004 bill required that at least one of the protected characteristics “was 
or will be the central motive for persecuting the applicant.” Anker, supra 
note 46, § 5:12 (quoting 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act, H.R. 
10, 108th Cong. § 3007(a)(2) (2004)). 
252. See Anker, supra note 46, § 5:12; Eligibility III, supra note 235, at 5–6 
(referencing J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208 (BIA 2007); S-P-, 21 I. & 
N. Dec. 486 (BIA 1996); Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658 (BIA 1988)). 
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“was or would be motivated in part” by one of the five protected 
characteristics.253 
The BIA interpreted the statutory nexus language to mean that at 
least one of the five protected characteristics of the applicant254 “cannot 
be incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason 
for harm.”255 In 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
took issue with the inclusion of “subordinate” in the BIA’s formulation. 
 
253. J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 211 (summarizing S-P- regarding the 
standard before the REAL ID Act). The BIA maintains that the standard 
applied in its previous case law “has not been radically altered by the 
amendments.” Id. at 214. But see Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 
740 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he plain meaning of the phrase ‘one central reason’ 
indicates that the REAL ID Act places a more onerous burden on the asylum 
applicant than the ‘at least in part’ standard we previously applied.”). 
 Anjum Gupta has proposed an alternative nexus model by drawing on U.S. 
civil rights and tort law to modify the older BIA standard. Anjum Gupta, 
Nexus Redux, 90 Ind. L.J. 465 (2015). Specifically, she has suggested that 
courts should clarify the nexus requirement by allowing the applicant to 
establish a prima-facie case by showing that the protected characteristic “led 
to (or would lead to) the persecution.” Id. at 504. Under a familiar burden-
shifting model, the government would then have to rebut the applicant’s 
prima-facie case by showing “that, even absent the protected trait, the 
persecution would have occurred for some other non-protected reason.” Id. 
at 505. If the government was able to show that there were other reasons for 
persecutory conduct affecting the applicant, the applicant could rebut this 
showing by demonstrating that (a) the persecution would occur even without 
the reason proffered by the government; (b) the likelihood of persecution was 
increased by the applicant’s protected characteristic; or (c) the severity of 
the persecution increased because of that characteristic. Id. at 507. While 
Gupta discussed one objection to her model, id. at 509–12, she did not 
address what seems to be a key objection: The statutory language in the 
INA is more demanding than the civil-rights statute she extrapolated on 
because that the latter is more akin to the older BIA standard Parussimova 
found less demanding than the REAL ID Act’s amendment of the INA. 
Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012) (“[W]as or will be at least one 
central reason for persecuting the applicant . . . .”), with 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(m) (2012) (“[W]as a motivating factor . . . , even though other 
factors also motivated the practice . . . .”). In other words, while Gupta’s 
new nexus model is not without merit, a decision-maker’s discretion here is 
severely curtailed by the INA. See Hathaway & Foster, supra note 21, 
at 386–88 (cautioning against importing causation models from other areas 
of the law but finding the proximity between refugee law and non-
discrimination law fruitful for settling nexus issues in refugee law). 
254. See Eligibility III, supra note 235, at 7–8 (citing INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 
U.S. 478, 482 (1992) (noting that in a case alleging persecution on account 
of political opinion, the “persecution [has to occur] on account of the victim’s 
political opinion, not the persecutor’s”)). 
255. J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 214; see Eligibility III, supra note 235, 
at 6. 
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It noted that while the BIA correctly rejected requiring the applicant 
to show that the protected characteristic was the “dominant” reason 
for persecution,256 the BIA’s rule actually required as much, namely, 
that the protected characteristic could not be a “subordinate” reason.257 
The appeals court held instead that a persecutor may have a variety of 
“central” motives—and some may even be irrelevant for asylum pur-
poses—when persecuting the applicant that need not be arranged into 
a hierarchy with the protected characteristic coming out on top.258 
Evidence for such central, non-tangential motivation may be either 
direct or circumstantial.259 Circumstantial evidence may be provided by 
showing that the persecutor acts against those who share the ap-
plicant’s protected characteristic—for example, based on country 
condition reports260—or by showing that an applicant was arrested soon 
after participating in a protected activity.261 
The proof of causation in cases involving laws of general 
applicability can be “challenging.”262 Basically, prosecution under gen-
erally applicable laws does not amount to persecution, as long as those 
laws are actually generally applied. 263  Prosecution under generally 
applicable laws must not serve as a disguise for persecution.264 For in-
 
256. That would have been the standard if the 2004 bill had been enacted. See 
supra note 251. 
257. Ndayshimiye v. Attorney Gen., 557 F.3d 124, 129–30 (3d Cir. 2009). 
258. Id. at 129. 
259. Eligibility III, supra note 235, at 11–12. 
260. While information by the Department of State may be provided and 
consulted in all cases, such information must be consulted in cases of 
religiously motivated persecution. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6402(2), 6471 (2012) 
(requiring that the Department of State’s Annual Report on International 
Religious Freedom to Congress serve as a “resource” for immigration judges 
and asylum officers where religious motivated persecution is at issue). There 
is no exact regulatory counterpart to this requirement. But see 8 C.F.R. 
§ 208.1(b) (2017) (requiring that asylum officers be provided “information 
concerning the persecution of persons in other countries” in coordination 
with the Department of State); § 208.11(a)–(b) (authorizing discretionary 
requesting and providing Department of State information regarding 
“individual cases or types of claims under consideration”); Religious 
Persecution Claims, supra note 115, at 8. 
261. See Religious Persecution Claims, supra note 115, at 12–13.  
262. Id. at 29. 
263. Id. (quoting Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1060 (3d Cir. 1997)); see also 
Long Hao Li v. Attorney Gen., 633 F.3d 136, 151 (3d Cir. 2011) (reasoning 
based on Chang that, since the alleged law of general applicability at issue 
was not fairly administered, it was not a generally applicable law). 
264. Chang, 119 F.3d at 1060–61 (noting that, while the asylum statute must not 
be interpreted so as to make the U.S. a haven for common criminals, there 
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stance, laws targeting “particular religious beliefs and practices gen-
erally are not neutral in intent”—and hence not generally applicable 
laws—especially when they mete out harsh punishment.265 In a country 
where civil or criminal law is based on religious law, it is more difficult 
to establish the motive of a state actor.266 “Mixed motives” might exist, 
but so long as the applicants can show that their real or imputed reli-
gion was, or likely will be, a central motive, they have established a 
causal nexus between a protected characteristic and either past or 
future persecution.267 
c. German Law 
To obtain refugee status under German law, applicants must estab-
lish that they were persecuted on account of one of the five protected 
characteristics by the 1951 Convention, such as religion. 268  Those 
simply fleeing civil war or violence unmotivated by the protected char-
acteristics may be afforded the less generous benefits of surrogate 
protection.269 
 
 
is nothing to suggest that “fear of prosecution under laws of general 
applicability may never provide the basis for asylum or withholding of 
deportation,” since the statute does not distinguish between lawful and 
lawless persecution); see also Eligibility III, supra note 235, at 76–79 
(providing guidance to asylum officers on how to distinguish illegitimate 
persecution on account of protected characteristics from legitimate 
prosecution of crime). 
265. Religious Persecution Claims, supra note 115, at 29, 31 (citing Chang, 
119 F.3d at 1061 (holding that an analogous law directly targeting the 
protected characteristic of political opinion “may provide the basis for 
asylum” if the lawful punishment “is sufficiently extreme to constitute 
persecution”); Ghebremedhin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 1116, 1120, amended on 
procedural grounds, 392 F.3d 241 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that subjecting 
religiously motivated draft evaders to harsher punishment than other draft 
evaders amounted to persecution on account of religion); see also 
Eligibility III, supra note 235, at 77 (“Prosecution for the crime of 
attending religious services could constitute persecution on account of 
religion.”). 
266. Eligibility III, supra note 235, at 20–21. 
267. Id. at 20. 
268. Compare Asylgesetz [AsylG] [Asylum Act], Sept. 2, 2008, BGBl I at 1798, 
as amended, § 3(1)(1), https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/asylvfg_ 
1992/BJNR111260992.html [https://perma.cc/A4SP-P4XY], with 2011 
Qualification Directive, supra note 15, art. 10(1)(b). 
269. Compare AsylG § 4(1)(3) with 2011 Qualification Directive, supra note 15, 
arts. 15(c); 18. See Heusch et al., supra note 15, at 46–49; see also 
Hailbronner, supra note 15, at 437–38, 448–52 (discussing the benefits 
granted to individuals recognized as refugees and the benefits of those 
granted subsidiary or surrogate protection). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 3·2018 
Testing Religion 
1029 
i. Establishing Religion 
 
Discussing in some detail the five reasons for persecution included 
in the definition of refugee—i.e., race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a social group, political convictions—the Asylum Act provides that 
“religion” includes theistic, non-theistic, and atheistic beliefs; solitary 
or communal participation in formal worship in private or in public; 
and other religious acts or expressions of viewpoints, including personal 
or communal conduct based on or mandated by a given religious be-
lief.270 Furthermore, membership of a social group can also have a 
religious dimension because group members may share a characteristic 
or belief so fundamental to their identity or conscience that they should 
not be forced to renounce it.271 
Importantly, the Act states that when assessing whether an 
applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution, it is irrelevant whether 
the applicant actually possesses certain religious or social characteristics 
leading to persecution if persecuting state or non-state actors impute 
these characteristics to the applicant.272 
As discussed earlier, binding precedent directs German courts to 
conduct individual credibility determinations, centered on the complex 
term “religious identity,” in the context of assessing whether applicants 
possess a well-founded fear of persecution. 273 No specific protocol of 
questions may be prescribed here because, as noted, the judge must 
establish whether a religious practice leading to persecution is a central 
aspect of the applicants’ “religious identity” in a free inquiry.274 
 
ii. Establishing Nexus 
 
In keeping with the applicable EU Directive, the German Asylum 
Act simply requires that a causal nexus exist between acts of perse-
 
270. Compare AsylG § 3b(1)(2) with 2011 Qualification Directive, supra note 15, 
art. 10(1)(b). The notion of religion expressed in these sections has been 
described as “comprehensive.” Hailbronner, supra note 15, at 422. 
271. Compare AsylG § 3b(1)(4)(a) with 2011 Qualification Directive, supra note 
15, art. 10(1)(d). 
272. Compare AsylG § 3b(2) with 2011 Qualification Directive, supra note 15, 
art. 10(2). 
273. See supra notes 179–199 and accompanying text. 
274. Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung [VwGO] [Code of Administrative 
Court Procedure], as amended, § 108(1), https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/bundesrecht/vwgo/gesamt.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GZW-
YKET]). The reasons for the decision must be set forth in the opinion that 
must be based on facts and proofs that were before the parties. Id. § 108(2). 
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cution and at least one the five protected characteristics set forth in the 
statutory definition of a refugee.275 
d. Summary 
The UNHCR, the U.S., and Germany require applicants to estab-
lish both that they possess a protected characteristic and that they are 
persecuted because of this characteristic to qualify as refugees. But 
where U.S. law expressly requires the protected characteristic to be “one 
central” reason of actual or feared persecution, neither the UNHCR nor 
German law does so, instead applying a test that is virtually identical 
to the pre-REAL ID Act standard in the U.S. 
The U.S. does not appear to apply any heightened or attenuated 
standard of proof when it comes to assessing the sincerity of the reli-
gious beliefs held by an applicant. German law applies its regular, high 
standard of proof in this area of inquiry where U.S. courts appear to 
tread rather lightly, for example, by expressly declining to require the 
showing that the applicants’ religious belief is an immutable or fun-
damental characteristic of their “identity.” At the same time, the 
UNHCR, the U.S., and Germany recognize that protected charac-
teristics may be imputed by agents of persecution which would establish 
a nexus without proving the applicants’ sincerity of belief. 
While the U.S. does not reference “(religious) identity” in the 
context of assessing the sincerity of belief of religious asylum seekers, 
and while the UNHCR uses “religion as identity” as one aspect of 
religion that may or may not be present in a given applicant, German 
law makes the inquiry into whether a sanctioned religious practice is a 
 
275. Compare AsylG § 3a(3) with 2011 Qualification Directive, supra note 15, 
art. 9(3). See Hailbronner, supra note 15, at 414 (noting that under 
German law, a given protected characteristic need not be the central or sole 
cause of persecution). It should be noted that German law discusses the 
targeted, intentional nature of persecutory conduct when defining 
persecution—not when establishing nexus—to distinguish persecutory 
conduct from general disadvantages incurred due to natural disaster or war. 
See supra notes 126–127 and accompanying text. This important distinction 
is overlooked in Hathaway & Foster, supra note 21, at 369. Thus, the 
German approach is identical to the “‘one factor’ or ‘one reason’ test of 
causation” preferred by Hathaway and Foster. Id. at 387–90 (noting the 
German Federal Administrative Court as one international authority, among 
others). See BVerwG, Nov. 24, 2009, 10 C 24.08, ¶ 16, 
http://www.bverwg.de/entscheidungen/pdf/241109U10C24.08.0.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/Z84S-RYWX] (“[A]t least in part because of characteristics 
relevant for asylum . . . .” (zumindest auch wegen asylerheblicher 
Merkmale) (referencing BVerwG, July 25, 2000, 9 C 28.99, ¶ 14, 
https://www.jurion.de/urteile/bverwg/2000-07-25/9-c-28_99 [https://per 
ma.cc/6YGS-KMM5] (“[A]t any rate in part because of a characteristic 
relevant for asylum . . . .” (jedenfalls auch wegen eines asylerheblichen 
Merkmals))). 
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central part of the applicants’ “religious identity” a cornerstone of ad-
judicating religious asylum claims. 
II. Iran, Iranian Refugees, and the Legal Situation of 
Christians in Iran 
A. Iran and Iranian Refugees in the U.S. and Germany 
In the years after 1951, the U.S. and Germany have transposed 
international refugee law into their national bodies of law in different 
ways. During that time, their relations with Iran have also taken 
different trajectories.276 Despite recent appeals to common values shared 
by the U.S. and Germany,277 the countries’ current relations to Iran 
make it appear as if the U.S. and Germany see two very different 
countries. For example the U.S. lists Iran as a state sponsor of 
terrorism;278 tries to bar Iranian citizens from even entering the U.S.;279 
 
276. For an overview of milestones in the deteriorating relations between the U.S. 
and Iran after 1953—including the CIA-assisted coup against Prime Minister 
Mossadegh over oil in August 1953, U.S. support for the shah’s repressive 
secret police, the Iran hostage crisis, and the Iran-Contra Affair—see Nikki 
R. Keddie, Modern Iran 128–130, 134–35, 248–51, 258 (2006). See also 
Christopher de Bellaigue, Patriot of Persia 200–52 (2012) 
(recounting the U.S. involvement in the British plan to overthrow 
Mossadegh and the events in August 1953 resulting in Mossadegh’s ouster); 
Peter Gries, The Politics of American Foreign Policy 190 (2014) 
(observing that the 1979–81 Iran hostage crisis and its extensive media 
coverage shattered Americans’ benign Orientalist fantasies about the Middle 
East and, instead, cemented the link between terrorism, Iran, and Islam in 
the minds of many). 
 For an overview of the generally more positive relations between Germany 
and Iran, see generally Oliver Bast, Germany I: German-Persian Diplomatic 
Relations, Encyclopædia Iranica (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www. 
iranicaonline.org/articles/germany-i [https://perma.cc/XN49-JDMG]. 
277. See, for example, the statements made by Germany’s then foreign minister, 
Sigmar Gabriel, when he visited the U.S. in early February 2017. Patricia 
Zengerle & Sabine Siebold, U.S., Germany Must Stick to Shared Values like 
Religious Freedom—Gabriel, Reuters (Feb. 3, 2017), http://www. 
reuters.com/article/uk-usa-trump-germany-idUSKBN15H23G [https:// 
perma.cc/5C2T-RBBF]. 
278. State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, https://www. 
state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm [https://perma.cc/999J-WBNR] (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2017). 
279. See supra Section I.A.2(a). While the bar is currently bogged down in federal 
courts, lifting the bar would require Iran to supply “certain information” 
deemed necessary by the Secretary of Homeland Security to adjudicate visa 
applications submitted by Iranians. Exec. Order No. 13,780, supra note 57, 
§§ 2(b), (d)–(e). Observers consider it “unlikely” that the Iranian 
government would actually cooperate with the U.S. and provide this 
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lists Iran as a “country of particular concern” for religious-freedom 
violations;280 provides separate categories under the USRAP for certain 
members of religious minorities in Iran; 281  and maintains no direct 
diplomatic relations with Iran.282 Meanwhile, Germany enjoys regular 
diplomatic, economic, and political ties to Iran.283 
During the time following World War II, there have been a number 
of Iranians who, after having entered the U.S., converted to 
Christianity, and then requested asylum on religious grounds.284 Among 
those who entered Germany during the last two years amidst the Syrian 
 
information. Saeed Kamali Dehghan, Trump Travel Ban Will Hit Iranian 
Critics of Regime Hardest, Analysts Warn, Guardian (Mar. 9, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/09/trump-travel-ban-
iranian-students-critics [https://perma.cc/D7CG-SHJM]. 
280. U.S. Comm’n on Int’l Religious Freedom, Annual Report 44 (2017), 
http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2017.USCIRFAnnualReport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6679-JUB3]. Being on this list means that the U.S. 
Secretary of State designated Iran—so designated since the list’s inception 
in 1999—as one of currently ten “countries whose governments either engage 
in or tolerate ‘particularly severe’ violations of religious freedom,” including 
torture, prolonged detention without charge, or abductions. Id. at 9, 12. 
281. Churgin, supra note 18, at 215 (referencing the 1989 Lautenberg 
Amendment).  The Lautenberg Amendment was extended until Sept. 30, 
2018, by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 
§ 7034(l)(5), 132 Stat. 348, 895 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1157 note 
(Establishing Categories of Aliens for Purposes of Refugee Determinations 
(requiring the Attorney General to establish “one or more categories of aliens 
who are or were nationals and residents of the Islamic Republic or Iran who, 
as members of a religious minority in Iran, share common characteristics 
that identify them as targets of persecution in that state on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion”)). Nonetheless, the Department of Homeland Security denied 
admission to about 100 Iranian Christians in February 2018. Press Release, 
USCIRF Concerned by Denial of Lautenberg Refugees from Iran, U.S. 
Comm’n on Int’l Religious Freedom (Feb. 23, 2018), http:// 
www.uscirf.gov/news-room/press-releases/uscirf-concerned-denial-lautenberg-
refugees-iran [https://perma.cc/5UWH-AY5W]; Miriam Jordan, Spurned by 
U.S. and Facing Danger Back Home, Iranian Christians Fear Worst, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/01/us/iranian-
christian-refugees.html [https://perma.cc/V3B3-5YF3]. 
282. “On April 7, 1980, the United States broke diplomatic relations with Iran, 
and on April 24, 1981, the Swiss Government assumed representation of 
U.S. interests in Tehran. Iranian interests in the United States are 
represented by the Government of Pakistan.” U.S. Relations with Iran, 
U.S. Dep’t of State, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5314.htm 
[https://perma.cc/YMD4-EXJF] (last visited Feb. 27, 2017). 
283. See Bast, supra note 276 (outlining over 400 years of interactions between 
the Germans and Persians).  
284. See infra Section III.B.1 (discussing concrete examples). 
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refugee crisis, there is also a significant number of young Iranians.285 
Some of those recent arrivals had secretly been Christians in Iran; 
others became Christians in Germany.286 While becoming Christian ini-
tially seemed to have increased the probability of their being recognized 
as refugees, 287  the sheer volume of conversions and the changing 
attitudes toward asylum seekers appear to have significantly decreased 
German authorities’ willingness to regard these conversions as legit-
imate and, thus, as valid reasons for recognizing them as refugees.288 
B. The Legal Situation of Christians in Iran 
About 1 percent of the Iran’s population of roughly 80 million 
consists of non-Muslims.289 Christians are believed to be the second larg-
est non-Muslim population group after the Baha’i.290 Those who attend 
Christian worship must register with the state, and only those who are 
so registered may attend worship or enter church premises.291 Most 
 
285. See, e.g., Phillip Connor, Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 
1.3 Million in 2015, Pew Res. Ctr. (Aug. 2, 2016), http:// 
www.pewglobal.org/2016/08/02/number-of-refugees-to-europe-surges-to-recor 
d-1-3-million-in-2015/ [https://perma.cc/YSK4-J3KW]. 
286. See Laura Kasinof, A New Home and a New Religion in Germany, 
Atlantic (Oct. 14, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/ 
archive/2016/10/christian-refugee-iran-germany-merkel/504092/ [https:// 
perma.cc/B54U-BWT7]. 
287. Id. 
288. Astrid Prange, Is Conversion a Reason for Asylum?, DW (Dec. 24, 2016), 
http://www.dw.com/en/is-conversion-a-reason-for-asylum/a-36903701 [https: 
//perma.cc/RTL3-7JUS]; Von Sabine Menkens, Das Glücksspiel bedrohter 
Christen in Deutschland, Die Welt (Dec. 23, 2016), http://hd. 
welt.de/politik-edition/article160529667/Das-Gluecksspiel-bedrohter-Christen 
-in-Deutschland.html [https://perma.cc/2W2F-J4SB] (noting that while early 
in 2016 most applications of recent converts were granted, the approval rate 
by December 2016 had dropped to 10%, turning the process into a gamble 
for applicants). Meanwhile, the statistics for the first half of 2017 for all 
asylum seekers—regardless of country of origin and claimed ground—suggest 
that one in two negative BAMF decisions are challenged in court and that 
one in four of those challenges succeeds, at significant cost for the BAMF. 
Deutschland liegt bei Asylentscheidungen vorn, DW (Dec. 4, 2017), 
http://www.dw.com/de/deutschland-liegt-bei-asylentscheidungen-vorn/a-
41636737 [https://perma.cc/2LQV-3JD6]. 
289. U.S. Dep’t of State, Iran 2016 International Religious Freedom 
Report 2 (2017), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/269134. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/6TMT-BTPJ]. 
290. Id. at 3 (estimating the number of Baha’i at about 300,000 and that of 
Christians at about 285,000, although some estimate that there could be up 
to 1,000,000 Christians in Iran). 
291. Id. at 4–5. 
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Christians belong to the historic ethnic churches of the Armenians and 
Assyrians.292 But a growing number of “restless” Iranian youths join 
Christian groups with roots in Western Europe and the U.S., at least 
in part to express their opposition to the Iranian government.293 
The Constitution of Iran294 provides that Iran’s official religion is 
Shi’a Islam. 295  According to article 13 of the same document, 
“Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian Iranians are the only recognized 
religious minorities, who, within the limits of the law, are free to 
perform their religious rites and ceremonies, and to act according to 
their own canon in matters of personal affairs and religious educa-
tion.”296 Moreover, the Constitution provides that “the government of 
 
292. See id. at 3. 
293. Perry Chiaramonte, Underground Church Movement Grows in Iran Despite 
Regime’s Efforts, Fox News (Nov. 28, 2016), http://www. 
foxnews.com/world/2016/11/28/underground-church-movement-grows-in-
iran-despite-regimes-efforts.html [https://perma.cc/2P2E-ZN4E] (noting 
that for youth searching for an alternative to the state and its religion, 
“[w]estern culture and the Christian church [are] very appealing”). It is a 
“public secret” in Iran that its surface of Islamic religiosity is not an indicator 
of Iranians’ true beliefs. Roxanne Varzi, Warring Souls 147 (2006). 
Varzi also notes the long history of maintaining a public persona distinct 
from one’s private life and beliefs as a matter of survival in Iran, going back 
to the Muslim-Arab conquest of Persia. Id. at 146. For a snapshot of Iranian 
youth’s counterculture that flaunts a Westernized ethos and prefers an 
apolitical, quietist outlook on Islam, see Pardis Mahdavi, Iran’s Green 
Movement in Context, in Cultural Revolution in Iran 13–26 (Annabelle 
Sreberny & Massoumeh Torfeh eds., 2013); Roula Khalaf, Iran’s ‘Generation 
Normal,’ Fin. Times (May 29, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/ 
b110ec2e-04b0-11e5-95ad-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/W6ZL-6KDN]. 
For a narrative exploration of Iran’s contradictory inside-outside cultures 
and the role of young Iranians in them, see generally Nicholas Jubber, 
Drinking Arak off an Ayatollah’s Beard (2010). 
294. See Keddie, supra note 276, at 246–48 (discussing the historical and political 
background of the Iranian constitution in post-revolutionary Iran as well as 
the constitution’s major tenets). 
295. Qanuni Assassi Jumhurii Islamai Iran [The Constitution of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran] 1358 [1980], art. 12; translation at Iran—
Constitution, Int’l Const. L., http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir000 
00_.html [https://perma.cc/WN37-6986] (last visited Jan. 9, 2017). This 
translation, while unofficial, is also featured on the official website of Iran’s 
Ministry of Interior. Constitution, Ministry of Interior, https:// 
www.moi.ir/Portal/Home/Default.aspx?CategoryID=3F0B662E-3527-4107 
-98EE-D58FF64C8B0C [https://perma.cc/K9LF-BRVH] (last visited Jan. 
9, 2017). 
296. Iran—Constitution, supra note 295, art. 13. These religious minorities are 
represented in the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Id. art. 64(2). 
Consequently, religions such as the Baha’i have no rights under the Iranian 
Constitution which means, for example, that Baha’is “are banned from all 
government employment . . . [,] cannot receive compensation for injur[ies] 
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the Islamic Republic of Iran and all Muslims are duty-bound to treat 
non-Muslims in conformity with ethical norms and the principles of 
Islamic justice and equity, and to respect their human rights.”297 But it 
also cautions that “[t]his principle applies to all who refrain from en-
gaging in conspiracy or activity against Islam and the Islamic Republic 
of Iran.”298 
Moreover, Iran’s Constitution contains heady—though not bound-
less—language about “the exalted dignity and value of man, and his 
freedom coupled with responsibility before God.”299 “[E]quity, justice, 
political, economic, social, and cultural independence, and national 
solidarity are secured by recourse to . . . negation of all forms of op-
pression, both the infliction of and the submission to it, and of 
dominance, both its imposition and its acceptance.”300 
While these provisions sound quite positive for those who are not 
Shi’ite Muslims, “the limits of the law” and “the responsibility before 
God” are rather tight in practice. First, as far as Christians are con-
cerned, Iranian officials do not recognize the need to establish new 
churches, but contend that the needs of Iran’s Christians are met.301 
Second, converting Muslims to non-Muslim religions is punishable by 
death.302 
Third, Iran’s Constitution does not grant Muslim citizens the right 
to join a non-Muslim religious community by conversion, or to have no 
religious beliefs.303 Under specific circumstances, traditional Islamic jur-
isprudence may view leaving the Muslim community to constitute 
apostasy (irtidād), for which the punishment fixed by the Islamic legal 
tradition (ḥadd, plural ḥudūd) is death.304 Iran’s Islamic Penal Code 
 
or crimes committed against them and cannot inherit property.” U.S. Dep’t 
of State, supra note 289, at 7. Moreover, “government-sponsored public 
denunciations of Bahais continued to increase steadily” as reported in 2016. 
Id. at 20. 
297. Iran—Constitution, supra note 295, art. 14. 
298. Id. 
299. See id. art. 2(6) (addressing the foundational beliefs of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran). 
300. Id. art. 2(6)(c). 
301. Ahmed Shaheed (Special Rapporteur), Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, ¶ 71, U.N. 
Doc. A/71/418 (Sept. 30, 2016). 
302. U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 289, at 4. 
303. Id. 
304. See generally Iran Human Rights Documentation Ctr., Apostasy in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran 4–8 (2014), www.iranhrdc.org/files. 
php?force&file=reports_en/Apostasy_in_the_Islamic_Republic_of_Iran
_104287928.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9EJ-83ML] (discussing the various 
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(“IPC”) does not contain a specific provision banning apostasy.305 But, 
recognizing ḥadd as one of the four main categories of punishment,306 
the Code refers in its ḥadd section to the Iranian Constitution’s incor-
poration article regarding religious law left uncodified.307 This consti-
 
elements constituting apostasy in sharia law on the basis of the Quran and 
the oral traditions (hadith)). On the sharia concept of ḥadd, see generally 
Rudolph Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory 
and Practice from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-first Century 
53–64 (2005). 
305. Although an inclusion was discussed in 2008, apostasy was not included in 
the 2012 revision of Iran’s penal code. The Law Library of Congress, 
Glob. Legal Research Ctr., Law Criminalizing Apostasy in 
Selected Jurisdictions 7 (2014) [hereinafter Apostasy Law], 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/apostasy/apostasy.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Z 
9J-JGU7]. For the wording of the 2008 proposal, see Iran’s New Apostasy 
Law: New Penal Code Mandates Death for Converts, Iranian Christians 
for Religious Freedom, https://web.archive.org/web/20140828214107/ 
http://www.madeye18.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article
&id=97:irans-new-apostasy-law&catid=31:news-english&Itemid=62 [https: 
//perma.cc/ML65-7QBN] (last visited Jan. 10, 2017). But see Nader 
Entessar, Criminal Law and the Legal System in Revolutionary Iran, 8 B.C. 
Third World L.J. 91, 97 (1988) (claiming that in 1988, Iran’s criminal 
code contained a provision banning apostasy). 
306. Qānuni Mujāzāti Islāmī [Islamic Penal Code] Tehran 1392 [2013], art. 
14. The translation of the first two books of the code is available online. Iran 
Human Rights Documentation Ctr., New Islamic Penal Code of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran—Books One and Two (2013), 
www.iranhrdc.org/files.php?force&file=pdf_en/Iranian_Codes/Translation
_of_the_new_Penal_Code_Book_1and2__507475863.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/J8HP-25HJ]. The IPC defines ḥadd (plural ḥudūd) as “a 
punishment for which the grounds for, type, amount and conditions of 
execution are specified in holy Shari’a.” Id. art. 15. 
307. Iran Human Rights Documentation Ctr., supra note 306, art. 220; see 
also Entessar, supra note 305, at 95 (noting that under the supremacy of 
traditional Islamic law (sharīʿa), the task of Iranian legislators and judges in 
principle is not to “originate any laws” but “simply to codify and apply the 
shari’a” (emphases omitted)); Iran—Constitution, supra note 295, art. 4 
(“All civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, 
political, and other laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria.”); 
cf. Peters, supra note 304, at 176–77 (discussing whether this and similar 
provisions found in modern Islamic criminal codes violate the international 
human-rights standard of nulla poena sine lege). This, however, does not 
mean that Islamic law can never change. For example, contemporary Iran, 
building on the teachings of Ruhollah Khomeini, appears to rely mostly on 
procedural safeguards to the Islamic nature of its laws: Since—according to 
article 94 of Iran’s constitution—all legislation enacted by the legislature 
must be reviewed by the Guardian Council consisting of legal experts, all 
legislation that passes this review is deemed compliant with the 
constitutionally required “Islamic criteria,” even if it appears devoid of any 
particularly “Islamic” content. Robert Gleave, Iran, Islamic Law in, in The 
Oxford International Encyclopedia of Legal History (Stanley N. 
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tutional article provides: “In case of the absence of any such [codified] 
law, [the judge] has to deliver his judgement [sic] on the basis of 
authoritative Islamic sources and authentic fatwa.”308 
There is no reason to doubt that these statutory and constitutional 
provisions apply to what “authoritative Islamic sources” teach on apos-
tasy. But assessing the realistic danger for those Iranians accused of 
apostasy should not end after establishing the fact that the death 
penalty is seen as the proper punishment for apostates in “authoritative 
Islamic sources.” Avoiding unrealistic, one-dimensional, and potentially 
biased caricatures of foreign legal systems for the sake of well-in-
tentioned advocacy requires a contextualization that establishes the 
elements of the offense of apostasy, that is, the circumstances under 
which this penalty may be imposed.309 While this contextualization, as 
shown below, tends to mitigate concerns regarding the death penalty in 
apostasy cases, it is worth noting that the Iranian justice system in gen-
eral does not receive high marks from international observers.310 
The IPC provides some general guidance that appears to be ap-
plicable, especially in the case of a ḥadd not defined in the Code itself.311 
This guidance—echoing the judicial precepts of “authentic Islamic 
 
Katz ed., 2009) (ebook); see also Wael B. Hallaq, Sharīʿa: Theory, 
Practice, Transformations 486–93 (2009) (discussing the 
transformation of traditional sharīʿa law in 20th-century Iran and concluding 
that, under Khomeini’s theory of the supremacy of the State over traditional 
Islamic law, “the great majority of laws adopted before and after the 
Revolution were Western in inspiration and content, and they remain so”). 
On the basic principles of Khomeini’s political ideas, see Keddie, supra note 
276, at 192–93. 
308. Iran—Constitution, supra note 295, art. 167. The article goes on to exhort 
judges, noting that a judge, “on the pretext of the silence of or deficiency of 
law in the matter, or its brevity or contradictory nature, cannot refrain from 
admitting and examining cases and delivering his judgement [sic].” Id. 
309. See, e.g., Marra Guttenplan, Note, Granting Asylum to Persecuted Afghan 
Western Women, 12 Cardozo J.L. & Gender 391, 411 (2005) (noting 
that, in Afghanistan and Iran, “apostasy is a capital crime” without 
discussing the elements of this crime). It is important to recognize that 
apostasy is not a strict-liability offense in Islamic law. See infra notes 311–
315. 
310. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, Iran 2015 Human Rights Report  2–3, 
10–11 (2015), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/253135.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y9TV-H5MF] (noting “numerous reports” of extrajudicial 
killings carried out by the government or its agents with impunity; stating 
that, while the law does not make apostasy a capital offense, “courts handed 
down capital punishments for similar charges;” and detailing that arbitrary 
arrests are “commonly used . . . to impede alleged antiregime activities” 
and the judiciary is not really an independent branch of the government). 
311. See generally Iran Human Rights Documentation Ctr., supra note 306, 
arts. 217–20. 
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sources”—shows, for one, that apostasy is not a strict-liability offense 
but requires several mental elements. Accordingly, defendants can be 
subject to ḥadd only if they have knowledge, intention, meet “the 
requirements for criminal responsibility,” and are aware of the 
criminality of their conduct under the applicable legal standards.312 
Importantly, if the defendants claim they lacked the requisite mental 
elements of the crime, these allegations are to be accepted without 
further evidence, if “there is the likelihood of veracity of the claim.”313 
Moreover, if the defendants repent before the commission of the offense 
is proved and the judge is convinced of the sincerity of the repentance, 
the applicable ḥadd is not to be imposed.314 Thus, obtaining a conviction 
for apostasy and other offenses calling for ḥadd is quite a demanding 
task when compared with other crimes.315 
While judicial convictions and executions for apostasy are very rare 
in Iran,316 extrajudicial killings of those identified as apostates from 
 
312. Id. art. 217. Knowledge here refers to “knowledge . . . about the subject of 
the offense,” intent refers to the “intention to commit the criminal conduct.” 
Id. art. 144. The general conditions of criminal responsibility are sanity, 
pubescence, and freedom. Id. art. 140. The age of maturity is set at nine 
lunar years for girls and fifteen lunar years of boys. Id. art. 147. Coercion, as 
the opposite of the requisite freedom, is a defense if it was “unbearable.” Id. 
art. 151. Finally, while ignorance of the law is generally not recognized as a 
defense, it is a defense where, as in the case of ḥadd, traditional jurisprudence 
so provides. Id. art. 155; see Peters, supra note 304, at 19–24 (discussing 
these general mental state requirements for criminal responsibility); Hallaq, 
supra note 307, at 319 (noting that apostates must “have acted willingly 
(mukhtār), and no element of coercion could be present”). 
313. Iran Human Rights Documentation Ctr., supra note 306, art. 218; see 
Peters, supra note 304, at 21–23 (discussing the sharia doctrine of 
uncertainty (shubha) according to the ḥadīth of Mohammad, “[w]ard off the 
fixed punishments [ḥudūd] from the Muslims on the strength of shubha as 
much as you can” (quoting Bulūgh al-Marām (Attainment of the Objective) 
by Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (1372–1448)); see also Hallaq, supra note 307, 
311–12 (discussing the reasons for “[t]he extreme economy with which the 
ḥudūd were invoked” in traditional Islamic law). 
314. Id. arts. 114, 220; see Peters, supra note 304, at 27 (discussing the classic 
background of this defense “that does not fit in Western theories of criminal 
law.”). 
315. See Silvia Tellenbach, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law, in The 
Oxford International Encyclopedia of Legal History, supra note 
307 (noting “important differences in proof and procedure” between crimes 
against the rights of man and crimes against the rights of God—most ḥadd 
penalties were imposed on crimes Islamic jurists considered to be violations 
of the rights of God—and observing that “[m]any of them seem to be devised 
to avoid the severe ḥadd penalties”). 
316. This may be an indication that Iranian courts actually follow the sharia law 
on apostasy. Only one case is known where, in 1990, Christian pastor Hossein 
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Islam due to their conversion to Christianity are reportedly more 
common. 317  Moreover, due to the proximity of apostasy to crimes 
against the state such as treason,318 and because those liable of ḥadd 
enjoy significant procedural protections, Christians and other religious 
dissenters may instead be convicted of spying for the U.S. or engaging 
in other subversive activities.319 Even where no convictions ensue, the 
U.S. Department of State reported that Muslim converts to Christianity 
in particular “continued to experience disproportionate levels of 
arrests . . . and high levels of harassment and surveillance.”320 
 
Soodmand was convicted of apostasy and executed. Iran Human Rights 
Documentation Ctr., supra note 304, at 31–32. 
317. See Apostasy Law, supra note 305, at 7 (referencing reports of extrajudicial 
killings of Protestant pastors); see also Iran Human Rights 
Documentation Ctr., supra note 304, at 14–15 (deploring the lesser 
penalties imposed on a person who kills another who has committed a capital 
offense such as apostasy and citing one senior cleric who believed that 
“anyone has the right to kill an apostate” even without the permission of a 
religious judge). 
318. See Hallaq, supra note 307, at 319 (noting that in cultures built upon 
religion, “apostasy is in some way equivalent to high treason in the modern 
nation-state”). Belief in the one God of Islam is the principal foundation of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran—Constitution, supra note 295, art. 2(1). 
Accordingly, renouncing this belief is seen as undermining the basis of the 
Islamic state. 
319. A case from December 2016 involved a Pentecostal church in Iran. The 
government seized a compound used for youth retreats owned by the church 
since 1974 because the church allegedly had ties to the CIA. Protestant 
Church Property Confiscated in Iran by Khamenei-Supervised Organization, 
Int’l Campaign for Hum. Rts. in Iran (Dec. 19, 2016), 
https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2016/12/church-siege-tehran/ [https:// 
perma.cc/V6KP-H26U]. Other cases involved members of a “house 
church”—i.e., a more informal gathering of Christians in the private 
residence of a member—who were charged with “crimes against national 
security,” and an imprisoned female convert who was charged with 
“propaganda against the Islamic regime and collusion intended to harm 
national security.” U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 289, at 12–13. 
Generally speaking, for 2015, the Department of State reported that “[t]he 
authorities often arrested members of unrecognized churches for operating 
illegally in private homes or on charges of supporting and accepting 
assistance from enemy countries.” Id. at 13. 
320. U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 289, at 11. This includes arrests for 
drinking communion wine, raids of private homes, closing of churches 
offering religious services in the Persian language, and restrictions on 
possessing and publishing religious materials such as bibles. Id. at 12–13, 16. 
About ninety Christians were either “in prison, detained, or awaiting trial 
because of their religious . . . activities” as of December 2016. U.S. 
Comm’n on Int’l Religious Freedom, supra note 280, at 47. 
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III. Judicial Review of Religious Asylum Claims by 
Iranians in the U.S. and Germany 
A. General Rules for Judicial Review of Administrative Asylum 
Decisions 
1. U.S. Law 
Those who are lawfully present in the U.S. and whose affirmative 
asylum application is denied by USCIS may ordinarily try to remedy 
this unfavorable outcome by submitting a new affirmative appli-
cation.321 Those who have been ordered removed from the U.S. and 
whose defensive asylum application has been denied by an immigration 
judge may appeal this denial with the BIA.322 Once a final removal 
order is issued by the BIA, an applicant for asylum may file a petition 
to have a federal appeals court review the order.323 Service of the peti-
tion no longer stays the removal of an alien by default.324 
Appellate courts may also review the “constitutional claims or 
questions of law” raised by the petitioner325 which are reviewed under 
the de novo standard.326 Courts give a certain amount of deference to 
agency interpretation of the statutes the agency administers under the 
test outlined in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense 
Council, Inc.327 
 
321. Anker, supra note 46, § A2:42. 
322. Id. § A4:1. 
323. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1)–(2) (2012). These judicial review provisions go back 
to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 306(a)(2), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-607 
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (2012)). IIRIRA repealed the previous 
judicial review section enacted in 1961. Compare § 306(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-
612, with Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 5, 75 Stat. 650, 651–
53 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1964)). For a discussion of the limitations 
imposed on judicial review by IIRIRA and their precedent in earlier U.S. 
immigration law, see generally Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: 
Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of Immigration Proceedings, 
29 Conn. L. Rev. 1411, 1419–38, 1466–67 (1997). 
324. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B) (2012) (providing that a court may order a stay). 
The repealed provision provided for a stay as the default provision, Id. 
§ 1105a(a)(3) (providing some exceptions). 
325. Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D). 
326. See, e.g., Upatcha v. Sessions, 849 F.3d 181, 184 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing 
Turkson v. Holder, 667 F.3d 523, 527 (4th Cir. 2012)). 
327. 467 U.S. 837, 844–45 (1984); see, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 
446–48 (1987); Rivas v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 765 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 
2014); see also Lenni B. Benson, The New World of Judicial Review of 
Removal Orders, 12 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 233, 240 (1998) (noting that 
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The appellate court decides the petition only based on the pertinent 
administrative record.328 Findings of fact are conclusive “unless any rea-
sonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”329 
The discretionary decision whether to grant asylum is conclusive “un-
less manifestly contrary to law and an abuse of discretion.”330 
Given the different scope of judicial review depending on whether 
an issue of fact or of law is involved, it is important to determine which 
of the reviewed issues are questions of fact and which are questions of 
law.331 Commonly, credibility determinations are reviewed deferentially 
as questions of fact.332 Some appellate courts have held that “questions 
of law” are strictly questions of statutory construction,333 while others 
 
deference does not mean the absence of de novo review of agency 
interpretation). 
328. Id. § 1252(b)(4)(A). 
329. Id. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Lenni Benson argued that despite the change in 
language from 1961 to 1996, the standard of review for questions of fact 
actually remained the same. Benson, supra note 327, at 239–40. This early 
claim is supported by a number of recent decisions from the Fourth Circuit 
and other circuits. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Mercado v. Lynch, 809 F.3d 415, 
417–18 (8th Cir. 2015); Aldana-Ramos v. Holder, 757 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 
2014) (citing INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)); Cordova v. 
Holder, 759 F.3d 332, 337 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Ai Hua Chen v. Holder, 
742 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) 
(2012))); Djadjou v. Holder, 662 F.3d 265, 273 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481); Khan v. Holder, 584 F.3d 773, 776 (9th Cir. 
2009)(stating that questions of fact are reviewed under the substantial 
evidence standard); Ramaj v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 520, 527 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(same). 
330. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D) (2012). This provision appears to echo the 
pertinent provision of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(2)(A) (2012) (directing reviewing courts to “hold unlawful and set 
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”). 
331. See Anker, supra note 46, § 6:47 (discussing the differences in how appellate 
courts interpret “questions of law” under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)); see also 
the discussion of the legislative history behind this statutory provision in 
Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 324–28 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(holding that the “ambiguous” term “question of law” likely includes not 
only the interpretation but also the application of the law, although it is not 
limitless so as to include all questions “having any legal dimension,” 
including evidentiary questions). 
332. See, e.g., Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 307 (2d Cir. 2003), 
superseded on other grounds by REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 
119 Stat. 302 (overturning Secaida-Rosales to the extent that it conflicted 
with the Act’s credibility provisions codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). 
333. Adame v. Holder, 762 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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have held that they also include the application of law to undisputed 
facts, i.e., mixed questions of law and fact.334 Some appellate courts 
have held that nexus questions are questions of fact,335 while others have 
held that they are mixed question of fact and law.336 
2. German Law 
Within two weeks of receiving the rejection of the application by 
the German refugee agency, Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 
(“BAMF”), an applicant may file an appeal with the administrative 
court of first instance having jurisdiction in the matter, 
Verwaltungsgericht (“VG”).337 The court then investigates the matter 
de novo.338 
Filing the appeal stays the deportation only in case of admissible 
but unfounded applications, unless the application was manifestly un-
founded.339 If the appeal succeeds, the court, since it lacks the power to 
recognize the applicants as refugees, obligates the agency to recognize 
the applicants as such.340 
 
334. Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 648 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Pullman–
Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982)). 
335. Cordova v. Holder, 759 F.3d 332, 341 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting that the review 
of questions of law is de novo, but with the appropriate Chevron deference). 
336. Islamovic v. INS, 217 F. App’x 68, 69 (2d Cir. 2007) (reviewing the agency’s 
nexus determination under the substantial-evidence standard normally 
applied in questions of fact, despite the Second Circuit’s 2006 Chen decision); 
see also supra note 331 and accompanying text. 
337. Compare Asylgesetz [AsylG] [Asylum Act], Sept. 2, 2008, BGBl I at 1798, 
as amended, § 74(1), https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/asylvfg_1992/ 
BJNR111260992.html [https://perma.cc/A4SP-P4XY], with 2013 Procedures 
Directive, supra note 15, art. 46. 
338. Compare Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung [VwGO] [Code of 
Administrative Court Procedure], as amended, § 86, https://www. 
gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/vwgo/gesamt.pdf [https://perma.cc/6G 
ZW-YKET]), with 2013 Procedures Directive, supra note 15, art. 46(3). See 
Heusch et al., supra note 15, at 151–52. This generous review standard—
in addition to the BAMF’s decision to decide cases quickly, i.e., after 
superficial review and with unqualified translators—has led to a significant 
backlog of asylum cases in the courts. As of July 2017, over 283,000 asylum 
cases were pending before administrative courts. Tausende Flüchtlinge klagen 
gegen ihren Asylbescheid, Zeit Online (Sept. 18, 2017), http:// 
www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2017-09/bamf-fluechtlinge-asylklagen-verwa 
ltungsgerichte-ueberlastung [https://perma.cc/HA5Q-2948]. 
339. Compare AsylG § 75(1) with AsylG § 38(1). See Hailbronner, supra note 
15, at 460. 
340. AsylG § 24(2); Hailbronner, supra note 15, at 460; VwGO §§ 42, 113(1); 
BVerwG, Mar. 29, 1996, 9 C 116.95, ¶ 13, https://www.jurion.de/ 
urteile/bverwg/1996-03-29/9-c-116_95/ [https://perma.cc/6NB4-W9UQ]. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 3·2018 
Testing Religion 
1043 
If the administrative court determines that the application was 
manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, no further appeals are 
allowed.341 In all other cases, the administrative court with appellate 
jurisdiction, Oberverwaltungsgericht (“OVG”), may grant a discretion-
ary appeal only if the case is of a fundamental nature; is materially 
based on a deviation from mandatory authority; or has certain pro-
cedural defects.342 
3. Summary 
U.S. and German law provides for judicial review of agency 
determinations. But while U.S. law limits judicial review in a variety of 
ways—for example, by binding the reviewing courts to the 
administrative record and prescribing a generally deferential posture—
German courts review agency decisions de novo. This includes the 
investigation of the facts at issue by the court. German administrative 
trial courts, thus, need not engage in the perennial preoccupation of 
U.S. courts, i.e., determining whether a given issue is a question of fact 
or of law or of both fact and law. 
B. Judicial Review: Evaluating the Applicants’ Credibility and 
Assessing the Situation in Iran 
1. U.S. Courts 
Judicial review of final agency determinations naturally covers a 
wide range of substantive and procedural issues. This Note will discuss 
only a limited number of cases reviewing the BIA’s assessment of the 
conditions in Iran for Christian converts and the BIA’s credibility 
determinations since these, as will be seen, are closely related in practice 
 
341. See AsylG § 78(1). 
342. See AsylG § 78(2)–(3). Thus, for the requested appeal to be granted, it is 
not sufficient for the decision to be clearly erroneous or factually or legally 
difficult, as in regular appeals to the intermediate administrative court 
(Oberverwaltungsgericht). Instead, the Act’s legal appeals provisions apply 
the higher hurdles for revision by the Federal Administrative Court already 
to the intermediate court. Compare VwGO, § 124(2), with VwGO, 
§ 132(2). In German procedural law, the basic distinction between appeal 
(“Berufung”) and revision (“Revision”) consists in that on appeal, the 
reviewing court examines the lower court’s factual and legal determinations, 
while on revision, the reviewing court typically only reviews the decision for 
errors of law. Compare VwGO, § 128 (appeal), with VwGO, § 137 
(revision). AsylG § 78(2) expressly excludes a revision of the decision of the 
court of first instance by the appellate court. Thus, if the intermediate 
administrative court grants the applicant’s motion for appeal, it must review 
the factual and legal bases of the lower court’s decision. 
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and reflect the tension between a subjective and an objective emphasis 
when reviewing asylum applications discussed earlier.343 
a. Najafi v. INS 
In Najafi v. INS,344 the U.S. Appeals Court for the Seventh Circuit 
remanded to the BIA the case of an Iranian who had filed for asylum 
and withholding of deportation in May 1993 to avert deportation to 
Iran after he was no longer a legal resident in the U.S.345 Najafi was 
born a Muslim in Iran. He had come to the U.S. on a student visa in 
1978.346 In 1984, he was introduced to Christianity in the U.S. and 
converted to Christianity in 1989.347 Najafi alleged “well-founded fear” 
on account of his conversion to Christianity.348 
The court agreed with Najafi that the immigration judge erred by 
focusing on the genuineness of Najafi’s conversion.349 Instead of asking 
the subjective question of whether Najafi had really converted, the 
court asked the objective question of whether Najafi would be viewed 
and treated as an apostate in Iran.350 The court wrote: “To assess a 
well-founded fear of persecution [in Najafi’s case], we need to know how 
the ordinary apostate . . . is treated in Iran. With this information, 
we will be able to approximate Najafi’s situation if returned to Iran.”351 
Conceding that “true belief is not readily justiciable,” the court noted 
“our task is theoretically easier,” in that the decisive question here is 
 
343. See supra notes 167–173 and accompanying text. 
344. 104 F.3d 943 (7th Cir. 1997). 
345. Id. at 944–45. 
346. Id. at 945. 
347. Id. 
348. Id. at 947. Najafi also alleged well-founded fear on account of his family’s 
past political alignment with the shah and his membership in a social group. 
Id. The court “readily dismissed” these claims. Id. at 948. 
349. Id. 
350. Id.; see Bastanipour v. INS, 980 F.2d 1129, 1132 (7th Cir. 1997) (faulting 
the BIA opinion for not considering “what would count as conversion in the 
eyes of an Iranian religious judge, which is the only thing that would count 
so far as the danger to Bastanipour is concerned”); Bahadori v. U.S. INS, 
No. 90-70500, 1991 WL 224031, at * 4 (9th Cir. Oct. 30, 1991) (noting that, 
in the case of an Iranian petition of mixed religious ancestry—Muslim father, 
Catholic mother—the BIA had “failed to consider whether Iranian 
authorities might impute a Moslem [sic] identity to Bahadori” and that the 
Ninth Circuit had “held that an alien may establish a threat of persecution 
based upon ideas imputed to the alien by others”). On the situation of 
religious minorities, especially Christians in Iran, see supra Part II. 
351. Najafi, 104 F.3d at 948; see Bastanipour, 980 F.2d at 1133 (“We do not 
know what Iran does to ordinary apostates.”). 
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“what would count as conversion in the eyes of an Iranian Religious 
Judge.”352 Therefore, the court was “not as concerned with the heart of 
the convert, but rather [required] some bonafide indicia of apostasy 
which would matter to the Iranian authorities.”353 
Accordingly, the court urged Najafi to point the immigration judge 
to evidence that “any activity necessary to the convert could trigger 
persecution in Iran.”354 The immigration judge, in turn, “should be 
satisfied with the sincerity of the alien’s new religious commitment.”355 
The central standard for evaluating any evidence “is whether this 
evidence might result in a prosecution for apostasy.”356 
Apparently, Najafi had claimed that sharia law made apostasy a 
capital crime and pointed to some news reports on punishment for 
apostasy “throughout the Islamic world.” 357 The court, though not 
tasked to weigh the evidence, commented that this was “not over-
whelming evidence that he personally, as an ordinary apostate, would 
be in peril if returned to Iran.”358 
b. Refahiyat v. U.S. Department of Justice INS 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Refahiyat v. 
U.S. Department of Justice INS,359 employed a two-pronged analysis of 
the well-founded-fear claim of Refahiyat who found himself in a 
situation similar to Najafi: Refahiyat also had come to the U.S. as a 
student.360 To avoid deportation after his legal stay in the U.S. had 
ended, he, too, applied for asylum and withholding of deportation, 
stating that he feared persecution also for religious reasons because he 
was “not a practicing Muslim.”361 The application was denied because 
Refahiyat was found not to have shown a well-founded fear of 
 
352. Najafi, 104 F.3d at 949. 
353. Id. 
354. Id. 
355. Id. 
356. Id. 
357. Id. at 948. 
358. Id. In a footnote, the court observed that “the death penalty on the books 
alone carries weight in establishing a fear of persecution,” but went on to 
state that “an alien’s claim would be strengthened by evidence that proved 
apostates are actively persecuted.” Id. at 948 n.5. But see Bastanipour v. 
INS, 980 F.2d 1129, 1133 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that already being under 
the threat of the death penalty for apostasy is enough for fear of persecution 
to be well founded). 
359. 29 F.3d 553 (10th Cir. 1994). 
360. Id. at 554. 
361. Id. at 555. 
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persecution.362 While the denial was appealed with the BIA, Refahiyat 
claimed that he had recently converted to the Mormon Church and 
should therefore be given asylum as a practicing Christian.363 The BIA 
denied the appeal.364 
The Tenth Circuit reviewed Refahiyat’s petition based on the Ninth 
Circuit’s test for well-founded fear.365 This test distinguishes between a 
subjective, “fear,” and an objective, “well-founded,” component where 
the petitioner must first support “a reasonable fear that the petitioner 
faces persecution” based on “credible, direct, and specific evidence in 
the record” before the court considers whether he has a subjective fear 
of persecution. 366  The court affirmed the BIA’s decision because 
Refahiyat argued “in a conclusive fashion” that he will be persecuted 
because he is a member of the Mormon Church.367 
c. Toufighi v. Mukasey 
In Toufighi v. Mukasey,368 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit upheld a removal decision by the BIA. This opinion shows—in 
the different ways the majority and the dissent framed the issue—how 
focusing on an applicant’s credibility instead of reviewing the conditions 
in the country of origin can lead to opposite results in adjudicating asy-
lum claims. 
Toufighi had entered the U.S. as a non-immigrant visitor but had 
remained in the U.S. beyond the six months authorized by his visa.369 
At his removal hearing before the immigration judge, he claimed that 
he, born a Muslim, had become a Christian and, therefore, feared perse-
cution because of his apostasy if removed to Iran.370 
The immigration court, while finding Toufighi’s testimony generally 
credible, held that Toufighi had not actually converted to Christianity 
and was merely alleging his conversion “as a vehicle for him to apply 
for political asylum in the United States.”371 The immigration court, ex-
 
362. Id. at 556. 
363. Id. 
364. Id. 
365. Id. at 557 (quoting Aguilera–Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
366. Id.; see also supra notes 164–166 and accompanying text. 
367. Refahiyat, 29 F.3d at 557–58 (“Merely asserting that one is aligned with a 
minority religion is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of religious 
persecution.”). 
368. 538 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2008). 
369. Id. at 990. 
370. Id. 
371. Id. at 990–91. 
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pressing its “very deep concern as to the genuineness [of Toufighi’s] 
claimed conversion,” noted in particular that Toufighi “apparently 
knows very little about the ‘Bible’ that he studied”—allegedly on a 
regular basis—and could not “even name the 12 apostles of Jesus 
Christ.”372 This was apparently Toufighi’s decisive shortcoming for the 
immigration court, since the court understood Christianity to begin 
“with the life and teachings of Jesus Christ in the New Testament” 
where “the 12 apostles have some of the most important, if not the 
most important, writings of Christianity.”373 Accordingly, there were 
“serious doubts” as to Toufighi’s conversion “when he cannot even 
given the names of the 12 apostles of Jesus Christ.”374 
The Ninth Circuit held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion 
when it affirmed the BIA’s denial of Toufighi’s motion to reopen his 
case375 because Toufighi had not presented any new evidence with his 
motion to reopen to corroborate the genuineness of his conversion.376 
The court also rejected Toufighi’s attempts to reframe the immigration 
judge’s “deep concerns” about the genuineness of Toufighi’s conver-
sion.377 
Judge Berzon based her dissent on two grounds: First, she asserted 
that the BIA and the majority “misunderstood what the [immigration 
judge] actually said about Toufighi’s conversion.”378 Second, the BIA 
and the majority, as a consequence of this misunderstanding, “entirely 
failed to consider whether circumstances have changed with regard to 
 
372. Id. 
373. Id. at 991. 
374. Id. 
375. Toufighi had filed a timely appeal of the immigration judge’s decision, but 
had failed to file the requisite supporting brief, which is why the BIA 
dismissed his appeal. Id. Instead of leaving the U.S. voluntarily as promised, 
he filed a motion to reopen his case, claiming that changed conditions in Iran 
warranted the reopening of his claim. The BIA denied his motion, holding 
that Toufighi’s evidence—“some general news articles”—did not establish 
that he would be directly affected by any changes described in the articles. 
Id. at 992. 
376. Id. at 994. 
377. Id. The court also noted that it did not have jurisdiction to overrule the 
immigration judge’s original order denying Toufighi’s application for asylum 
and withholding of removal, since Toufighi, as noted earlier, did not file a 
timely appeal to that order, so that only the BIA’s denial of Toufighi’s 
motion to reopen was before the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 995. 
378. Id. at 998 (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
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how Iran treats apostates.” 379  On the first ground, Judge Berzon 
pointed out that the immigration judge had not found “that Toufighi 
had not converted, only that his conversion was not spiritually genu-
ine.”380 She then pointed out that persecution can take place based on 
actual beliefs or based on imputed beliefs,381 arriving at this conclusion: 
“[T]he question is not what Toufighi believes but what Iran understands 
him to believe—or, more accurately, not to believe.”382 In the words of 
Judge Berzon, “the sincerity of Toufighi’s belief has no direct bearing 
on the question whether he will be persecuted based on imputed 
religious beliefs.”383 
2. German Courts 
a. Iranian Couple I Case 
In the 2016 Iranian Couple I Case,384 the administrative court in 
Stuttgart reviewed the negative decision of the BAMF regarding the 
refugee-status application of an Iranian couple who claimed that 
political activity in Iran critical of the Iranian government had resulted 
in arrests and mistreatment during the arrest.385 In May 2013, after 
legally obtaining Iranian passports, the couple flew from Tehran to 
Germany via Istanbul.386 While in Germany, the couple got in touch 
with a Christian minister and other Christians and began to read the 
bible.387 Both were baptized in a Persian service in July 2014.388 
In June 2015, the BAMF rejected the couple’s application for refu-
gee status.389 The BAMF provided two reasons: First, the fact that the 
couple obtained passports and could leave Iran legally showed that the 
 
379. Id. (noting that Toufighi had “submitted documents demonstrating that the 
climate of repression in Iran is worsening for Muslims who have renounced 
Islam,” which was for the BIA to review on remand for sufficiency). 
380. Id. (observing that the immigration judge “credited Toufighi’s testimony 
that he was a church member” and that he would, if returned to Iran, “only 
practice his religion in hiding”). 
381. Id. at 999. 
382. Id. at 1000 (echoing the holdings from Najafi and Bastanipour). 
383. Id. 
384. VG Stuttgart, Feb. 8, 2016, A 11 K 3425/15, http://lrbw.juris.de/cgi-
bin/laender_rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bw&Datum=2016&nr
=20465&Blank=1 [https://perma.cc/RB8S-4ZFA]. 
385. Id. ¶¶ 1–2. 
386. Id. 
387. Id. 
388. Id. ¶ 3. 
389. Id. ¶ 4. 
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Iranian government had no interest in persecuting them on account of 
their past political activity.390 Second, their adoption of Christianity 
was pretextual since the couple had not internalized the Christian faith 
to the point of being unable to live without it.391 
To support their claim for refugee status, the Iranian couple pro-
vided four letters. Two were written by pastors, attesting to the sin-
cerity of their belief and church membership.392 
During trial, the administrative court interviewed both wife and 
husband to investigate their political activities in Iran.393 It also in-
quired into the reasons for their conversion and their knowledge about 
the Christian religion.394 The court asked a number of open-ended ques-
tions about their reasons for the conversion, the meaning of the 
Christian faith for their lives, and how the plaintiffs practiced their 
faith, and how they would practice their faith in Iran.395 The court also 
raised a number of knowledge questions about Christian holidays, the 
structure of the bible, and Christian prayers.396 
The court affirmed the BAMF decision, thereby rejecting the 
Iranian couple’s complaint for two reasons. First, based on the results 
of the trial, it was unable to gain a full conviction regarding the couple’s 
claims of past persecution on account of political opinion due to the 
contradictory nature of their accounts.397 Second, the court also held 
that the couple was not threatened by persecution on account of 
religion.398 
The court noted that an investigation of the plaintiff’s sincerity was 
necessary because the Iranian authorities, as a rule, deem it un-
imaginable that a Muslim could break the taboo of leaving Islam for 
Christianity, assuming by default that the person converting abroad 
did so insincerely, simply to gain the right of asylum.399 Based on its 
 
390. Id. 
391. Id. 
392. Id. ¶¶ 6–9. Such testimony by religious ministers is not given dispositive 
weight in German administrative court proceedings. See supra note 192. 
393. VG Stuttgart, A 11 K 3425/15, ¶¶ 18, 20. 
394. Id. ¶¶ 19, 21. 
395. Id. 
396. Id. 
397. Id. ¶ 36. 
398. Id. ¶¶ 44, 56. 
399. Id. ¶¶ 49–50. This notion is apparently also held by the BAMF. Christoph 
Sydow, Volker Beck wittert Volksverhetzung bei Flüchtlingsbehörde, Spiegel 
Online (Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/volker-
beck-wittert-volksverhetzung-bei-fluechtlingsbehoerde-a-1145086.html [https: 
//perma.cc/Y9JW-2BZS]. As seen above in Part. II.B., apostasy is not a 
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investigation during trial, the court was not convinced that the 
plaintiffs had made “a serious conversion to the Christian religion that 
shaped the religious identity of the plaintiffs in an obligatory man-
ner.”400 As one of the main reasons for its finding of lacking sincerity, 
the court noted that the couple was unable to explain why they had 
chosen Christianity instead of all the other world religions that can all 
be lived openly in Germany, because their reasons for choosing 
Christianity were equally valid for the other religions: “There is no 
recognizable intellectual, or even just spiritual, examination that, for 
the plaintiffs, could have exclusively led them to the Christian faith as 
their new religion.”401 Furthermore, the court, while recognizing that 
the plaintiffs had some basic knowledge about Christianity, also found 
their knowledge deficient.402 Finally, the court noted that the plaintiffs 
could not explain how they might live their faith in Iran: “A convincing 
examination of how to lead the life of a Christian in Iran has evidently 
not taken place.”403 
b. Iranian Individual Male Case 
In the 2016 Iranian Individual Male Case,404 the administrative 
court in Berlin affirmed the BAMF’s rejection of an Iranian individual’s 
application for refugee status on account of past political and feared 
religious persecution.405 The court was not convinced that the plaintiff 
left Iran based on past persecution.406 Furthermore, the court noted that 
plaintiff’s conversion to the Christian faith cannot result in a right to 
asylum simply because it is a fact created by the applicant himself after 
he left Iran that was not the result of a way of life that had shaped his 
personality and identity in Iran.407 
 
strict-liability offense in Iran, but it is not clear where German authorities 
get the sweeping notion that all conversions abroad will be seen as pretextual 
by Iranian authorities. 
400. VG Stuttgart, A 11 K 3425/15, ¶ 51. 
401. Id. ¶ 53. 
402. Id. ¶ 54. 
403. Id. ¶ 55. 
404. VG Berlin, May 27, 2016, 3 K 13.15 A, http://www.gerichtsentscheidungen. 
berlin-brandenburg.de/jportal/portal/t/wid/bs/10/page/sammlung.psml?acti 
on=controls.sammlung.PrintOrSaveDocumentContent&case=print [https:// 
perma.cc/NL8L-5WKC]. 
405. Id. ¶ 12. 
406. Id. ¶ 17 (noting that plaintiff’s contradictory remarks during trial “increased 
doubts as to whether his claimed fate of persecution is close to reality 
(realitätsnah)”). 
407. Id. ¶ 18. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 3·2018 
Testing Religion 
1051 
The court explained its, incorrect,408 categorical denial with more 
precision by stating that asylum seekers basing their fear of persecution 
on a sur place conversion to a religion persecuted in their country of 
origin, they must make credible their inner motives of such conver-
sion.409 In other words, they must establish that their conversion was 
based on a firm conviction and a serious change of religious attitudes 
instead of opportunistic considerations, so that now the conversion 
shapes the religious identity of the asylum seeker.410 
A merely formal conversion to Christianity by baptism is normally 
not sufficient.411 Instead, adult converts must show that they are famil-
iar with the basic tenets of their new religion.412 Moreover, they must 
show that their way of life in Germany is defined by their new 
religion.413 
The plaintiff did not convince the court that his fear of persecution 
because of religion was well-founded.414 Specifically, the court noted 
that the Iranian individual first decided to undergo instruction in the 
Christian religion after his application with the BAMF had been 
rejected and that attempts to show the seriousness of his conversion 
were based on fabrication.415 This led the court to doubt whether the 
plaintiff, after his removal to Iran, would engage in the kind of religious 
activities that would expose him to a real risk of persecution; the court 
also doubted that he could not be expected to forego the exercise of 
such activities without unreasonable limitations of his religious 
identity.416 
Specifically, the court found that the plaintiff, while still in Iran, 
had not been a person deeply engaged with the Muslim religion, which 
made it unlikely that he first in Germany extensively examined his pre-
vious understanding of god. The court found it “no less likely” that he 
got in contact with the Christian congregation where he was baptized 
 
408. The court had initially confused the proper standard for political asylum 
determinations under GG, art. 16, with the proper standard for refugee 
determinations under AsylG § 3. Heusch et al., supra note 15, at 21. 
409. VG Berlin, 3 K 13.15 A, ¶ 27. 
410. Id. 
411. Id. ¶ 28. 
412. Id. (noting that the applicants’ personality and intellectual disposition 
determine the depth and nature of this investigation). 
413. Id. 
414. Id. ¶ 29. 
415. Id. ¶ 30. 
416. Id. ¶ 31. 
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because it offered support and care in all kinds of practical, non-
religious matters.417 
The court was not moved to change its mind by the fact that the 
Iranian male was familiar with the basic tenets of the Christian religion 
and that his pastor described him as a committed Christian.418 This was 
so because the court held that the prognosis of how the plaintiff’s rela-
tionship to his new faith will likely appear after his return to Iran was 
decisive. 419  Since the court did not gain the impression that the 
plaintiff’s religious identity will be limited in Iran—he conceded a 
willingness to adapt his ways of sharing his new beliefs to the legal con-
ditions in Iran and was not a leader in the German congregation—the 
court did not consider it particularly likely that he will have issues in 
Iran due to his activities in Germany.420 
c. Iranian Couple II Case 
In the 2013 Iranian Couple II Case,421 the administrative court in 
Schwerin overturned the BAMF’s rejection of an Iranian couple’s 
application for religiously motivated asylum.422  Unlike the adminis-
trative courts in the previous two decisions, the Schwerin administra-
tive court documented its extensive investigation into the political and 
human-rights conditions in Iran.423 
Based on these findings of fact, the court held that, since the wife 
was baptized in 2011, thereby converting to the Christian faith, her life 
and freedom would be in danger if she were removed to Iran.424 The 
court explained that there is a risk that the plaintiffs’ human rights will 
be severely limited because they must expect that they cannot practice 
their faith without interference and that they could be criminally perse-
cuted for apostasy which may result in the death penalty.425 Adopting 
the 2009 findings of the administrative appellate court in North-Rhine 
Westphalia, the court noted that currently also low-profile converts 
from Islam to Christianity are at risk who do no more than attend pub-
 
417. Id. 
418. Id. 
419. Id. 
420. Id. 
421. VG Schwerin, Feb. 13, 2013, 3 A 1877/10 As, https://openjur.de/u/ 
620085.print [https://perma.cc/L4RZ-F2TQ]. 
422. Id. ¶¶ 1, 35. 
423. See id. ¶¶ 36–70, 101–65 (analyzing a variety of government and non-
government sources). 
424. Id. ¶ 71. 
425. Id. ¶ 90. 
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lic religious rites.426 The court, therefore, did not think a reasonable 
person in the situation of Iranian Muslim converts to Christianity can 
be expected to return to Iran, if that convert wishes to practice his or 
her religion outside of house churches.427 The court did not find any evi-
dence that the plaintiffs’ conversion was done to be recognized as refu-
gees.428 Therefore, the court ordered the BAMF to award refugee status 
to this Iranian couple. 
Conclusion: Toward a More Just Adjudication of 
Refugee and Asylum Claims 
A. The Findings 
The international refugee definition that has been at the center of 
this Note has been described as “compris[ing] one holistic test of inter-
related elements” where the relationship and relative weight of these 
elements “necessarily falls to be determined on the facts of each 
individual case.”429 While this characterization threatens to negate the 
very existence of a meaningful, predictable test, this Note has demon-
strated that the U.S. and Germany agree on a number of elements when 
it comes to adjudicating asylum or refugee claims. 
Even absent an internationally binding definition of persecution, 
adjudicators in both countries recognize that persecution requires severe 
mistreatment—a requirement that may be met cumulatively—and that 
persecution may be inflicted by state and non-state actors. In order to 
gauge the severity of the threatened or actual mistreatment, both judi-
cial systems inquire into the importance of the sanctioned religious 
practice for the applicants. Both countries also embrace an objective 
concept of persecution, that is, they disregard the subjective motivation 
of agents of persecution. 
Adjudicators in both countries look for subjective and objective 
elements to establish a well-founded fear of persecution, and both coun-
tries agree on the basic contours of the objective prong. Both also rule 
out as asylum seekers or refugees those who cannot have a well-founded 
fear of persecution because they have reasonably within their reach an 
alternative to seeking surrogate protection abroad inside their countries 
of origin. 
Finally, decision-makers in the U.S. and Germany look for a nexus 
between the claimed protected characteristic and the persecutory 
conduct. 
 
426. Id. ¶¶ 92–96. 
427. Id. ¶ 97. 
428. Id. ¶¶ 166, 187–88. 
429. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 134, ¶ 3. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 3·2018 
Testing Religion 
1054 
But at the same time, this Note has also demonstrated that not 
only “the facts of each individual case” undermine the benefits of having 
a uniform international refugee definition in terms of assuring similar 
outcomes for similarly situated persons. Instead, the inherent vagueness 
of the definition creates a number of additional moveable parts that 
legislators and adjudicators in the U.S. and in Germany move about 
according to national legal precedent and broader procedural 
requirements. 
Facially, the main difference between the U.S. and the German 
asylum systems consists of the fact that asylum is a discretionary grant 
in the U.S., while it is an individual right in Germany. But the 
individual laws and regulations, as well as the review of administrative 
decisions by the courts in the U.S., show that this difference is not over-
ly significant in practice because once U.S. agencies find that applicants 
are eligible for asylum, their application is apparently rarely denied on 
a discretionary basis. Thus, in both countries the main hurdle for asy-
lum seekers or refugees is to establish that they are actually refugees 
within the meaning of the 1951 Convention. 
Regarding the practical application of the common international 
definition of “refugee,” a major fundamental procedural or evidentiary 
difference lies in the heightened standard of proof the German civil-law 
judiciary requires to establish anything, including the sincerity of an 
applicant’s conversion, while U.S. courts require the typical prepon-
derance of evidence standard for civil trials such as usual asylum cases. 
As for substantive law, there are a number of significant differences: 
Germany, unlike the U.S., recognizes non-state actors of protection—
e.g., international organizations—if they meet certain statutory require-
ments at the time a refugee-status claim is adjudicated. 
More importantly, Germany alters the subjective prong of the well-
founded fear analysis from an inquiry into the subjective genuineness 
of the applicants’ fear into an investigation into whether the religious 
conduct that is sanctioned in their country of origin is central to the 
individuals’ “religious identity.” As the German court cases demon-
strate, this inquiry is a very searching one that calls for a highly self-
reflective and established religiosity of the applicants. But as discussed 
above, this is an inquiry U.S. adjudicators expressly do not undertake, 
being satisfied instead with a bona-fide showing of sincerity of belief. 
They do, however, investigate the subjective importance of a sanctioned 
practice for the applicants when evaluating whether conduct rises to 
the level of persecution. 
As for nexus determinations, German law applies a standard that 
is more generous for applicants in that it only requires them to show 
that their religious identity, which is difficult to establish, is one reason 
for being persecuted among others. Current U.S. law, on the other hand, 
while it makes it relatively easy to establish “religion,” makes it harder 
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to prove nexus by requiring that “religion” be “one central reason” for 
persecution. 
In addition to these important legal differences that have the strong 
potential of resulting in dissimilar outcomes, the U.S. and Germany en-
joy relations with Iran that are quite different. One cannot help but 
notice that German courts seem to operate with a quite optimistic 
understanding of the situation Christians—including those who con-
verted abroad—face in Iran. This may be due to the fact that Germany, 
unlike the U.S., has diplomatic ties with Iran. While this does not make 
the Iranian government less secretive, it does allow for “official” 
German observers on the ground. This, in turn, leads German courts 
to rely less—or not at all—on reports produced by human-rights organ-
izations in their evaluation of the local situation. 
Comparing the pictures drawn by the U.S. Commission on Inter-
national Religious Freedom, the U.S. State Department, and German 
courts, it seems safe to say reports by human-rights organizations have 
a tendency to paint a bleaker picture of the situation in Iran than the 
diplomatic personnel of a government interested in maintaining reason-
able relations with Iran. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Iranian Couple II 
Case, discussed above as the only favorable German court decision, 
relied heavily on international sources to establish the situation in Iran. 
B. Toward a More Just Adjudication of Claims 
The primary purpose of recognizing asylum or refugee status is to 
provide meaningful surrogate protection against persecution in the ap-
plicants’ country of origin, not to provide some abstract right or entitle-
ment in the applicants’ host country. Thus, the assessment of the situ-
ation in that country is of the essence. It is equally evident that dif-
ferences in this assessment will result in different outcomes in asylum 
and refugee claims. 
The U.S. and Germany agree, at least in principle, that the poten-
tial persecutor’s view of the applicant at the time of adjudication should 
be determinative when adjudicating refugee and asylum claims. This 
approach is exemplified in the Bastanipour and Najafi decisions of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, discussed above. 
But this perspective does not always seem to win the day. In fact, 
beyond the shared understanding that persecutors may impute religious 
beliefs and practices to applicants, German courts either do not seem 
willing to take this perspective at all or appear to operate with an overly 
optimistic assessment of the situation faced by Christians in Iran. But 
focusing single-mindedly on the applicants’ “religious identity” might 
not capture their religious self-understanding and thus infringe on their 
religious liberty. More importantly, such focus also potentially adds 
nothing to establishing whether applicants will suffer persecution in 
Iran, since it is not immediately clear that potential persecutors in Iran 
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share this focus on a self-reflective and somewhat stable “religious iden-
tity” that satisfies some textbook definition of religion. 
In other words, to justify the “German” approach, it would have to 
be established that potential agents of persecution will engage in perse-
cution only if a sanctioned conduct is “central” to the victim’s religious 
self-understanding and identity. While this Note has demonstrated that  
apostasy is not a strict-liability offense but, at least in Islamic legal doc-
trine, is actually quite difficult to establish and has only rarely been 
invoked as a justification for punishment in Iran, it does not appear  
that Iranian judges, police officers, or other potential persecutors have 
adopted the German approach to evaluating a defendant’s “religious 
identity” before handing her over for punishment for apostasy or other 
severe mistreatment on account of religion. 
Without a doubt, there are many practical obstacles when evalu-
ating how an Iranian judge or another potential agent of persecution 
might view an idiosyncratic Christian convert returning from a Western 
nation or practicing her religion in a covert manner in Iran. But simply 
substituting familiar credibility evaluations for investigating how a po-
tential persecutor might view the applicant is inadequate. 
The outcomes of such an inquiry are not necessarily more beneficial 
for those seeking asylum or refuge in the U.S. or Germany: Such an in-
quiry may show that persecution is less likely in a particular case than 
otherwise assumed. Or it may show that it is more likely. Still, it is the 
right inquiry to undertake if the goal is the protection of those who 
otherwise might suffer severe harm. 
Generally speaking, German and U.S. adjudicators seem to look at 
two different countries when evaluating Iranian refugees’ applications 
for asylum and refugee status. This is not desirable because this dif-
ference in perspective is not what ultimately decides the fate of 
potential victims of persecution in Iran. It is also not desirable because 
it may encourage international forum shopping by those who can afford 
it. 
Therefore, adjudicators in both countries should base their decisions 
on the best available evidence on Iran which may cut either way. But 
adjudicators owe no less to those seeking refuge from persecution. This 
could be accomplished by relying on a broad spectrum of information 
sources to cancel out potential source bias, although, in the end, the 
trier of fact will consider all the evidence, including evidence regarding 
the situation in Iran, and make her own credibility determinations. But 
those overseeing triers of fact could lessen the burden of frontline 
adjudicators and ensure a more even adjudication by providing gen-
eralized country guidance that does not leave the individual trier of fact 
to make complex assessments, as this is already required, e.g., by the 
IRFA. 
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In view of the difficulty of obtaining similar outcomes for similarly 
situated applicants across two different legal systems, focusing on the 
treatment awaiting such applicants in their country of origin would be 
an important contribution toward such similar treatment. No less is 
demanded by justice. 
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